


THE  
MAHSUD-WAZIRI EXPEDITION  
OF  
1881.

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
*Diaries of Officers of the Quarter Master General's Department in India  
attached to the Mahsud-Waziri Expeditionary Force.*

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## PREFACE.

THE previous history of occurrences which led up to the sanction of an Expedition will be found clearly set forth in the correspondence printed and forwarded with Punjab Government, Military Department, No. 175 of 14th January 1881, to General

Kennedy,\* and more especially in Mr.

Young's (Secretary, Government, Punjab)


No. 2 of 3rd January 1881 to Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

\* This is the correspondence at pages 2 to 15.

J. DAVIDSON.







THE  
MAHSUD-WAZIRI EXPEDITION  
OF  
1881.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

No. 43, FEBRUARY 1881.

No. 2, dated Lahore, 3rd January 1881.

From—W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Your telegram of the 17th October asked for an expression of the opinion of the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor as to the measures to be taken to effect a settlement of our rupture with the Mahsud-Waziris, who have been under blockade since the raid in which Tank was plundered and burnt in January 1879; and in case a military expedition were still recommended, you enquired what force it was proposed to employ, and what plan of operations would be pursued. My telegram, in reply, stated briefly the reasons for which His Honor recommended that active measures should, for the present, be

Commissioner, Derajat's No. 453,  
dated 16th October, with enclosure.

deferred; and I am now to submit, with the correspondence marginally noted, a fuller expression of the views of Sir Robert Egerton as to the

terms imposed, and the measures by which compliance with such demands can be secured.

2. In order, however, to place the subject completely before the Government of India, it will be convenient to review briefly the history of our relations with the Mahsuds up to 1879, the political position of the tribe at that time, and their conduct since, and, finally, to discuss their present attitude as bearing on the question of the likelihood of obtaining without recourse to exceptional means that full and adequate reparation which the Government of India have themselves declared to be necessary.

3. The Mahsuds, a clan of the great Waziri tribe, who march with the border of the Derajat, have their homes in the Northern Suliman hills between the Tochee and Gumal rivers, where the Gubber and Pir Ghal mountains

look toward the plains of Tank, Marwat, and Bannu. They are generally divided into three branches: the Alizai, numbering some 5,505; the Shahman Khel, 2,200; and the Bahlolzai, 5,000 fighting men. Notorious as the boldest of robbers, they are more worthily admired for the courage which they show in attack and in hand-to-hand fighting with the sword. From the early days of our rule in the Punjab few tribes on the frontier have given greater or more continuous trouble, and none have been more daring or more persistent in disturbing the peace of British territory.

It is no exaggeration to say that, for the first twenty years after annexation, not a month passed without some serious crime, cattle-lifting, or robbery, accompanied by murder, being committed by armed bands of marauders from the Mahsud hills; till finally, emboldened by years of impunity, a large body, 3,000 strong, assembled and marched down to sack Tank, an important town on the border of the Dera Ismail Khan district. The gallantry and good tactics of the native officer commanding the cavalry of the outpost saved Tank from destruction, and the Waziri rabble, enticed on to the plain by a feigned retreat, were charged, broken, and driven up the mountain passes in confusion. To punish the misbehaviour of a whole generation, a force under General Sir Neville Chamberlain entered the Waziri country in March 1860. It is unnecessary to follow the details of this expedition, the history of which belongs to the annals of the Punjab Frontier Force; it is sufficient to record that the Waziris were defeated in two severe engagements, at Palosin and Barara-Tangi. Their entire territory was visited and surveyed. Kanigoram, the nominal capital occupied by Urmurs, less culpable than the Waziris, was spared only on payment of a fine; but Makia and many other Waziri settlements were destroyed and burnt.

4. Severe as was the punishment and humiliation thus inflicted, the Mahsuds at first would come to no terms. A year passed before they were sufficiently humbled to open negotiations, in consequence of which each of the three sections, Alizai, Bahlolzai, and Shahman Khel, engaged in June 1861 to be responsible for the conduct of its own members, and all gave hostages for good behaviour. These promises, however, were no sooner made than broken, and the Mahsuds again fell back to their habits of plunder and murder. Not a year passed but some or all of their clans were under blockade for serious offences committed in Tank. Attempts to enlist them in the defence of the border, and to induce them to cultivate lands in the plains, were fruitless and unsuccessful, and in the ten years ending with 1872 twenty murders and more than 500 cases of raids, highway-robbery, and burglary lay to their charge. About this time, however, the capture of several marauding parties furnished a certain hold over the tribe, which had begun to feel the pressure of a stern blockade and of want of access to British territory. Strenuous efforts were made by the local authorities to win them over to a better understanding, and to place our relations with them on a better footing. The result was a settlement effected by Major Macaulay with the Shahman Khel in 1873 on the basis of the surrender of twenty men of note as hostages, payment of a fine of Rs. 3,000, and engagements for future good conduct. The opposition of the Shingis, a small but influential section, delayed a similar understanding with the Bahlolzai, but one was finally arranged in the year following, 30 hostages being taken and payments enforced of a sum of Rs. 10,000 by way of fine and compensation. These proceedings and the negotiations which led to them were described in my predecessor's letters Nos. 1518, dated 10th November 1873, and 1326, dated 3rd August 1874.



5. But the experience of the past had shown that the peculiarity of the political position of Tank under a Nawab in whose hands were vested not only the direct management of our relations with the Mahsuds, but also all powers of police and magisterial jurisdiction, was both a source of weakness in repelling raids and a fruitful cause of complications with the restless Mahsuds. The Katti Khel family of the Nawabs of Tank was connected by marriage with the Alizai clan, which had ordinarily been exempt from blockade as less criminal than the Shahman Khel and Bahlolzai, and utilised its admission to free intercourse with British territory in supplying the wants of its proscribed brethren. It was found, too, that misapprehensions were fomented, and the wishes and views of Government distorted by the jealousies of factions within our border, and that such misunderstandings with the credulous and excitable Mahsuds could not be removed as long as our intercourse with the tribe was indirect and conducted through a chief whose supposed interests lay in fomenting rather than allaying excitement on the border. With a view, therefore, to bring the administration of Tank into harmony with the vigorous rule of British territory,—to secure to the inhabitants a greater measure of protection from savage neighbours, whose raids had cowed and impoverished them for years, and to bring the Mahsuds into closer and more direct relations with ourselves,—in 1875, at the recommendation of Sir Henry Davies, then Lieutenant-Governor of this Province, the Supreme Government sanctioned the withdrawal from the Nawab of his executive and police jurisdiction. Tank was thenceforth amalgamated in all respects with the district of Dera Ismail Khan, and regular police posts were established at Gumal, Tank, and Mullazai. About the same time another measure, which had long occupied the attention of the local Government, and added greatly to the safety of this border, was brought to a successful termination. In the year 1876, as reported in my predecessor's letter No. 970, dated the 5th of June, the Bhattannis, a tribe lying on the immediate border from the Baindarra range to the Girni, interposed between us and the Mahsuds of the higher hills, and in command of the ravines, by which alone Waziri robbers could raid on the plains, undertook the duty of watch and ward of all passes on the frontier from Marwat to the south of Tank. A militia force was enlisted from among them to hold selected posts, the higher appointments being in the nomination of the headmen; and in return the Bhattannis accepted fully the principle of responsibility for all plunder carried off by their passes, and for furnishing information of the movements of marauding parties too powerful to be opposed. Similar arrangements were made with this tribe on the Bannu border northward, and with the Mianis and Ghorizais on the skirt of the Gumal valley.

6. These measures, the introduction of a strong police administration in Tank, the enforcement of the responsibility of sections commanding the passes by which ravines from the Gubber and Suliman hills debouch into the plains of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, had a striking effect in curtailing the power of the Mahsuds for mischief, and the establishment of direct relations with them, independent of all go-betweens, lessened the chances of friction and political complications. The change introduced in the management of Tank was followed by the Nawab's withdrawal to Lahore, and for a considerable time the faction in the hills devoted to him, and anxious for a return of the old *régime*, strained every nerve to promote disturbances and crime in British territory. Umar Khan and Yarak, the leaders of this party, visited Kabul in 1876 to ask the assistance of the Amir in reinstating the Nawab in his territory; and the following year saw them again at Kabul

with the same object. Their partisans meanwhile were working hard to excite offences in Tank, in the hope that continual trouble might lead to the restoration of the system that had passed away. In spite of several cold-blooded murders committed without any other object than that just mentioned, a striking improvement was soon seen in the general behaviour of the tribe and the peace and safety of the villagers in the Tank ilaka. Detailed statistics were given in my predecessor's letter No. 262C. of the 9th July 1878, which it is unnecessary to repeat here. It is sufficient to remark that, whereas in 1873 the Mahsuds were guilty of 68 serious offences, the average of the four following years was 23, and in 1878 they were implicated in one murder and six cases only of theft and robbery, for which full redress was at once procured. The policy thus inaugurated was further tested and its success demonstrated by the result of negotiations for the recovery of a Hindu child kidnapped from Kot Nasran by a band of robbers belonging to the party of Umar Khan. For ordinary crimes it may be easy to obtain satisfaction by seizures and reprisals on the offending clan in British territory; but in this case our hold over the tribe had to be tested by the demand of specific redress. A blockade was enforced against the whole tribe without distinction of clans, and with the energetic co-operation of the Bhattanis, whose passes were strictly closed to all Mahsuds, the pressure of want was soon felt among the tribe at large. The offenders, fearing that the clansmen would take the law into their own hands, surrendered the child to Ahmadi, till now ringleader of the opposition, to the British Government; and, finally, he, with Umar Khan, Alizai, and the leading Shaman Khel chiefs, formally surrendered their prisoner to the British authorities, laid down their arms, and made full submission. Thus was established the important principle of dealing with the tribe as a whole, and making all generally responsible for the misdeeds of the members of any subdivision. Before this the system attempted in 1861 of dealing separately with the three clans, Alizai, Shaman Khel, and Bahlolzai, had been worked with but indifferent success, and with the result that all traded in British territory and had access to our markets under the name of Alizai, while all raided on British villages in the names of the proscribed sections. During the six months that the Mahsuds were under blockade for the offence last mentioned, from August 1877 to February 1878, not a single crime was recorded against the tribe; and this satisfactory state of things continued till the end of 1878, during which year the plains of Tank, formerly never at rest from Mahsud outrages, enjoyed an unexampled security of life and property.

7. This peace was rudely broken by the great raid on Tank committed by a band of about 3,000 Mahsuds on the 1st January 1879. It is unnecessary to describe the incidents of this audacious act of war, which were narrated in detail in my predecessor's letter No. 661 of the 15th March 1879, as they will be fresh within the recollection of the Supreme Government. Suffice it to say that, though no certain intelligence of the imminence of any such outbreak had been received, rumours were current of a restlessness in the hills consequent on the intrigues of Umar Khan, lately returned from a third visit to Kabul. The posts of Girni and Zam were reinforced, and half the available strength of the Dera Ismail Khan garrison was located in the Tank valley, and the villagers and Bhattanni posts in the passes warned to be on the alert. The Bhattannis, however, failed to offer any resistance, and the military detachment at Zam made no attempt to confront the incursion. The Mahsuds advanced upon Tank unopposed, burnt the bazar and a large

portion of the town, and, with all the property on which they could lay hands, regained their hills in safety. No such audacious raid had been perpetrated since 1860, when, as related above, a large rabble led by Jangi Khan, father of Umar Khan, descended in the hope of surprising Tank, but were frustrated and driven back with loss by the energy and gallantry shown by the rsesaldar in command of the detachment at Zam. It is unnecessary to dwell on the enormity of this last outbreak,—a gross and open violation of British territory, in which one of the largest towns of a British district was sacked and burnt. The flame thus lighted spread far and wide over the Tank valley on the skirts of the hills—a signal for general disorder: it roused the trading clans of Powindahs, then camped in large numbers on the plains of Dera Ismail Khan, and even Mianis and Gorizais, small sections of British subjects on the Gumal frontier, availed themselves of a time of confusion to plunder and destroy several border villages. On the 2nd January the Zalli Khel Waziris, an isolated section of the Ahmedzai, distinct from the Mahsuds, aided by Mianis and Powindahs, pillaged the Gumal bazar and partially burnt the Jatta police station. The Government of India are fully aware of the punishment which has been inflicted on all tribes, save the Mahsuds, implicated by active aggression or passive connivance in these disturbances. A large party of Suliman Khel Powindahs, refusing to surrender stolen property known to be with them, were attacked by a small detachment of cavalry and infantry under Captains Shepherd and Gowan, and 70 of their number killed; further, the sum of nearly Rs. 60,000 has been levied as fine and compensation from the Powindahs, whose settlements the necessities of trade placed within our grasp. The Bhittannis have been punished by the resumption of their lucrative service in the border militia and by a fine of Rs. 10,000; the ringleaders of the Mianis and Ghorizais were captured and sentenced by the ordinary tribunals of law to long periods of imprisonment; from the former, too, a fine of Rs. 3,000 has been levied, and an allowance of Rs. 2,000 for service in the Murtaza post has been withheld. The Mahsuds alone, the principal offenders, have hitherto escaped with impunity, save from such distress as a rigorously enforced blockade may inflict.

8. Before considering the terms to be imposed, or the means which must be employed to enforce compliance, I am to make some remarks on the causes of this raid, and the position then held by the tribe with regard to the British Government.

For some years before the attitude of Amir Sher Ali Khan had been hostile, and his emissaries busy in sowing disaffection and preaching the crusade among all frontier tribes, from the hills of Kaghan northward through Swat and Bajour to the southern limits of the Suliman range. Not only chiefs discontented with their position and eager for any change, but all who had embroiled themselves with the British—outlaws and obscure murderers—were encouraged to visit Kabul, where they were honourably received and dismissed with rewards. But it was then also a time of special excitement; war had broken out with Afghanistan, and, in spite of the victories of Ali Masjid and the Peiwar, rumours of a defeat of British troops or of Russian interference, fantastic enough, but such as find easy assent with the credulous Pathan, were industriously circulated, and assisted the preaching of fanatical mullas in determining an outbreak of the restless and excitable Waziris. At such a time of popular excitement Umar Khan returned from a third visit to Kabul, whence he had been dismissed with orders to foment trouble on the Derajat border. An exhaustive inquiry,



which has already been reported at great length to the Government of India in the papers submitted with my predecessor's letter No. 460, dated the 22nd February 1879, failed to disclose any deeper motive for this outburst of hostility than the intrigues of Umar Khan and his party, acting on the fanaticism and avarice of a tribe then raised to an uncontrollable pitch by the preaching of bigots and the stirring influence of a season of war. But though their misconduct may be traced to an original impulse from the Amir, against whom we were then in open arms, the Mahsuds cannot palliate or excuse the offence as an act of legitimate hostility against a power which had invaded Afghanistan. Nothing is more certain than that they have never at any time owed allegiance or paid homage to the Amir; their entire independence had been their pride, and the visits of their headmen to Kabul were not those of subjects to their suzerain, but inspired by greed of rewards, with which all were honoured who could boast of having thwarted the British Government or murdered its subjects. But, while thus free of all political dependence on Kabul by the agreements described above, they had entered into distinct engagements with us such as would have been made with no tribe subordinate to any foreign ruler. Their country was not menaced by British troops, and their act cannot be regarded as a part and parcel of the national opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan, with which kingdom the Waziri hills have no political connection. In the opinion of the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor it must be held to have been an unprovoked and unjustifiable invasion of British territory, from mere love of plunder and bloodshed; nor have the Mahsuds themselves attempted to excuse or defend it on any ground whatever, save as a rash and thoughtless act, for which they ask forgiveness with a show of humility, though slow to offer the reparation demanded.

9. The damage inflicted in the raid on Tank was estimated at Rs. 63,000; but ere long, as reported in the correspondence forwarded with my letter No. 410, dated the 20th February 1879, the Mahsuds again assembled in large numbers near Jundola, threatening to descend by the Zam; and finally, on the 19th January, large bands of marauders attacked and partially looted the villages of Aspari, Kot Ket, and Tajauri in the neighbourhood of Kot Nasran, which were only saved from entire destruction by detachments of regular troops. A small force, under Colonel Rynd, attempted unsuccessfully to cut off the Mahsuds, who succeeded in making good their escape by the Tank Zam. The further damage here caused amounted to about Rs. 4,960.

\* Proceedings, 4A., May 1879.

Your letter No. 1288 E.P.\* of the 26th April 1879, in conveying the orders of the Governor General in Council as to the terms to be demanded from the Mahsuds, stated that His Excellency had no desire that the tribes should be treated with undue leniency on account of the fact that a military expedition against them might now be inconvenient; "the terms, therefore, should now be such as His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor considered adequate." Accordingly, after taking the opinion of the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, the terms proposed by Sir R. Egerton in my No. 298C., dated the 25th June 1879, and sanctioned in your No. 1852 of the 15th July, were as follows:—

*First*, the surrender of all property plundered, or payment of compensation assessed at Rs. 67,000.

*Second*, the payment of a fine of Rs. 30,000.



*Third*, surrender of six headmen, ringleaders in the disturbance of January, *viz.*, Umar Khan, Yarak, and Matin (Alizai), Bozak, Uzmat, and Mushak (Bahlolzai).

10. Since the raids, which formed part of the great rising, the Mahsuds have not ceased from continued aggression on the Tank border, and there has not been a month of the past year or of that now drawing to a close but witnessed some serious offence committed by their marauding bands. A list, compiled by the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, which forms an enclosure to this letter, gives a detail of the later offences with which the Mahsuds are charged, showing that, besides the more audacious incursions of January in the year 1879, they were guilty of five serious cases of murder and armed robbery, fourteen of cattle-lifting, and three attempts, happily frustrated by the border militia and the energetic pursuit of villagers. In the same year, too, an attack in force was made upon Gumal, but repulsed by the villagers with some loss. In the beginning of the present year, as reported in my letter No. 734 of the 29th April, a large band, collected by the preaching of Mulla Adhkar, a bigot exercising great influence over all clans and sections of the Waziris from Kurram to Makin, again attempted an attack on Gumal, and their plan was only rendered abortive by the despatch of timely reinforcements to the Jatta, Manghi, and Murtaza posts. In addition to this gross violation of British territory, up to the end of the month of August the Mahsuds had been guilty of four serious cases of robbery and murder, sixteen of cattle-lifting, and three attempts of similar crimes. The statement below shows the total value of property destroyed or carried off, and of compensation awarded as blood-money in the usual way, together with the amount recovered and the balance for which reparation has now to be exacted, amounting to Rs. 72,917 :—

Year.	Total amount of loss, including blood-money.			Recovered and redressed.			Balance unredressed.	Remarks.
	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs. A. P.	
1879	...	71,972	2 0	1,823	12 0	70,143	6 0	For 3 months only.
1880	...	3,978	13 0	1,175	0 0	2,803	13 0	
Total	...	75,950	15 0	3,003	12 0	72,947	3 0	

With this statement it is instructive to compare the statistics for 1878, which show only one murder, six petty thefts and robberies of property valued at Rs. 1,200, for which full redress was recovered within the year. Further, the Mahsuds have been concerned in several outrages on the roads from Thal to Kurram and Bannu, among which it is only necessary here to refer to (1)

(1) No. 889, dated 28th May 1880.

(2) No. 888, dated 2nd May 1880.

(3) No. 215S., dated 22nd July 1880.

the raid on the 3rd April on the Khuttak labourers camped near Thal, (2) the attack on a Turi encampment on the night of the 25th April, and (3) the raid on the Chappari post on 1st May 1880, which were reported to the Government of India in the letters marginally noted.

11. Since the blockade was enforced, the general attitude of the tribe, as described in the reports of the local Political officers which have been forwarded from time to time to the Government of India, appears to have been one of outward show of humility and desire to make terms, and at various times petitions to be forgiven and received once more into favour have been presented by jirgas or bodies of the headmen of different sections; but the tribe, as a whole, have as yet displayed no inclination to take active steps towards making the reparation required by the British Government. In April 1879 a large party of Mahsuds were seized in the Bannu district, and 160 of their number—the men of better position and standing—have since been detained. On the 11th of the same month the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan reported that seventy leading families of the Shahman Khel and Alizai Mahsuds had surrendered themselves unconditionally to Government. As it was impolitic to treat with anything but a full jirga of the tribe, a few of the principal men only were detained and the rest sent back to their hills, to endeavour to effect such agreement as would lead to compliance with the conditions of punishment imposed. On 30th October 1879, as reported in my predecessor's letter No. 1755 of the 12th November, the Deputy Commissioner recorded that the attitude of the Mahsuds was unchanged; that, pressed by the severity of the blockade and the inconvenience of being debarred from British territory, they would be glad to make peace if the condition involving surrender of their headmen were waived. Shortly before this Umar Khan had again visited Kabul to ask for the Amir's intercession, and returned thence in time to witness the British victory at Charasia.

12. In paragraph 27 of my predecessor's letter No. 661, dated 16th March 1879, were detailed the reasons which led His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor to recommend that the surrender of certain chiefs of the tribe should be insisted on as a condition of peace, and Sir Robert Egerton still adheres to the opinion there expressed. Although the Waziri tribe is remarkable for its comparative internal union, and the value which it sets on the life and honour of all members of the clan, yet with the precedent of 1859, when after the Kabul Khel expedition the Ahmedzai Waziris themselves arrested and brought in from a distant village in Dour Muhabbat Khan, the murderer of Captain Mechem, it is possible that even this demand may be complied with, should it become evident to the tribe that the British Government are determined to exact severe and heavy penalties. The Lieutenant-Governor, however, believes that a military expedition alone will reduce the Mahsuds to such straits as will incline them to listen to a demand for the surrender, not of one unknown murderer, but of six leading headmen, who have for years past been identified with what must always be the popular side, whether in success or defeat—the faction which heads the opposition to the authority of the great and settled Government, whose strong rule alone curbs the hereditary instincts of these wild tribes to prey on the rich plains at the foot of their hills.

It has already been noticed that the expedition of 1860 failed to secure immediate compliance with the demands then made on the tribe. Their stubborn and haughty refusal to make formal submission is not a matter for wonder when it is remembered that from the earliest days of their settlement in the hills and valleys round Kanigoram, no power, whether of Kabul or Delhi, had succeeded in penetrating their fastnesses; they doubted the power of our troops to force the rugged defiles leading to their homes, and even when the flames of Makin and the destruction of their homesteads showed them that the age had passed when they could harry with impunity the plains of

Tank and Bannu, they appear to have felt that the expedition had done its worst, and would withdraw whether they made formal submission or not. They have now, however, before them not only the experience of 1860, but the lessons of the late war in Afghanistan. Though personally courageous and adepts in hill-fighting, they are ill-armed, and know that the most formidable tribes in Afghanistan have failed before the superior discipline and weapons of the British troops. The knowledge of the hopelessness of the struggle may tend to shorten it, but the Lieutenant-Governor can find no reason to hope that the Mahsuds will accept terms imposed until they see that Government is determined to enforce them by the only means which appear firm enough to compel full submission.

13. The question of the punishment of the Zalli Khel section of the Ahmedzai Waziris for their raid on the 2nd January 1879 on Gumal need not here be discussed. A large convoy belonging to this tribe fell into our hands near Girni on the 4th January 1879; and on the 27th January of the present year, as reported in the papers forwarded with letter No. 437 of the 26th February 1880, a large capture of cattle belonging to the Zalli Khel was effected by the Deputy Commissioner with cavalry from the Kot Kirghi, Jatta, and Manjhi posts, and the value of the property thus secured is nearly equal to the amount of the fine and compensation which has been demanded from this tribe.

14. The Government of India have themselves on more than one occasion expressed their sense of the necessity of inflicting on the refractory Mahsuds a punishment severe in proportion to the enormity of their offence; and though, owing to the causes to which it is unnecessary here to refer, active measures for the enforcement of the terms sanctioned by His Excellency in Council have had to be deferred, the same necessity for vindicating the power of the British Government to protect its own subjects and punish violations of its territory yet exists in full force. The gradual improvement in the behaviour of the Mahsuds up to the end of 1878 has been described above. The causes which led to the rising of January 1879 were abnormal, and require the use of special means to repair the mischief that has been done; and there seems no reason to doubt that if the Mahsuds are once compelled to make full submission, and a satisfactory settlement is effected with them, the peace and security of the Dera Ismail Khan border will hereafter be no less remarkable than it was in the years immediately preceding this outbreak.

15. A further communication will be made to you by the Military Department of this Government on the strength and composition of the force recommended and the plan of operations proposed in the event of an expedition being sanctioned by His Excellency in Council.

(Confidential.)

No. 7, dated Camp Dera Ismail Khan, 5th February 1881.

From—BRIGD.-GENL. T. G. KENNEDY, C.B., Commanding Punjab Frontier Force,  
To—The Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Military Department.

In reply to your No. 175 of the 14th ultimo, forwarding copy of a letter\* on the subject of the misdeeds of the Mahsud-Waziris in and since January 1879, and calling for my opinion on the 15th paragraph of that letter, relating to the strength

\* No. 2, dated 3rd January 1881, from the Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.



and composition of the force and the plan of operations proposed in the event of an expedition being sanctioned, I have the honor to report that my plan would be to collect the force at Bannu, and march on 1st April, *via* the Khisora pass, on Makin, and, if necessary, on Kanigoram; at each place demanding fulfilment of the Government terms, and, failing compliance therewith, inflicting such punishment on those towns and the crops on or near the line of march as Government may direct.

From Kanigoram I would prefer returning to Bannu by the way I went, if I can be empowered to assure the Mahsuds that similar expeditions would be made yearly until the Government terms are satisfied in full, and that between such expeditions their strict blockade would be maintained.

Such yearly visitations, varying in their points of entry and exit, would benefit us in the knowledge we should gain of the entire Mahsud country, and would certainly reduce even a more unmanageable tribe than the Mahsuds to thorough submission.

The visits would, I think, from the fact that they need not last more than a month on each occasion, prove less expensive than what, in my opinion, is the only other plan of obtaining the stated terms in full, namely, a protracted stay in their country, the necessary duration of which it is impossible to foresee, because keeping open the communications and the escort for the supplies for the column of occupation would employ as many troops as those constituting the column itself.

2. If I may not threaten these yearly expeditions, I would from Kanigoram, in consultation with the Commissioner of the Derajat regarding supplies and the direct line from Kanigoram into the Shahor valley, past Umar Khan's fort and across *via* the Gumal pass on to the Dera Ismail Khan frontier, explore that line; but the weather will be hot then, and the work can hardly be so leisurely done as it would be if another expedition were next year sanctioned to enter the Gumal pass, cross over into Shahor, and back down the Zam to Tank.

3. In regard to the force required for my plan, I think it should consist of 12 mountain guns, 300 cavalry, 3,800 infantry including 300 Muzbi pioneers, 1 company sappers, engineer and survey officers.

I consider Muzbi pioneers very necessary, as roads for laden animals have frequently to be made, and elaborate irrigation arrangements may have to be destroyed, and the sappers will require additional help by men who will not, when hardworked in this way, be employed on other duties. I can provide myself with an officer for the duties of the Quartermaster General's department, also with a Principal Medical Officer to superintend all the details of his department; and I hope to be able to arrange in the Punjab Frontier Force for signallers, but if I cannot, I will submit my requirements in this respect.

4. I submit a statement of how, in my opinion, a force of this strength may be collected, and I attach extracts from General Sir Neville Chamberlain's despatch of the former expedition in 1860 against the Mahsuds in support of—

- (a) the time of year I name for the starting of the expedition;
- (b) my reasons for selecting the route named;
- (c) the numerous and varied duties that, in my opinion, necessitate a force of the strength named;

- (d) the reasons why camp equipage and baggage, and consequently carriage (all of which shall be closely supervised), cannot be reduced to what might be considered sufficient ordinarily for a spring campaign, as I consider it better to carry shelter and clothing than to have to carry sick men, and so to reduce the fighting strength.

5. Perhaps it will suffice to add in this report that, with the information in my office of the previous expedition and my own recollection of it (for I was present in it), I hope to be able to arrange all details to the satisfaction of Government; and to do so thoroughly, I would only ask that I may receive the earliest information if the expedition is sanctioned.

*Statement showing how the proposed Force may be raised.*

12 Mountain Guns.

- 6 from Dera Ismail Khan, leaving none at that station until the battery now at Lundi Kotal arrives. Its destination in ordinary relief is Dera Ismail Khan.
- 3 from Edwardesabad, leaving 3 guns there, but with an insufficient number of men to man them owing to furlough being open; but I do not think this would matter for the time the expedition lasts. If it is thought otherwise, the furlough men might be recalled during that period.
- 3 from Lundi Kotal if the battery has returned thence, otherwise from Kohat, leaving 3 guns at Kohat, but insufficiently manned owing to absentees on furlough. If necessary, the furlough men might be recalled, but I would beg that they may not be so, but that 3 guns be sent from the British mountain battery near Murree, if it is essential to replace the guns I propose taking from Kohat.

*N.B.*—If the Lundi Kotal battery has rejoined my command, it would, after giving 3 guns for the expedition, proceed on to Dera Ismail Khan with only 3 insufficiently manned guns, as it is proposed to grant the battery its furlough on its reporting itself to my command; but I think Dera Ismail Khan may be left without guns during the period of the expedition.

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Total 12 guns.

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300 Cavalry.

- 100 of 1st Punjab Cavalry from Dera Ismail Khan, replacing them by 100 of 2nd Punjab Cavalry from Dera Ghazi Khan.
- 200 of 4th Punjab Cavalry from Edwardesabad, replacing them by 100 of 3rd Punjab Cavalry from Kohat.

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Total 300 Cavalry.

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3,800 Infantry, *i.e.*, Rifles, exclusive of Native Officers.

- 1,000 from Kohat, namely 500 of 1st Punjab Infantry and 500 of 6th Punjab Infantry, relieving them from Rawalpindi.

(*N.B.*—The 5th Punjab Infantry would remain at Kohat.)

1,000 from Edwardesabad, namely, 500 of 2nd Punjab Infantry and 500 of 4th Punjab Infantry, relieving them by 600 men from Talagang and Jhelum.

1,000 from Dera Ismail Khan, namely, 500 of 4th Sikh Infantry and 500 of 3rd Punjab Infantry, relieving them by 500 of the 2nd Sikh Infantry from Dera Ghazi Khan (requiring no relief there) to hold all the Dera Ismail Khan posts with their head-quarters at Tank, and, if necessary, 300 men from Mooltan for Dera Ismail Khan itself.

500 from Abbottabad of 1st Sikh Infantry, requiring no relief there, or, if considered necessary, to be relieved by a detachment from Rawalpindi, or Murree, or the Gullies.

300 Muzbi pioneers from Rawalpindi, Lahore or Peshawar.

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Total 3,800 Infantry.

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60 Sappers,	} As may be directed.
Engineer officers,	
Survey officers,	

In this statement I have selected regiments, firstly, that have not seen active service in the late campaign; secondly, that only served in its first phase; and lastly, with reference to some of the batteries and to the Muzbis where it was unavoidable.

The 1st Punjab Cavalry is chosen, although it served through both phases of that war, to give it a zest in the blockade in which it is engaged by its being stationed on the Dera Ismail Khan frontier. And in fixing the contribution of each battery and regiment, I hope to avoid the necessity for recalling men from furlough for the expedition, except in the cases of those batteries and regiments that have enjoyed leave during 1879 and 1880; for I am quite sure that the liberal grant of furlough being now enjoyed by those who were recalled from their homes (some of them four times) before going to Afghanistan and then were two years without leave should be tampered with as little as possible.

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Extract from GENERAL CHAMBERLAIN'S despatch, referred to in paragraph 3.

*A. Time of year.*—Showing that the crops were available for the animals of the force.

Para. 86.—On the bleak heights of Razmak (12th May) the stunted wheat was struggling into ear, but as we descended every few miles brought its change of climate, until at Dua Wurka (16th May) we found the Ahmedzais thrashing out their corn.

*B. Proposed route.*—It will be remembered that General Chamberlain marched up the Tank Zam and down the Khisora pass.

Para. 87.—The Khisora and Tank Zam are much of the same character, but the former offers far less natural obstacles and is greatly t

be preferred. \* \* \* \* \* In short, should it ever again be necessary to visit the head of the Mahsud country, this route should be followed.

*C.—The duties necessitating a strong force—*

Para. 88. \* \* \* \* \* The shortest marches took hours to perform. The safety of our followers, supplies, and baggage required the heights on both sides to be crowned and held until the arrival of the rear guard. Though starting by sunrise, it was generally noon, and often later, before the new ground was reached. Arrived there, the pickets had to be posted and escorts for the surveyors, cattle, and foragers to be supplied. In the afternoon fatigue parties to be turned out to construct breastworks for the night pickets. \* \* \* \* \* Near sunset from 700 to 1,000 men occupied these works, \* \* \* \* \* and, in addition to inlying pickets, half the men slept accoutred, and the whole in uniform.

*D. Necessary precautions against rain and cold—*

Para. 65.—Height of camp was fixed at 6,700 feet (at Kanigoram).

Para. 68.—Rain fell and the nights were very cold. The men had blankets and greatcoats, but fever and diarrhoea were sending numbers into hospital.

Para. 79.—Razmak is 7,300 feet.

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Telegram, dated 14th February 1881.

From—Dera Ismail Khan,  
From—Brigadier-General KENNEDY.

To—Phillour.  
To—Colonel BLACK.

Dik (14th) February. My telegrams of 12th. Major Macaulay inclines to first visiting important men's residence rather than important places, and this can best be done from Tank; so please interline my report that my plan would either be to follow General Chamberlain's route, or to collect the force at Bannu, &c. The route may be decided hereafter without harm from a little delay; but if the strength and details and all proposals for the expedition are sanctioned, most of its arrangements might be very advantageously commenced upon at once.

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No. 100-739, dated 24th February 1881.

From—Colonel S. BLACK, Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Military Dept.,  
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I am desired by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor to forward the accompanying copy of Brigadier-General Kennedy's letter No. 7, dated 5th instant, and map and telegram dated 14th idem, submitting a plan of operations in the event of a punitive expedition against the Mahsud-Waziris being sanctioned.

2. At the same time I submit a copy of a letter No. 2, dated 3rd January last, written under His Honour's directions, to the Foreign Department of the Government of India, reviewing our political relations with this tribe,



detailing the several offences committed by them up to the present time, and stating the means of securing full reparation for their past misconduct, and some guarantee for future tranquillity on this part of our border.

In this communication His Honour has expressed his opinion that the Mahsuds should be brought to terms by military force. He thinks that no other course will be effectual, and that, although he regrets the necessity of invading the territory of any of our border neighbours, it becomes absolutely necessary to undertake these punitive expeditions when all other measures fail in securing the safety of the lives and property of our own subjects.

3. The terms which Sir Robert Egerton thinks should be demanded from the Mahsuds have been detailed in the letter above quoted, and have been approved by the Government of India in their Foreign Department letter No. 1862, dated 15th July 1879.

They are as follows :—

*1st.*—The surrender of all property plundered, or payment of compensation assessed at Rs. 67,000.

*2nd.*—The payment of a fine of Rs. 30,000.

*3rd.*—The surrender of 6 headmen, ringleaders in the disturbance of January 1879,—Umar Khan and 5 others.

4. The above terms, and the reasons which compel the Government of India to have recourse to coercive measures, will be fully and clearly proclaimed to the Mahsud tribe, in order that an opportunity may be afforded to them of complying with the demands of Government without bloodshed; but if they decline to submit, the measure of punishment must be dealt out to them as vigorously and as expeditiously as possible. The officer in command of the force should, in His Honour's opinion, be instructed to destroy all forts of the headmen, to blow up all towers, seize property, to use the standing crops for the maintenance of the animals attached to his force. It may further be necessary to destroy certain villages and crops, in order to inflict loss upon the enemy, and thus induce them to submit. In these matters a wide discretion must be left to the General and Political Officer. His Honour would here observe that these punitive expeditions do not require us to proceed with so much elaboration in arrangement as would be necessary in proceeding against an enemy with regular troops. The Waziris are, like most of the Pathan tribes, warlike by instinct, and know how to make the most of the advantages which their hills afford for defence, but they are badly armed and cannot stand against a well-organised force. It seems therefore quite unnecessary to provide supports at the base of operations, or to require the General in command to keep open communications to his rear. Such measures, though they may be quite in accordance with sound military tactics, and may on some occasions be very necessary, are not in expeditions of this nature considered by His Honour to be necessary. In dealing with these border tribes, His Honour admits the necessity of caution, and that the General should possess some knowledge of the tribe to be punished; but he thinks that when the tribe is small in numbers, is badly armed, or in other respects comparatively insignificant, a march through the country of an offending tribe should be but the ordinary work of our Frontier Force, who, men and officers, would be improved by the experience gained, and would be performing duty very much resembling the police operations and the execution of sentences of a Judicial Court in our own more settled provinces.



5. Brigadier-General Kennedy has proposed to use a force, strength as per margin, to carry out the wishes of Government, and the Lieutenant-Governor considers that this is sufficient. The Mahsuds (or properly Masa'uds) number about 14,000 fighting men. They are armed now, as they were in 1860, with matchlocks and other weapons of a similar kind; there is a complete absence of arms of precision amongst them, and they are not likely to be assisted by other sections of Waziris. On the other hand, our troops are armed with breechloading rifles, which they did not possess in the expedition under Brigadier-General Chamberlain in 1860, and it may safely be said that the effective force of our soldiers armed with these weapons compared with their power in 1860 is at least as 2 to 1.

12 mountain guns.  
800 cavalry.  
8,800 infantry.  
4,100 total.

6. In Brigadier-General Kennedy's letter now submitted he makes alternative proposals. The first being to advance rapidly to Makin and Kanigoram and back to British territory, threatening the tribe with a repetition of these until they tender their submission; and the second being, if not permitted to threaten the tribe with a yearly expedition, to continue his advance from Kanigoram into the Shahor valley, and return to British territory by the Gumal pass. These proposals are, however, modified by his telegraphic message of the 14th instant, in replying to a reference from this Department. His Honour considered that the force should visit the residences of the principal men (named in clause 3 of the terms to be demanded) who have taken an active part against the British Government. The advance by the Khisora pass is certainly the easiest, if the object to be attained were fixed at reaching and destroying Makin, or extracting a fine out of the inhabitants of Kanigoram; but in this instance Umar Khan and others whom the Government wish to punish reside in the valleys to the south of Kanigoram, and these places can best be reached by an advance up the Shahor valley, leaving British territory by the Tank Zam. Another reason for visiting the Shahor valley is, that the comparative frequency of offences committed in the Gumal valley points strongly to their having been committed by Waziris from the Shahor and adjacent valleys, and make it more desirable to visit and punish the residents of that part of Waziri territory.

7. Sir Robert Egerton is inclined to believe the Mahsuds may be induced to submit directly they become aware that a military force is actually in motion to visit those parts of the hills where the principal men reside; and he is in favour of rapid advance through the Waziri country rather than a prolonged stay in or occupation of their hills, because the former will require a less force and be more economical, whilst it possibly may produce equally good results. He would not, however, withdraw hastily, nor show any anxiety to return, as this would be likely to cause the Waziris to resist our demand.

8. Brigadier-General Kennedy has shown in his letter how the requisite number of men can be obtained, and His Honour generally concurs in his proposals. As, however, it is an object to move as few troops as possible, His Honour thinks that it will not be necessary to call upon the garrisons of Rawalpindi, Talagang, and Mooltan to supply the places of troops taken from Kohat, Edwardesabad, and Dera Ismail Khan. His Honour would like to see 300 of one of the Muzbi corps attached to the force; but this is the extent of the demand he would make on other stations than those occupied by regiments of Brigadier-General Kennedy's force.

## 9. At Kohat there would remain—

- 1 battery mountain artillery,
- 1 cavalry regiment,
- 1 infantry regiment,

with a small compact force in the district at Togh. This seems to His Honour to be sufficient as a temporary measure.

## 10. At Edwardesabad there would remain—

- $\frac{1}{2}$  battery artillery.
- 1 cavalry regiment.
- The depôts of two infantry regiments

## 11. At Dera Ismail Khan there would remain—

- 1 cavalry regiment.
- The depôts of two infantry regiments.
- 1 company of British infantry.

The whole available portion of the natives of this garrison might be placed at Tank.

12. At Abbottabad the 5th Goorkhas and depôt (1st Sikh Infantry) would be sufficient as a temporary measure.

13. There is, in His Honour's opinion, little or no danger in leaving Dera Ismail Khan or Edwardesabad weak whilst an expeditionary force is operating on the Mahsud hills, provided that the operations are not protracted, as time is required for any tribe to make an organised attack on our frontier stations.

14. In the event of this expedition being sanctioned either on the now proposed or in accordance with any other scheme which may be decided upon by the Government of India, I am to suggest that the services of competent officers of the Survey Department may be made available; and His Honour would here mention the name of Mr. G. Scott, of the Revenue Survey, for employment on this particular duty.

15. Supplies and carriage to the extent requisite will be collected by the civil officers as soon as His Honour learns that the Government of India approve of his proposal to coerce the Mahsud-Waziris.

16. In conclusion, I am to express the strong recommendation of His Honour that the expedition be placed under the command of Brigadier-General Kennedy, who, from long experience on the frontier, the part taken by him in the expedition against the Mahsuds in 1860, and recent distinguished service in the Afghan wars, appears to be well fitted for so important a duty.

17. His Honour trusts that an early decision may be arrived at on the reference, as he is anxious that the force should move into the hills whilst the crops of the Mahsuds are on the ground.

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No. 740.

Copy forwarded to Secretary to Government, Punjab, for information, with reference to his No. 3, dated 3rd January last.

*Preliminary (to 28th March 1881).*

The Government of India having sanctioned, on the 12th March 1881 (G340B., dated 12th March 1881), an expedition against the Mahsud-Waziri tribe, the following was to be the composition :—

	STRENGTH.		Remarks.
	Men.	Guns.	
1st Punjab Cavalry ...	100	...	
4th Punjab Cavalry ...	200	...	
2nd Mountain Battery ...	111	3	
3rd Mountain Battery ...	205	6	
4th Mountain Battery ...	108	3	
8th Company Sappers and Miners.	73	...	(See in part Field Force Order No. 6.)
1st Sikh Infantry ...	500	...	Regiments to be formed into 6 companies.
2nd Sikh Infantry ...	500	...	Colours not to be taken. Weak and sickly men to be left in cantonments.
1st Punjab Infantry ...	500	...	Ammunition, 200 rounds per man.
2nd Punjab Infantry ...	500	...	Signallers to be extra to the above strength of 500 men.
3rd Punjab Infantry ...	500	...	
4th Punjab Infantry ...	500	...	On 28th instant it was arranged that these corps should rendezvous at Tank on 11th April.
6th Punjab Infantry ...	500	...	
32nd Pioneers ...	450	...	

*Reserve Brigade* under Brigadier-General G. Gordon, C.B., but under the supreme command of Brigadier-General T. G. Kennedy, C.B. :—

18th Bengal Cavalry	...	21st Punjab Native Infantry.	} Subsequently added.
6th Company Sappers and Miners	...	14th Native Infantry.	
1-8th Royal Artillery, screw guns	...	26th Punjab Native Infantry.	
4th Battalion Rifle Brigade	...	} All this, however, will be found modified by G. G. O. No. 248, 6th May.	
20th Punjab Native Infantry	...		
30th Punjab Native Infantry	...		

The following constituted the Staff and Departments, head-quarters being at Edwardesabad :—

*Brigadier-General T. G. Kennedy, C.B., Commanding.*

Colonel C. J. Godby, 2nd in Command ...	Arrival 11th April 1881.
Colonel F. Lance, 2nd Punjab Cavalry ...	Date of reporting arrival, 3rd April 1881.
Colonel R. Clifford, 2nd Punjab Cavalry ...	3rd April 1881.
Major P. Codrington, B.S.C., Assistant Adjutant General ...	20th March 1881.
Major J. Davidson, B.S.C., Assistant Quartermaster General ...	22nd March 1881.
Lieut. C. Manners-Smith, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General.	25th March 1881.
* Captain C. Egerton, B.S.C., Provost Marshal ...	10th April 1881.

Captain Egerton on the arrival (on 17th April) of Lieutenant Colonel Chowue became attached to the Brigadier-General's Staff.

Major Pierson, Commanding Royal Engineer	...	18th March 1881.
Captain G. C. Turner, R.E.	...	20th March 1881.
Lieutenant W. T. Shone, R.E.	...	22nd March 1881.
Lieutenant W. Wahab, R.E.	...	20th March 1881.
Lieutenant H. Appleton, R.E.	...	18th March 1881.
Lieutenant-Colonel Chowne, 6th Punjab Infantry	...	17th April and Provost Marshal, Baggage Master.
Captain Keighley, Chief Commissariat Officer	...	24th March 1881.
Captain A. LeQuesne, Transport Officer	...	5th April 1881.
Lieutenant Wilcocks, Transport Officer	...	19th March 1881.
Lieutenant Blunt, R.E.	...	11th April 1881.
Captain Roupell, 70th, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General for Musketry.	...	11th April 1881.
Surgeon Major Holmes, 1st Sikh Infantry, Principal Medical Officer.	...	10th April 1881.
Surgeon Coates, Staff Surgeon	...	18th April 1881.
Veterinary Surgeon Pringle.	...	16th April 1881.
Major Holdich, R.E., Survey	...	28th March 1881 }
Captain Martin, B.S.C., Survey	...	28th March 1881 }

Subsequent-  
ly remain-  
ed with  
General  
Gordon's  
Brigade.

The scale on which the troops were ordered to enter the hills (by Field Force Order) was the Kabul scale with certain modifications, such as the following:—

Men to have	...	25 lbs. (allowing say 5 lbs. for greatcoats).
Mess stores per regiment	...	1 mule.
Mess tent and cooking utensils	...	2 mules.
Hospital medicine trunks	...	3 mules.
Dandi poles	...	1 camel.
Hospital kajawahs	...	5 camels, Punjab Frontier Force regiments.
Quartermaster's stores, sandals, &c.	...	2 mules.
Hatchets and bill hooks to be supplied, if possible, at Tank	...	1 mule.
Mochi for repair materials	...	40 lbs.
Signalling apparatus complete (of regiments of Punjab Frontier Force).		

10 per cent. mules and camels to be spare.

#### *Camp Equipage.*

Non-commissioned officers and men per company, 2 tents of 2 pals each.  
Hospital, 2 tents of 2 pals each.  
Permanent 50 kahars (Punjab Frontier Force), 1 tent of 2 pals each.  
Banniahs' tents, 1 per shop, or a maximum of 2 camel-loads.  
A small tent for artificers, if necessary.

#### *Followers.*

Pakhals, 8 per regiment with spare pair pakhals.  
Kalassis, 2 (or 1 tindal, 1 kalassi).

#### *Bazar.*

1 chowdry; 1 weighman; 8 shopkeepers.  
Muleteers 1 to 3; camelmen 1 to 5.

#### *Hospital.*

Dulis, 4 per regiment, 24 kahars.  
Dandis, 6 per regiment, 24 kahars.

Extra to be provided at Tank at a total of 3 per cent. dulis or dandis for fighting men  $3 \times 5 \times 4 = 60$  kahars.

*Supplies.*

Usual authorised allowance for fighting men and camp followers and horses, pakhalis mules, baggage mules, camels (baggage mules and camels at 2 seers per diem).

A supply of "goor"\* to be taken and "chabina"; for this purpose 10 mules allowed to regiments and to batteries in proportion (14th April 1881).

\* Also tobacco.

*Modifications—Cavalry.*

Quartermaster's stores to be calculated for 1 month.

Intrenching tools, 81 lbs. to 100 men.

Armourer's tools, stores, forge, at rate of 10 mules to a regiment.

*Modifications—Mountain Battery.*

Quartermaster's stores to be calculated for 1 month.

Hospital medicines, 2 mules per battery.

Veterinary stores, 1 mule per battery.

No regular offices to be taken into the hills. Sweepers not to be taken across border. The following is an abstract of

\* See in part Field Force Order No. 6.

orders which were issued\* :—

Each man to enter the hills with 2 pairs of boots.

Followers to be well provided in this respect.

Strong picketing gear to be taken by cavalry, complement of farriers, and ample supply of horse-shoes.

As cold weather is to be expected, each man should have a warm jersey or something suitable (followers also).

All Lushai dandis in possession to be brought, and as many dulis as can be carried by remainder of kahars of Punjab Frontier Force establishment.

Durri dandis to be taken in usual way. Poles on a camel.

Hospital blankets to be provided for each duli or dandy.

Bareli dandis not to accompany.

Five camel kajawahs (Punjab Frontier Force) to be taken.

All dulis, dandis, &c., to have a chagal. Camel carriage to be restricted to carriage of tents, if possible, hospital kajawahs, arm chests, and those articles which can not go on mules.

Bands not to go beyond Tank.

Dogs not to be allowed in camp.

Four days' supplies to be carried regimentally.

Shelter to be provided for all followers.



One heliograph complete from the station equipment of Abbottabad Edwardesabad, and Dera Ismail Khan to be taken.

Full proportion of hospital comforts (especially bandages, lint, &c.) to accompany.

Indents for transport animals to be sent to the Commissariat authorities of Rawalpindi, Peshawar, according as nearest, at once.

Dates of departure and progress to be made to Assistant Adjutant General twice a week.

All muleteers and camelmen to be provided with sickles (datris) and, if possible, some spare ones to be brought.

A few adzes for repairing tent pegs, &c., should be taken.

A British officer in each regiment to be placed in charge of transport, to see to their feeding, grooming, &c. Commanding officers to make frequent inspections.

All corps to reach Tank with 4 days' supplies complete.

40 bill hooks	} to be obtained by regiments by indent on magazine depôt, Dera Ismail Khan: 1 mule-load allowed for their carriage.
30 hand hatchets	

Felling axes at 2 per company to be carried (in entrenching tool kaja-wahs); regiments not in possession of them to indent on the magazine depôt, Dera Ismail Khan.

Spare rope to be taken with each Lushai dandi.

The Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, was asked to provide supplies for the force for 16 days after entering the hills. The supply to be massed at Tank. The indent for these supplies was as follows:—

#### *Strength.*

British officers	...	...	...	90
Native combatants	...	...	...	5,000
Camp followers	...	...	...	3,500
Animals*	...	...	...	4,890

#### *Supplies.*

	<i>M.</i>	<i>S.</i>	<i>C.</i>	Calculation based on authorised allowance for fighting men and camp followers (latter at one uniform rate).
Atta	190	25	0	
Dal	26	22	8	
Barley	272	0	0	
Ghi	10	21	14	The calculation of followers includes the 500 men needed with 2,026 camels, carrying 16 days' supplies, but neither grain for these camels, nor carriage for them, is included.
Salt	4	0	0	
Tobacco	?	} Some of all these items would be useful.		
Goor	?			
Parched grain	?			

A camel-load has been reckoned at 4 maunds; but it is suggested each camel should carry its own food for 4 days=8 seers, reducing the above number of camels by about 100. Small bags might be made up accordingly. Only camel carriage should be taken for supplies, as thereby less grain is required and the string of animals is less extended.

\* Horse, battery mules, baggage and ammunition of regiments, 4,890.

*Detail, referred to in above Estimate.*

	Fighting men.	Followers.		M.	S.	C.
Atta	5,000 at 1 seer	3,500 at $\frac{3}{4}$ seer	...	190	25	0
Dal	5,000 at 2 <i>chittaks</i>	3,500 at 2 <i>chittaks</i>	...	26	22	8
Ghi	5,000 at 1 <i>chittak</i>	3,500 at $\frac{1}{2}$ <i>chittak</i>	...	10	21	14
Salt	5,000 at $\frac{1}{2}$ <i>chittak</i>	3,500 at $\frac{1}{2}$ <i>chittak</i>	...	4	17	0
Grain	Horses	Ordnance mules.	Camels.	Mules, ponies, yaboo.		
	475 at 4	...	...	47	20	0
	225 at 3	...	...	16	35	0
		800 at 2	...	40	0	0
			3,400 at 2	170	0	0
Requirements for 1 day ...				506	21	6

Immediately the approximate amount of the supplies were known, contracts were given out to (and eagerly taken up by) natives who got up their supplies from so far down even as Amritsar (railing to Chichawatni).

Considerable difficulty was experienced in collecting the requisite number of transport animals: the camelmen of the Punjab had an aversion to hiring out their camels for the purpose.

The total number of transport available from the Northern Punjab stood thus—

Mules	1,770	It having been decided by the Commissariat authorities to supply all the hospital indents for such from Peshawar on the break-up of the Khyber brigade.
Kahars	1,000	
Dandis	136	

These were marched through the Kohat pass, arriving there under Lieutenant Wilcocks on 25th. The 1st Punjab Infantry, 6th Punjab Infantry, and No. 2 Mountain Battery were equipped by them, the remainder moving on 27th towards Edwardesabad with 32nd Pioneers to equip 4th Punjab Cavalry, 2nd Punjab Infantry, 6th Punjab Infantry. All spare were intended to go on to Tank, there to be available for general transport and commissariat purposes.

On the 23rd March the Executive Commissariat Officer, Mooltan, reported he had completed all indents of Dera Ismail Khan garrison.

On 17th March the Chief Director of Transport, Rawalpindi, wired that transport carriage would in future be under Commissariat.

Great difficulty was experienced in regard to the line of communication between Dera Ismail Khan and Chichawatni, the nearest station on the Sind, Punjab and Delhi Railway (distant 172 miles from Dera Ismail Khan), also the Dera Ismail Khan and Tank line (40 miles).

From Chichawatni to Dera Ismail Khan there is but a bad, in some places sandy, road and heavy. The mails are carried by Murree carts. At each chowki are at the utmost 3 pairs of horses. It was foreseen that the great influx of travellers with their servants requiring expresses, the increase to the ordinary letter dāk, and heavy parcel dāks, would break down the few horses on the road. The Post Master General was urgently asked by the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, to assist the district arrangements. This he said he was unable to do.

A further appeal was made on 27th March by the General Officer Commanding, but without any result at the time.

[Eventually the monthly subsidy on the Dera Ismail Khan and Chichawatni line was raised from Rs. 205 to Rs. 355 per mensem, and a lump sum

of Rs. 500 was given to the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, for conveyance of mails between Dera Ismail Khan and Tank during the expedition.]

Had the Punjab Government improved the Dera Ismail Khan and Chichawatni line of communications by placing ekka daks or some sort of light country cart, the attention would have been much appreciated for the conveyance of the thousand and one requirements which always suddenly crop up when a force is being organised for active service. As it was, much inconvenience resulted owing to the want of carriage of some sort.

The view taken of signalling hitherto has been that a permanent signal station should be established at Shah Bandar with an escort of 30 rifles with the view of communicating with the force from some high point in the hills. As the force will have no line of communication, there is no need for intermediate signal posts.

On 24th March the Quartermaster General wired that Lieutenant Blunt, R. E., with 35 signallers, had been told off for the Waziri Field Force, and Captain Harris and 25 men for reserve. He was requested to detain the signallers, and to allow Lieutenant Blunt to proceed to Field Force head-quarters.

At the representation of the Brigadier-General, extra signallers were arranged for at the telegraph stations of Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, and Edwardesabad.

To this end 2' 12" heliographs were sent from the Quartermaster General's Office, Simla—one to be located on Shah Bandar, one to accompany the force. One 12" heliograph was also sent for from Roorkee for Edwardesabad.

On 26th March Major Pierson, R.E., reported his arrival at Dera Ismail Khan. Some of the officers under him were sent by him to Peshawar and Attock to collect central stores and drop them down by boat to Dera Ismail Khan.

His estimate for the requirements of Central Field stores was generally thus:—

	Mules.
44 picks, 44 shovels	4
6 crowbars	1
2 saws, 6 adzes, 6 sledge hammers, 8 bill hooks, 6 wedges	1
180 lbs. gun-cotton	1
Detonators, rope, yarn	1
1,000 feet Bickford's fuze, rope, &c.	1
2,000 lbs. powder sufficient for destroying 25 towers	16
Mining tools	1
8 jumpers	1
Sandbags	1
Smiths' tools	1
Spare helms	2
Wire for entanglements, calculated roughly @ 500×6 yards	2
A supply of crowbars for each regiment	7
	<hr/> 40

It was subsequently arranged, as wire entanglements would probably hardly be applicable to the conditions of the march, not to take any.

(Subsequently, alterations were made under verbal orders from General Kennedy. The Commanding Royal Engineer's diary might be consulted on this point.)

Calico maps reduced scale 1" = 4 miles of the Waziri country were issued by Surveyor General and sent to regiments.



Unfortunately the maps of 1860 of the scale of 1" = 2 miles were not available.

Copies of General Chamberlain's despatches of 1860 were received from Intelligence Branch and issued to heads of departments.

The plan of operations spoken of so far has been, very briefly, to enter the hills from Tank, to operate against Shahor, Kanigoram, Makin, and to issue down the Khisora pass. The reserve would, when the Field Force advances from Tank, move out towards the Khisora and demonstrate, thus taking off some attention from the direction of the Field Force, and would eventually hand over, say, two days' supplies to the Field force about the second march up that pass.

The Government having offered more troops if desired, and the reinforcement of the reserve (so styled) brigade by the 21st Native Infantry was sanctioned.

One of the difficulties which has presented itself at the outset is the consideration that troops and followers are not to get free rations.\* The terms of service on which the followers of some regiments are (*viz.*, on full or half rations paid by Government up to 1st April) at once makes most unpleasant comparisons to arise between service on this frontier and service elsewhere.

It comes to this. Regiments and followers who have been doing next to nothing in Kuram, yet drawing free rations, are now to be actively engaged in what is known to be very arduous work, and are to have no such consideration.

This matter was represented quietly to Adjutant General on the 23rd March 1881 (by telegram).

The feeding of followers caused some anxiety from the fact that from the time troops began to collect for the expedition *atta* rose to 5 seers per rupee.

The following are the arrangements made for the defence of the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu border, but see entry of diary of 22nd April :—

		Cavalry.	INFANTRY.		Remarks.
			No.	Men.	
Draband	...	...	1	38	
Manji	...	...	1	30	
Jutta	...	...	1	50	
Girni	...	16	1	50	
Kot Kirghi	...	8	1	50	
Tank Zam	...	16	1	32	
Kot Nasran	...	...	1	40	
Tank	...	61	1	110	

In regard to the capabilities of the Mahsud-Waziri country sustaining troops, the information is that firewood and green crops in abundance may be calculated on, but nothing else, save possibly the capture of a few live stock now and then.

On the 24th March the Military Secretary to the Punjab Government informed the General Officer Commanding that the Director General of Telegraphs had made arrangements for the extension of the telegraph line from Tank to Kot Kirghi.

By Government letter No. 342B. of 12th March 1881, it was ruled that, as the expeditionary force is to be composed partly of troops under His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's orders, General Kennedy should report his proceedings to the Adjutant General while in the field.

The Punjab Government also desired to be kept acquainted with the progress of the expedition and of all occurrences arising in the course of operations.

The Adjutant General, in his letter No. 3541 of 15th March 1881, to General Kennedy in reference to Government letter No. 342B., forwarded copies of Kabul Scale Compilation, and requested that as soon as the force assembled he might be furnished with—

B Form 251.

Return of staff officers No. 413.

Return of ammunition on manuscript form attached.

These forms to be rendered every month, or should the operations not extend to a month, then shortly before the break-up.

"You need not forward any of the returns to the Quartermaster General or Government of India."

A fortnightly telegraphic report of health of troops will be required on the form given at Appendix 52 of the Compilation.

If more convenient, the Officer Commanding Reserve may be ordered to furnish similar returns direct to Head-Quarters: in his case he will of course send for copies.

Particular attention is drawn to the orders regarding correspondence at page 19 of Compilation.

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*Diary, commencing 28th March.*

*March 28th, Edwardesabad.*—Brigadier-General Kennedy inspected 1-Sth Royal Artillery in marching order. All the marching arrangements were carefully inspected, and stress laid on the necessity for the men being well shod.

In the evening No. 8 Company Sappers and Miners was inspected as above.

Information was received of the march of the 30th Native Infantry and No. 6 Company Sappers and Miners from Rawalpindi (for Reserve Brigade).

*March 30th, Edwardesabad.*—Brigadier-General J. Gordon, C. B., Commanding Reserve Brigade, arrived at Edwardesabad to confer with General Kennedy regarding the command of Edwardesabad and various details connected with his reserve.

*March 31st, Edwardesabad.*—The 32nd Pioneers arrived at Edwardesabad (with No. 1 Mountain Battery destined for Dera Ismail Khan).

Information was received that sanction could not be granted to No. 1-8th Royal Artillery (screw) being taken. Application was made to take three guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery in lieu of No. 4 Mountain Battery.

Very heavy rain fell in the evening, delaying the march of the 32nd Pioneers, No. 1 Mountain Battery, and No. 8 Company Sappers and Miners on the 1st April.

A telegram from the Quarter Master General, in reply to General Kennedy's of 24th March, recommended the advance of the reserve along with the main force, and offered a separate reserve, if necessary, and in addition to the original reserve.

*1st April, Edwardesabad.*—In the afternoon a very heavy storm came on, with torrents of rain. The 1st Punjab Infantry arrived in the evening, having crossed the river,\* which rose very suddenly, with difficulty. Portion of the regiment was unable to ford, and had to remain on the left bank.

\* Kuram.

The ground being everywhere a swamp, and unfitted for men to camp, they were accommodated by the 4th Punjab Cavalry, 2nd and 4th Punjab Infantry, chiefly in the barrack verandah for the night.

*2nd April, Edwardesabad.*—The 32nd Pioneers, No. 8 Company Sappers and Miners, left for Tank, encamping at Nowrung.

The Deputy Commissioner, Edwardesabad, has received intelligence that Ayub Khan has sent mullahs into Dawar, informing the people there that he might shortly be expected to take the field against Abdul Rahman, and asking them to assist him with men.

Orders sent by Brigadier-General to Officer Commanding Dera Ismail Khan for collection of reserve ammunition, at 50 rounds per man, for 3,600 men at Tank.

A reply was sent to Quarter Master General's No. 2371 of 31st March that the term "reserve" was a misnomer, that General Gordon could not on account of cramped camp, scarcity of fodder, &c., march along with the Bannu column, but it was said that if he could be reinforced by 1,000 men, the proper use to make of his force would be to let it operate against Makin after General Kennedy's force, having done Shahor, had returned and advanced towards Kanigoram.

*April 3rd.*—Information was received from the Military Secretary, Punjab Government, that Government sanctioned free rations to troops and followers whilst across the border (see entry of 14th April).

*April 4th, Tank.*—Field Force head-quarters moved to Tank.

A telegram was received from the Military Secretary, Punjab Government, authorising free grant to followers of 1 blanket and 1 pair of shoes.

A telegram from Military Secretary, Government of India, placed the services of 14th and 26th Native Infantry at disposal of General Officer Commanding to be used at his discretion entirely. These were accordingly told off to the Reserve Brigade at Edwardesabad.

*April 5th.*—A committee of three medical officers was directed to assemble and report on the quality of the food being collected by the Commissariat.

The telegraph line from Tank to Kot Kirghi was commenced under superintendence of Mr. M. Shaw.

*April 6th, Tank.*—Slight showers during the early morning. Heavy clouds over part of the Waziri hills.

Orders were issued to all regiments to inspect (the day after arrival at Tank) all soldiers, followers, and transport cattle, and to submit a return of all unfit or unlikely to stand the severities of campaigning.

*April 7th, Tank.*—Slight showers and cloudy in the morning.

The 32nd Pioneers, No. 8 Company Sappers and Miners, and transport mules arrived from Edwardesabad. Heavy rain fell to the west in the hills and a moderate shower in the evening at Tank.

*April 8th, Tank.*—Under telegraphic orders from Quarter Master General, the 5th Punjab Infantry were to replace the 26th Punjab Native Infantry for the reserve brigade. Commanding officers of regiments were ordered to prepare nominal rolls of all muleteers, camelmen, and kahars attached to their brigades, and to keep up a careful record of all casualties for eventual transmission to Chief Commissariat Officer to enable him to settle with heirs.

At General Gordon's request, permission was asked (by telegram) from the Punjab Government to send 2 guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery to the Tank column.

*April 9th, Tank.*—Arrivals at Tank—\*1st Sikh Infantry (having marched from Abbottabad, 250 miles in 17 marches, without a halt) and 1st Punjab Infantry.

The 5th Punjab Infantry directed to join Reserve Brigade (under orders from Quarter Master General), 26th Native Infantry replacing them at Kohat.

In order to provide for the medical treatment of men unable from sickness, &c., to proceed into Waziri country, a base† hospital was ordered to be established at Tank under charge of Surgeon J. Nelis, 2nd Sikh Infantry.

Commanding officers of regiments were ordered to bring up their sick carriage to 5 per cent. for troops, 3 per cent. for followers, inclusive of dulis, dandis, camel kajawahs (camels being considered capable of carrying two men, one man in each kajawah), kahars 6 per duli and 5 per dandy.

The field hospital establishment was to consist of—

1 bhisti	} The hospital was for the accommodation of the transport followers; Surgeon Coates in charge (also of Brigade Staff).
2 sweepers	
1 cook	

Surgeon-Major Holmes was appointed principal medical officer with the force.

A case of glanders was discovered among the transport mules, the animal being at once shot by Committee's recommendation. Orders were at once issued for strict inspection by Transport Officer of all transport animals (with regiments and elsewhere) daily.

Orders on the marginally noted subjects were circulated to regiments:—

A. Order of march and notes to idem	} (Copy is appended at page 32.)
B. Camp duties	
C. Camp orders	
D. Provost Marshal and baggage	

\* The 1st Sikh Infantry marched in May-June 300 miles from Makin to Abbil in 23 days.

J. D.,—10-6-81.

† More correctly a station general hospital.



*April 10th, Tank.*—No. 2 Mountain Battery and 6th Punjab Infantry arrived from Kohat. Scarcity of grain at Tank necessitated the issue of an order to restrict transport mules to 1 seer grain daily, but to receive as much khasil as possible.

Deputy Surgeon-General deRenzy, having completed medical arrangements of the force, was allowed to proceed to Abbottabad under telegraph orders from Military Secretary, Punjab Government. Two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery were ordered to join General Gordon.

*April 11th, Tank.*—1st Punjab Cavalry, 4th Punjab Cavalry, 2nd Punjab Infantry, 3rd Punjab Infantry, arrived from Edwardesabad and Dera Ismail Khan, also Commanding and Field Engineers. Smart showers fell in the evening.

*April 12th, Tank.*—The assembly of the Field Force was completed by the arrival of No. 3 Mountain Battery, 6 guns No. 4 Mountain Battery, 3 guns 4th Punjab Infantry, and 4th Sikh Infantry. The numbers in camp then stood as below. Smart rain fell in the evening.

Complaints having been received of irregularities committed by followers and others in cutting and wasting khasil, forage guards, &c., were specially arranged for (Field Force Order No. 58).

*Statement showing strength of troops to be left at Edwardesabad, Dera  
Ismail Khan, Tank and outposts, on the departure of  
Field Force.*

[illegible]

*Strength of Field Force assembled at Tank on 12th April 1881.*

Brigadier-General Kennedy, Colonel Godby, Assistant Adjutant General, Assistant Quarter Master General, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, two Aides-de-Camp, Staff Surgeon, Provost Marshal, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.	EFFECTIVE.		SICK.		7-pr. guns.	Remarks.																																																																																															
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*April 13th, Tank.*—Very heavy rain fell in the morning, swamping portion of camp.

4th Punjab Cavalry,\* 6 sowars.

6th Punjab Infantry, 20 rifles under 1 native officer.

The 4th Punjab Cavalry and 6th Punjab Infantry were directed to furnish standing guards for head-quarters camp, from which all orderlies were to be furnished.

\* Subsequently changed to two non-commissioned officers and 10 men of 2nd Punjab Cavalry.

*April 14th, Tank.*—Heliographic communication was opened up with Sheikh Budin in the morning (22 miles), but clouds prevented regular work. Heavy clouds during the day and an appearance of severe rain in the hills.

Application was made to the Military Secretary, Punjab Government to establish a telegraph station at Sheikh Budin, so as to repeat by electric telegraph any messages received by heliograph from the hills, there being a fear that owing to the approach of the hot weather it might not always be possible to signal Dera Ismail Khan.

Arrangements having been made for each mule to carry its own grain for 8 days, all regiments were allowed to load up 10 mules with "goor," "chabina," tobacco (cavalry and artillery in proportion).

*April 15th, Tank.*—The telegraph line to Kot Kirghi (commenced on 5th) was completed, including a branch from the main line to Zam outpost, for use at first encamping ground after leaving Tank.

The country, roads, &c., hardly yet dried up after the severe rains of the 13th.

A recommendation having been made to head-quarters by the Brigadier-General, in consultation with the Deputy Surgeon-General and Commanding Officers, to grant meat to men in lieu of dal and less atta, a telegram in reply, dated 14th April, was published in orders, notifying no change could be made in scale of rations, but meat might be issued occasionally. Accordingly a bi-weekly issue of half meat in excess of ordinary ration was sanctioned in Field Force orders.

*April 12th.*—In Field Force Order No. 61 it was notified that Government had sanctioned Kabul scale of pay to followers after crossing frontier. Free rations after crossing frontier at scale laid down in paragraph 564, Pay Code (new), has already been sanctioned.

*April 14th.*—Adverting to the entries of 2nd and 5th April, grants by Government, the following telegram was received from Adjutant General: "Government have ruled that free rations, blankets, and shoes should be limited to public followers, except only syces of native cavalry, as in Kabul campaign. Grant to troops and private followers inadmissible. Both latter should be suitably clad by employes. General Gordon was directed to move to Meeran on Saturday, 16th April.

The expedition undertaken against the Mahsud-Waziris consisted of the following troops:—

Brigadier-General Thomas G. Kennedy, c.B., Commanding. Staff—Colonel Christopher James Godby, second-in-command; Major E. C. Codrington, Assistant Adjutant General; Major J. Davidson, Assistant Quarter Master General; Lieutenant C. Manners-Smith, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General; Lieutenant-Colonel F. Lance, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, Orderly Officer; Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. R. Clifford, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, Orderly Officer; Major W. H. Pierson, R.E., Commanding Royal Engineer; Lieutenant T. Shone, R.E., Assistant Field Engineer; Lieutenant H. Appleton, R.E., Assistant Field Engineer; Lieutenant Wahab, R.E., Assistant Field Engineer; Captain G. W. Martin, Survey Department; Captain C. M. Keighley, Chief Commissariat Officer; Captain A. C. de Quesne, Lieutenant J. Willcocks, V.S. Pringle, Transport Officers; Captain C. P. Egerton, Provost Marshal and Baggage Master (from 17th March Lieutenant-Colonel Chowne performed these duties, Captain Egerton being attached to General Kennedy's

Staff); Captain F. F. F. Roupell, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General for Musketry; Surgeon-Major A. P. Holmes, M.D., Principal Medical Officer. Troops—Cavalry: Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. McLean, C.B., commanding; 1st Punjab Cavalry, 100 sabres, Captain H. Hervey commanding; 4th Punjab Cavalry, 200 sabres, Major T. Underwood. Artillery: No. 2 Mountain Battery, three guns, Captain Campbell commanding; No. 3 Mountain Battery, six guns, Captain Aitken commanding; No. 4 Mountain Battery, three guns, Major A. Broadfoot. Infantry: Unattached to any Brigade—1st Sikh Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Rice commanding; 32nd Pioneers, Major C. Hodson commanding; 8th Company Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant R. Phillpots commanding. 1st Brigade—Lieutenant-Colonel H. P. Close commanding; 4th Sikh Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Bainbridge commanding; 1st Punjab Infantry. Major T. Higginson commanding; 2nd Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Tyndall, C.B., commanding 2nd Brigade—Lieutenant-Colonel B. R. Chambers commanding; 3rd Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Rynd commanding; 4th Punjab Infantry, Major A. M. C. Bruce commanding; 6th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel S. J. Browne commanding.

#### THE WAZIRI EXPEDITION.

*"Pioneer," dated 10th May 1881.*

[FROM A CORRESPONDENT.]

Not a few old frontier officers (old enough to remember the incidents of the last Waziri expedition) must have read with interest your late article on the subject of our present relations with the Waziris, and the circumstances of their submission; but only a few, I fancy, are prepared to go all the way with you in your estimate of the moral effect of that submission, and the general deductions that you draw therefrom. There can be little doubt in the minds of men who can look back through the last quarter of a century that our border relations are on a higher and better footing by many degrees than they were on the day when the Mahsuds offered so stout a resistance to General Chamberlain's advance. There is, perhaps, a better understanding on the far side of the border of the higher lights of civilisation which guide our frontier policy, and there is surely a better appreciation of our power to enforce that which persuasion fails to accomplish. But there is no such change in the moral characteristics of our trans-frontier neighbours, anywhere between Peshawar and Biluchistan, as would lead them to such a step as that which your article assumes them to have taken, in *giving up* their chiefs simply for fear of a military demonstration. They have not given them up, and the distinction between surrendering them as prisoners and the voluntary surrender of the chiefs themselves (under strong home persuasion no doubt) is a very important one. In the latter case there can be no ground for the inevitable tribal feuds, which would certainly ensue were force used to compel submission, and which would probably lead to far worse evils than are ever likely to befall an uncivilised country from an invasion of British troops. On the other hand, the chiefs can pose temporarily as martyrs for the good of their country—well assured of their lives, and probably of their comforts, while under our fatherly care—and hopeful, may be, of a final triumphant return. Still the fact of their coming in (to use the ordinary political



phrase) is sufficiently unusual to call for explanation. It was certainly unexpected, and there must have been unusual circumstances to account for the phenomenon. These circumstances are found readily enough, in the opinion of those best acquainted with the materials and their country, in the extraordinarily fine crops of the present year. After a long period of failures and destitution verging on starvation, there has come a year of most hopeful promise. Were this year's crops to be destroyed, starvation *must* ensue; while the promise of the fields is at present so good and fair, that the harvest in due course should more than counterbalance the previous years of failures. One can easily understand the strength of an argument which points, on the one hand, to starvation for wife, family, and people, and on the other to an honourable captivity, with the right perchance of shooting, in season and out of season, every head of game that can be slaughtered on a career of indiscriminate shikar. Little chiefs no doubt judge by what befalls big chiefs; and though their view may be mistaken, this, coupled with the advent of a force, which even a Mahsud must recognise as sufficient to wipe the annals of his country out of future history, is probably the only moral persuasion on which we can fairly congratulate ourselves as influencing the movements of the Waziri chiefs.

But we need not despair. We have many things to congratulate ourselves about, even if we are not altogether satisfied with the progress of light and culture across the border. No one who saw General Kennedy's force march out of Edwardesabad for Tank, or who could have stood by General Gordon as his brigade marched past at Meerean on the morning of the 2nd, could help feeling a really honest pride in the workman-like appearance of our "collapsed" (was it Colonel East who used that word?) Native army. Things which collapse are usually elastic; and if we bow to Colonel East's assertion, the Native army is no exception to the rule. General Gordon's brigade consists almost entirely of troops who have been knocked about on service continuously for the last two years. The 5th Punjab Infantry (the only Frontier Force regiment in the brigade) went by 600 strong, followed by the 14th Sikhs (who have only just arrived from Pindi after averaging 17 miles a day continuous marching from Pindi to Bannu), the 20th, 21st, and 30th—all looking fit, if need be, for an instant advance on St. Petersburg. The cavalry were represented by the 18th Bengal Cavalry, artillery by Carre's European mountain battery and two guns of Morgan's, while the Rifles formed the only European infantry contingent. This, with a Sapper company, makes up about as pretty a little working party for a frontier expedition as could well be found in any country in the world, and in the matter of transport and commissariat it is thoroughly equipped. What a satisfaction it is to meet strings of fine, fat, healthy camels going to and fro in quest of fodder, and to walk down long lines of sleek, contented-looking (contented perhaps is hardly the word—the brutes are never contented) mules and ponies, only those who have been over the Khojak to Kandahar, or held their noses through some of the more specially unpleasant defiles of the Khyber, can tell! It is quite a revelation in the way of transport. If we have drained the transport supply of the Punjab to the dregs, all that an uninformed outsider can say about it is, that the dregs are most excellent. In good truth, the fact that so large a force as 9,000 men can be massed at any point in the frontier within a few weeks in such thorough workman-like form, and so efficiently equipped, is real matter of congratulation to anyone who chooses to think about it, and who has the advantage of being able to

compare a not very remote past with the present—far more substantial than the doubtful results of that somewhat vague moral influence which we claim to have established over our border neighbours. Only “a soldier’s view” perhaps; but we have hardly arrived at the stage when soldiers’ views can be dispensed with by the Government of India, either as respects the inside or outside of her frontiers.

If any exception to the efficiency of equipment is to be made, it must be in the arrangements for heliographic signalling. The last map issued by the Survey Department (4 miles to the inch) will show pretty plainly that (assuming that each column advances westward from Tank and Bannu respectively and keeps up no intermediate posts) the Bannu column will only be able to flash to its base (in the fort at Bannu) occasionally when hills occur conveniently along the line of route with sufficient command to overlook Bannu; but the Tank column should always be able to flash to its base (Sheikh Budin), because Sheikh Budin is on a high hill, which itself commands nearly the whole line of route till it turns northward; and even then can be easily recognised from any fairly commanding hill. Bannu and Sheikh Budin (the two bases) meanwhile are always intervisible, so that it becomes a question merely of long shooting round three sides of a square (to put it roughly), of which each side may be said to be about 50 miles. For this purpose a staff of European signallers was sent to Bannu, numerically quite sufficient, but equipped with nothing but 3-inch heliographs—pretty little toys, which are good for about as many yards as they are wanted for miles. Luckily the Rifle Brigade had two 5-inch instruments, with which communication with Sheikh Budin is kept up with difficulty. At Sheikh Budin (the junction—the real strategic position of the whole heliographic campaign) there is indeed a 12-inch instrument, which works admirably; but there are no European signallers. The one officer, who nobly tries his patience and his eyes in deciphering messages from the little 5-inch light 50 miles away by the incessant use of a powerful telescope (needless to say the Native signallers are no good under the circumstances), is fairly used up. Should he go totally blind (as seems not improbable), the whole scheme must fall through. There is such an insatiable thirst for “portability” in these days that it is considered quite cheap at the cost of efficiency. “Tommy” can put a 3-inch heliograph into one pocket, and nearly get the stand into another, and so he is sent to work where he is never likely to have a ray of much less than 40 miles, and may possibly have to work over 60—much as if he should take a pea-shooter into action instead of his rifle.

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The order of march throughout the expedition will be—

(1)—Advance guard, 1st Sikhs.

1 non-commissioned officer and 6 sabres.  
Signallers.

1. It will be halted by the officer commanding it for any repairs to the road that may be required for the passage of the baggage, moving on again as soon as the Pioneers are ready to resume their places in the column.

2. It will also be halted by its commander for a quarter of an hour after every three-quarters of an hour’s marching, to admit of the baggage

coming up. It will not get too far ahead of the column, and should notice when the latter may be halted by orders from the rear.

3. The signallers of the 1st Sikhs and of all the cavalry, with their heliographs and flags, and under two signalling officers, will follow the reserve of the advance guard.

II.—33rd Pioneers.

Signallers.

Sappers.

Engineers.

Surveyors.

1 non-commissioned officer and 6 sabres.

4. These will, in the order named, follow the reserve of the advance guard.

5. The Pioneers will furnish their own flankers, connecting in front with the rear flankers of the advance guard, and in rear covering the detachment of the cavalry.

6. When any work has to be done to the road, the working party will be covered by the advance guard. When the work to be done is at the side of the pass, but within the flankers, the column will proceed; and when the work is done, the working party will regain their place in the column, but without hurrying to do so.

7. If the work is not completed by the time the rear guard arrives, the officer commanding the rear guard will pass up the word by sowars, or signal to the officer commanding the leading brigade, when the column will be halted, and the rear guard will cover the working party.

8. The signallers will be those of the leading brigade, and will be accompanied by three signalling officers, who will dispose of them under orders of the Superintendent of Signalling.

9. Surveyors wishing to proceed beyond the flankers must report to the Brigadier-General, when a suitable escort will be provided.

III.—6 guns.

10. Will follow the detachment of cavalry in rear of the above party, and will be subject to the orders of the officer commanding the advance guard.

IV.—Head-quarters of the cavalry.

11. Will follow the guns, but when the ground admits of it will move out and form an advance guard ahead of the infantry.

12. This body of cavalry will consist of the remainder of 300 sabres accompanying the force, after deducting 50 sabres for the rear guard, 40 for flankers, and all guards, escorts, and orderlies.

V.—Leading Brigade, with a half battery attached, which will bring up the rear of the brigade, followed by 1 non-commissioned officer and 6 sabres.

13. Will follow the cavalry, and in event of the latter moving out will close on the guns in front.

14. The brigade will throw out its own flankers, connecting in front with the rearmost flankers of the Pioneers, and in rear covering its own guns.

15. The escort of these guns, if detached, will be detailed by the officer commanding the brigade.

16. The officer commanding this brigade will halt his brigade, if gaps in the line of baggage are reported to him, passing on word to the front of his having done so.

17. The detachment of cavalry in rear of the guns will forward to the officer commanding the brigade all reports brought to it from the rear.

18. At every halt on the line of march the brigade will form mass of quarter columns, and the baggage will lock up to it.

*VI.—Baggage, including reserve ammunition and supplies.*

19. The baggage will follow the leading brigade in the following order:—

Field park.

Entrenching tools of regiments except Sappers and Miners.

All dulis and dandis carrying sick men, with the exceptions mentioned in note I on order of march.

Hospital medicine trunks, including those of field hospital.

Officers' spare horses.

Head-quarters and departmental officers' baggage on mules.

All laden mules of regiments in order of march.

Camels of regiments in order of march to facilitate their supervision by regimental guards.

(a) Hospital kajawas.

(b) Dandi poles.

(c) Hospital tents of regiments.

(d) Tents and baggage of regiments.

Field hospital tents.

Commissariat supplies of the force.

*VII.—Rear brigade.*

Baggage guard and rear guard.

Signallers.

20. A brigade,\* with a half battery and 90 sabres, will be detailed for these duties, two regiments one on either flank as the baggage guard, and the remaining regiment as the rear guard.

21. The baggage guard on either flank will connect its flankers in front with the rearmost flankers of the leading brigade, and in rear will cover the cavalry of the rear guard.

22. The front connection will be taken up on both flanks as the rear of the leading brigade quits camp, so that the entire mass of baggage may be efficiently flanked.

23. With about every two companies of flankers a British officer will be detailed from each regiment of the baggage guard, to command the supports, and to see that there are no excessive gaps in the flanking arrangements.

24. Also to send word to the officer commanding the leading brigade if there are gaps in the baggage necessitating a halt to enable it to lock up.

25. The head-quarters of both these regiments will be with their rearmost details, so that they may assist the rear guard or move forward to assist their flankers.

\* *Note.*—The Infantry portion of this brigade will become the rear brigade on alternate days, as will be noted in orders.

The position of regiments in brigades will be changed each day under orders of officers in command of brigades. The guns will be daily changed with a half battery of those in advance.



26. The regiment in rear guard will protect its own flanks, connecting its flankers with the rearmost flankers of the baggage guard regiments.

27. The 90 sabres and 3 guns will be disposed of thus—

50 sabres under a British officer with the rear guard, to follow the baggage.

40 sabres in single file on both flanks of the baggage, to connect between the cavalry of the rear guard and the detachment of cavalry in rear of the leading brigade.

28. The guns will follow the cavalry of the rear guard.

29. The signallers of the rear brigade will be in three parties, each under an officer. One of these parties will ordinarily be at the head of the baggage column, one with the rear guard, and the third will be posted in a convenient position between the two.

30. Regiments will detail separate baggage guards of 20 rifles each for mules and camels respectively, and cavalry and artillery will detail similar baggage guards in Guards.

proportion to strength.

These guards will be responsible for all hospital, bazar, and transport establishments attached to their corps.

31. Other regimental guards on the line of march should be as few as possible.

33. Detached orderlies for officers' baggage are altogether prohibited. The protection of the baggage is duly arranged for, and servants must do the rest. A great object is to detach as few fighting men as possible, and commanding officers are invited to aid to the utmost this important point.

33. A standing escort of 1 native officer and 20 rifles will be detailed hereafter for general supplies and its transport. Its duty will be to see that no supplies are left in the old camp, and that all follow in their appointed place on the line of march. It will then accompany the leading supplies into camp, and superintend and help their unloading and stacking, under the orders of the Commissariat Officer.

34. The protection of supplies on the line of march will be afforded by the baggage guard of the force.

*Notes on order of march.*

1.—Each regiment and battery, and the Sappers, will be followed by its first reserve of ammunition on mules, pakhali mules, one duli, six dandis, one mule-load of hospital stores, men's greatcoats, if the weather is threatening.

In a column organised for hill warfare it is necessary to have each regiment complete in itself, as in a winding defile it might be impossible to get up ammunition, dandis, &c., without great loss of time.

When a regiment or battery is detached from the main column, the commanding officer will, according to the nature of the ground and the duty required, take or leave behind in charge of the regiment next in column the mules, dandis, pakhalis, and hospital stores.

II.—The object of an advance guard, rear guard, and flankers are—

- (a) To prevent the line of march being surprised, they will, therefore, hold their own as long as possible until reinforced, conveying immediate intimation to their nearest support, which in like manner will communicate to the nearest reserve: for instance, the nearest reserve to the most advanced flankers of the baggage guard will be the leading brigade.
- (b) To prevent shots from rear ranges at the line of march, they should, therefore, be content to keep an enemy beyond long matchlock range, and never quit their responsibility to pursue or to dislodge men at great distances, except under the orders of the officer commanding their regiment, who must then either replace them or halt the column, which should never be done, except for very good reasons.
- (c) A skilful flanking officer will do his work efficiently with as few good intelligent scouts as possible, keeping his supports handy to reinforce, and not to unnecessarily fatigue his men.
- (d) The 40 sabres will single file off on the immediate flanks of the baggage, covering the distance named. They are for purposes of communications, and so should be intelligent men capable of taking over and handing on without mistake reports to be passed along, as very much may depend on their intelligent performance of this duty. These men will be disposed of under a British officer on each flank, who will then join their regiments. If 20 sabres on either flank do not suffice, they must be increased from the main body of the cavalry ahead, and worked with intelligence. A sowar need seldom go back to his place in the communications, but, seeing that his message is understood and carried on without delay, may ordinarily halt until his place comes up to him.

III.—All officers and non-commissioned officers on baggage flanking duty should aid in seeing that displaced loads of animals are readjusted without delay, and that overcrowding or straggling of baggage does not occur, and also that the line of march is kept by all soldiers, and specially by followers, and that no short cuts are taken. Also that no damage to houses or crops is done without orders.

To prevent any of a large number of animals or their drivers or followers generally leaving the line of march is a very difficult but very essential duty, and one to which very careful attention of all officers on baggage guard is particularly requested.

### *Camp Duties.*

#### *I.—Advance guard and main body of cavalry and signallers.*

1. On arrival at the new ground will at once post all the day pickets to protect the laying out of camp. Whilst this is being done, somewhat more distant positions will be selected, to combine the duties of pickets and the complete protection of animals at graze and foragers for grass and firewood.

To post pickets on reaching new camp.

2. All pickets will be connected, when possible, by vedettes or patrols, whose orders will be to prevent animals, soldiers, and followers from straying too far from camp. The efficient performance of this duty is next in importance to that of pickets.

Connection by vedettes or patrols.

3. These day pickets may be relieved, if possible, during their tour, and will be withdrawn so as to reach camp by sunset.

Relief and withdrawal.

4. These troops will also together furnish, as far as possible, all escorts, grazing guards of necessary, and orderlies as may be detailed.

To furnish escorts, grazing guards, and orderlies.

5. They will not be employed on night duties, except to furnish to their own camp sentries and inlying pickets, and the men for night sentry should certainly not, and those for inlying picket should not if avoidable, be employed during the day.

Exemption from night duties except for their own camps.

6. Lieutenant-Colonels McLean, C.B., and Rice will be daily "Colonels of day outposts," and will together be entrusted with all the necessary arrangements, reporting verbally to the Brigadier-General when all are completed. They will respectively utilise the senior officers under them to aid them in placing the pickets.

Lieutenant-Colonels McLean and Rice to be "Colonels of day outposts."

7. Each picket will have a heliograph party, under a British officer attached to it, in connection with each other if possible, and with head-quarter station.

Heliographs with pickets.

The signallers of the leading brigade will, on arrival in camp, aid in these duties.

## II.—Sappers and Pioneers.

Will not ordinarily be available for other camp duties than their own sentries and inlying pickets, for which men should be saved from working parties.

Protect their own camps only.

## III.—The Leading Brigade.

1. Soon after arrival in camp, the Colonel commanding the brigade, who will be "Colonel of night outposts," will, in consultation with commanding officers of regiments of his brigade, decide on the positions for the night pickets for the entire camp, which will be furnished by his brigade, and when decided will report verbally to the Brigadier-General.

Colonel Commanding is "Colonel of night outposts."

To furnish pickets for whole camp.

2. Each regiment of his brigade will contribute its share of the requisite number of men, who, with the necessary working tools, will parade at 4 P.M., and each picket will be marched off under a British officer of the regiment furnishing it, accompanied by an engineer officer, to prepare its defences for the night, which when completed will be inspected by commanding officers of regiments (assisted by the senior officers under them), who will report to the Colonel of the night outposts, who, when he has received all the reports, will intimate verbally to the Brigadier-General that the arrangements of the pickets are complete.

Night pickets how furnished.

When commanded by a British officer.

3. When night pickets are of greater strength than a company, they will be commanded by a British officer.

4. The working tools of pickets will be brought back by men sent up from camp in time to admit of their return before dark, or the tools will be carried on next day.

5. Night pickets will not, as a rule, be visited; men must not be detached from them to camp after dark, or before the picket is withdrawn.

Inlying pickets, &c., to be in excess of above detailed.

6. Besides these pickets, each regiment will furnish its own camp sentries and inlying picket.

7. All night pickets will be carefully withdrawn next morning, by alternate retirements of half pickets, by commanding officers of regiments, under the orders of the "Colonel of night outposts" (whose tour of duty will then be over), just in time to form the rear brigade, the necessary animals for their blankets, working tools, &c., being kept behind for them.

Withdrawal of night pickets.

8. In the morning one company under a British officer of the regiment on rear guard will, when they have packed and loaded their own regimental baggage, assist in loading the supplies, which will be commenced in consultation with the Chief Commissariat Officer, with a view to avoid having the camels standing too long under their loads before marching. The company will then rejoin the regiment.

9. Supplies, having been loaded up as described in the preceding paragraph and placed on the line of march, and unladen on arrival in the new camp as detailed under the heading "Line of March," will be protected by the guard described, giving one sentry by day over the place of issue and two sentries by night, as directed by Captain Keighley, Chief Commissariat Officer.

Supplies how guarded.

The rear brigade.

10. The rear brigade will (as far as possible) only furnish its own camp sentries and inlying pickets.

Signallers.

11. The signallers of this brigade will, on arrival in camp, be utilised, if necessary.

NOTE.—The intention in detailing all these camp duties is to give the men, as far as can be foreseen, some fixed time for cooking,—which time can be gathered from the duties described.

Reason for above. Detail of duty.

#### *IV.—Camp guards, sentries, and inlying pickets of all regiments.*

1. Will parade half an hour before sunset, and be posted regimentally; due connection with the sentries of other regiments being maintained.

Posted half hour before sunset.

2. Adjutants of regiments, after posting their sentries, to remain at hand to meet on their respective limits the "Camp Field Officer for the night" (to be detailed in Field Force Orders), who will approve or improve the

Under approval of the Camp Field Officer for the night.



arrangements made, reporting verbally to the Brigadier-General that he has done so.

Visited under regimental arrangements. 3. Guards and sentries will be visited by night under regimental arrangements.

*V.—Alarm posts in each regiment, detachment, and department.*

To be invariably told off. 1. Will invariably be appointed by commanding officers and heads of departments.

Guns, supplies, and transport how protected. 2. Regiments nearest the guns, supplies, and transport must include their protection in their arrangements.

Weak spots guarded, and remainder of regiment in support. 3. In appointing alarm posts, the quick manning of weak places should be well considered, and then strong and central supports be told off, available to reinforce in any direction.

Roll-call after sunset, and all men to be marched to their alarm posts. 4. Every soldier in camp (except those on guard and sentry) will parade for evening roll-call half-an-hour after sunset in the dress he may be in at the time, but fully accoutred, and will be told off and marched off to his appointed place for a night alarm, and on arrival

there, each post being duly warned of its place of assembly, and that a night alarm should be met by soldiers quickly and quietly as possible without any talking or noise, will be dismissed, and all commanding officers will then

No further roll-call till morning.

meet at the Brigadier-General's tent to report the arrangements made. After this evening roll-call the troops off duty will be left undisturbed (except for a night alarm) without any further roll-call until the morning, when one will always be quietly taken just before the march.

*VI.—Laying out camp.*

Quartermasters of leading brigade to do it. 1. The quartermasters of the leading brigade and of the regiments in front thereof will, with the aid of selected men from their respective regiments, assist the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General to lay out the camp for the entire force. Two of these quartermasters, in turn, will then be responsible that the camps of the commissariat, transport, and of regiments of the rear brigade are pointed out to them on their arrival. Regimental quartermasters will strictly comply with the order of the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General as to the formation (in companies or half companies) of their respective camps.

Regimental transport in camp. Quartermasters' duties. 2. Quartermasters will be entrusted with all the animals attached to their respective regiments, and will daily attend "stables" to examine their backs, and see them groomed and fed, and also to the necessary repairs of saddles and gear.

*Camp Orders.*

Leading line of march. 1. No soldier or follower is to leave the line of march, except to a short distance and for a short time for purposes of nature, when he will invariably be accompanied by another

man. No short cuts will be allowed, and no damage to crops or houses without orders is to be done.

Villages not to be entered.

2. No village near the road or camp is on any account to be entered without the permission of the Brigadier-General.

Going beyond pickets prohibited.

3. No soldier or follower is on any account to go beyond the pickets without the sanction of the Brigadier-General.

Dogs.

4. No dogs will be allowed in camp that are not tied up at night and kept quiet.

5. Cooking may be done at any time during the night, but there must be no talking aloud after the "last post."

6. Every soldier and follower in camp is to be made aware of the above five orders, and commanding and departmental officers will report verbally to the Brigadier-General that this has been done in their respective commands and charges, after which disobedience of orders will be severely punished.

All to be made acquainted with above five orders.

Camp time.

7. Regiments having their "gongs" may carry them, provided no extra carriage is required for them.

The 1st Sikh Infantry will regulate the time, and no other gong will be struck until that regiment has finished giving the hour, which will then be repeated by each regiment in succession (in the order of their camp from the 1st Sikh Infantry) when and not before the regiment preceding it has completed its strike.

Bugle sounds.

8. The only bugle sounds that will be allowed in camp will be the—

"*Rouse.*"—Half-an-hour before day break, when every soldier in camp will hastily but quietly accoutre himself over the clothes he may be wearing at the time, and will fall in without any noise in front of their respective camps: all "telling off" to be done in a low voice.

"*Reveille.*"—At day break, when regiments will be dismissed, camp struck, and animals laden.

"*Dress.*"—Half-an-hour after the "*reveille.*"

"*Assemble.*"—Half-an-hour after "*dress.*"

"*Advance.*"—When the advance guard, pioneers, &c., and the leading brigade are in their places.

"*Orders.*"—Towards sunset when the adjutants (or another officer) of regiments and detachments will attend with their notebooks at the Assistant Adjutant General's tent.

"*Retreat.*"—When a roll-call will be held.

"*1st Post.*"—At 8 P.M.

"*2nd Post.*"—At 8-30 P.M., after which, although cooking may continue up to any time, no sounds of talking, &c., will be allowed.

On the day of a halt the only difference in the above will be that the "*dress,*" "*assemble,*" and "*advance*" will be omitted.

The above bugles will be sounded at the head-quarter camp by the massed buglers of the nearest infantry regiment to that camp, and will be repeated by all other regiments, cavalry and artillery trumpets conforming. No other bugles or trumpets will be sounded in camp or on the line of march, except by order of the Brigadier-General, so that when others are sounded it will be concluded they are by his order, and will be repeated by all regiments.

The sound "officers' call" will be held to mean "commanding officers' call" to the spot from where it originates.

The baggage master will generally superintend the line of baggage on the march, and will especially prevent unnecessary stoppages and gaps. All baggage will file out of camp in the order of regiments on each day's march, under the superintendence of a specially selected Native officer or non-commissioned officer from each corps, under the orders of the baggage master, aided by the quartermaster of the rear brigade and departmental officers.

The quartermasters of the regiments of the leading brigade and of those in advance of it will proceed with their regiments after seeing the baggage of their respective regiments in its proper place in the line of march, and, after duly instructing the non-commissioned officers to see that these places are kept throughout the line of march, may rejoin their regiments. The quartermasters of the rear brigade will aid the baggage master in superintending the whole line of baggage.

On arrival in camp, quartermasters of the leading brigade and of the regiments in advance of it will have marked out, by heaps of stones or mud under their immediate superintendence, the day and night latrines for their own and all other regiments and followers of other departments, and will arrange with provost men to have them pointed out to regiments and departments concerned.

The night latrines will be in rear of the line of camp sentries and on as open ground as possible, so that men going there may not be surprised, and these latrines will be used up to the hour of march next morning.

In fixing sites for these day and night latrines, it should be remembered that it is not improbable that the force may return by the same marches by which it advances into the hills, when the same encamping grounds will have to be again used.

General Kennedy proposed to General Gordon that arrangements should be made at Sheikh Budin for a party of British signallers to work with General Gordon after our advance into Waziristan.

This, however, was not considered desirable by General Gordon, and the matter dropped.

The Foreign Secretary telegraphed that the Viceroy desired that in all political questions during the expedition references be made to the Lieutenant-Governor, whose orders were to be followed.

A uniform rate of Rs. 8 per mensem was sanctioned for all kahars across the border.

*April 16th.*—A parade in drill order was held of all the troops in the Tank column at 7 A.M., the force being drawn up in lines of quarter column close on the north face of camp. After the usual salute and inspection, the troops marched past, infantry in double companies, and were dismissed.

The parade lasted half an hour. The very workmanlike work of all was a subject of remark by all spectators ; but it was remarked that a very large proportion of the men in the ranks appeared young.

General Gordon was directed by General Kennedy to report all his movements to the Quarter Master General.

A letter from the Military Secretary, Punjab Government, No. 1575 of 13th April 1881, received this morning, to the Brigadier-General, forwarded copy of the proclamation and copy of No. 735 of 11th April from the Secretary, Government, Punjab, to Major Macaulay. The Military Secretary's letter stated that His Honour hoped every effort would be made to assist negotiations, but left the Brigadier-General a wide discretion in arranging all military details, and in determining what valleys, strongholds, &c., should be visited, and what length of stay should be made at each. It also pointed out the punishment to be inflicted.

A copy of the correspondence complete is attached.

A telegram from Quarter Master General, dated 15th, directed copies of reports sent to Army Head-Quarters to be made to Military Secretary, Punjab Government.

General Gordon reported the march of head-quarters of his brigade, 1-8th Royal Artillery, Rifle Brigade, 6th Company Sappers and Miners, 18th Bengal Cavalry, 20th and 30th Native Infantry, to Meerean, and of arrival of 21st Native Infantry at Edwardesabad.

A telegram from Adjutant General, dated 15th, having brought to notice that medical arrangements of General Gordon's brigade had not been completed, Dr. deRenzy proposed the establishment of a field hospital to take over the sick of regiments, and to treat the transport sick followers of the Commissariat Department. It was, however, resolved to leave undisturbed the regimental hospital system, and to establish a field hospital (under charge of Surgeon Coates, Staff Surgeon) for the commissariat and transport followers not attached to regiments.

Dr. deRenzy also proposed to have a field depôt of medical and surgical stores attached to the field hospital, and to let the corps take the field with only a small stock. Some of the hospital carriage of regiments, &c., was to be made over to this depôt.

It was inconvenient to introduce this, because regiments had come as far as Tank, some with a full supply of hospital necessities, some with little. The former would have to leave some of their equipment at Tank, where there were no proper arrangements for storing them

if their regimental carriage were taken away, so the stores destined for the depôt were distributed to corps at Tank, and all took a full supply, a small quantity only remaining with the field hospital. Among the stores was a large quantity of Swiss milk, now about to be supplied for the first time to Native troops.

A base hospital was formed at Tank, into which all the sick were sent, the force advancing without a man on the sick list. From Tank the base hospital patients are to be forwarded on recovery to their respective stations.

- 1 British officer.
- 4 hospital assistants, 31 kahars, 9 drivers.
- 3 sepoy's tents (2 pals each), 5 camels.
- 2 small tents for followers, 2 mules.
- Medicines, 3 mule-loads.
- Medicines of medical depôt, 3 mules and 1 camel.
- Swiss milk, 3 mules.
- Bazar medicines, &c., 2 mules.
- Four days' supplies for all, 2 mules.
- Spare, 1 mule.



The regimental hospital system is to remain undisturbed through the operations.

Lushai dandis are almost exclusively used; it is the best form of dandy, being light, comfortable, and easily repaired in the field.

Hospital carriage :

1 per cent. dulis, 4 per cent. dandis.

2 per cent. kajawahs for fighting men.

3 per cent. carriage for followers.

—(From notes by Surgeon Coates.)

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MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

No. 8, APRIL 1881.

No. 689, dated 5th April 1881.

From—W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government, Punjab,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to your No. 539 E.P., dated 24th March, on the subject of an expedition against the Mashud-Waziris, I am desired to submit, for the approval of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General, a draft proclamation, which the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to issue to the chief men of the tribe, warning them of the intentions of the British Government, and granting them a final opportunity of submitting to the terms demanded in satisfaction of their offences.

2. I am to solicit early orders upon the subject of this communication. The proclamation has been printed in triplicate *facsimile*, one copy being retained in this office and one furnished to Major Macaulay, so that reference to the purport of any line in it will be readily made, and the Lieutenant-Governor trusts that he may receive instructions by telegraph.

3. The expeditionary force will probably be ready to enter the Mahsud country on the 12th instant, and it is desirable to issue the proclamation so that the days of grace may expire about that time.

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No. 690.

Copy of the above forwarded to Colonel S. Black, Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department.

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*Proclamation to the Maliks of the Mahsud-Waziris and all whom it may concern.*

In the years 1873 and 1874 the Shaman Khel and Bahlolzai branches of the Mahsud-Waziris entered into treaty engagements with the British Government, with which for a long time previously they had been at enmity. They then promised to maintain friendly relations with the British Government, and agreements were taken from them, of which the object was to secure the British border against predatory incursions and murderous assaults by members of the tribe. As a guarantee for their good faith and security for their good conduct, they gave several representative members of their clan as hostages.

Again, when in November 1878 the British army advanced upon Afghanistan, the Mahsud-Waziris, in common with other tribes on the border then at peace with the British Government, were warned of the consequences of preferring the hostility to the friendship of that Government.

The Mahsuds however, on the 1st of January 1879, violated their engagements, and, disregarding the warning conveyed to them, collected a body of 3,000 men of the tribe, who plundered the town of Tank and other villages, causing the loss of some lives and of much property in British territory. Since that time the Mahsuds have committed frequent offences within the British border, causing further injury to life and property, and disturbing the peace of British territory.

In order to punish this tribe for their misconduct, and to prevent a recurrence of it, the Government of India has offered the Mahsuds peace upon certain terms.

The British Government, desirous only of exacting justice, wishes that the Mahsuds should submit to these terms of their own accord, and without the compulsion of a military force. The terms have been announced publicly to the Mahsuds for some time past, but hitherto the tribe has not tendered its submission. Now again the British Government gives a final opportunity to the Mahsuds to comply with these terms, and to send in delegates from all branches of the tribe to make arrangements for paying the fine and compensation.

If this is not done, then it is the will of the Viceroy and Governor General in Council that the British forces should enter the Mahsud country, to enforce these terms and inflict such punishment on the tribe as may seem good.

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Telegram, dated 8th April 1881.

From—Lahore,  
From—Secretary,

To—Tank.  
To—MAJOR MACAULAY.

You have received *facsimile* copy of proclamation and foreign telegram of 7th. You can now issue in Persian and Pashtu proclamation as modified by foreign telegram. This should be done as soon as possible.

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Copy of above forwarded to Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department, for information.

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No. 735, dated Lahore, 11th April 1881.

From—W. M. YOUNG, Esq., Secretary to the Government, Punjab,  
To—MAJOR C. E. MACAULAY.

You have already been informed by telegram of your appointment as Political Officer to accompany the expedition about to proceed against the Mahsud-Waziris. I am desirous to forward herewith, for your information and guidance, copies of the papers marginally noted and with reference to the letter from the Secretary to Government of India in the Foreign Department, to communicate the following instructions for your guidance in the performance of your duties.

Proceedings 1A. of January 1881.  
Military Secretary's No. 740, dated 24th February 1881, and enclosures.  
Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 539 E.P., dated 24th March.

*Vide* Proceedings 13A., Foreign, March 1881.  
*Vide* Proceedings 10½A., Foreign, April 1881.

2. Subject to the orders of Government in this department, you will exercise sole authority in regard to all political matters connected with the expedition, and will convey to the General Commanding the force the orders of the Government regarding the objects of the expedition and the treatment of persons and property captured or surrendered. You should refer all matters of importance direct for the orders of Government, and report the progress of the expedition and all important or urgent news in triplicate telegrams to this Government, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and to the Commissioner of the Derajat Division.

3. Enclosed is a copy of a proclamation which you should proceed to make known to the Mahsud chiefs without any delay. Should these latter show any desire to come to terms, every facility must be afforded to enable them to fulfil their intentions. If the terms demanded are not fulfilled within such time as you think reasonable, the force will advance.

4. The object of the expedition is to compel the Mahsuds to submit to the terms which have been offered them by the Government, *viz.* :—

*First.*—The surrender of all property plundered on the 1st of January 1879 and subsequently up to the date of any settlement which may be made, or payment of compensation for the value of it.

*Second.*—The payment of a fine of Rs. 30,000.

*Third.*—The surrender of six headmen, ringleaders in the disturbance of January 1879, namely, Umar Khan, Yarak, and Matin (Alizai), Bozak, Azmat, and Mushak (Bahlolzai).

The third condition is one which was sanctioned by the Government of India in 1879, and it is desirable to enforce it. But it is not one the fulfilment of which is considered absolutely essential to the acceptance of the submission of the Mahsuds. It is not one for the sake of which the Government would enter upon, or continue, hostilities, and may be relaxed, if its non-fulfilment is the sole obstacle to the submission of the tribe, and if the other conditions are fulfilled.

If no submission is tendered, the expeditionary force will, under the orders of the Brigadier-General Commanding, visit all parts of the Mahsud-Waziri country which it may be practicable to enter within a reasonable time. The order in which various places are visited and the duration of the stay must be left to the General Commanding, who will be directed to consult you as to how his movements should be regulated so as to produce the best effect.

5. All fortified places visited by the troops should be destroyed. The houses and property of the ringleaders, and of all persons who are known to have been directly concerned in the raid on Tank, or in the commission of other offences on the British frontier, should be destroyed or seized, the cattle lifted, and the crops utilised for fodder or destroyed. The same punishment should be meted out to the villages, which seek to obstruct the march of the troops, or offer them any opposition. If a village is deserted by its inhabitants, the same measures will ordinarily be resorted to, unless the Political Officer should be of opinion that there is special reason for exercising leniency. The Lieutenant-Governor considers that severe punishment must be inflicted on a tribe of whose male population so large a proportion joined in the audacious attack upon the town of Tank in January 1879. The tribe, in fact, must be regarded as having offended *en masse*, and as liable, therefore, to punishment in a body. But His Honour is anxious to afford an opportunity

to those persons who have not signalised themselves by any offence against the British Government, and who desire to submit, to capitulate, if they should be so disposed, and thus save themselves and their property from ruin; therefore, if upon the approach of the troops to any village a deputation adequately representing the inhabitants shall sue for pardon, then, provided they have not been directly involved in any of the offences committed by the tribe, they should be treated with consideration, and allowed to remain in their homes, receiving payment for any supplies which may be taken from them for the use of the troops. They should, however, be disarmed, and a certain number of the headmen may be detained as hostages at your discretion.

6. If at any time during the progress of the expeditionary force the tribe through its representatives submits and offers to fulfil the terms demanded by the Government as above explained, it will be for you to receive their overtures; and for you and the General Commanding to decide, with advertence to the actual circumstances of the time, the attitude of the tribe and the nature of the offers made by them, whether such overtures warrant any relaxation of military operations.

7. It is possible that some alteration in, or addition to, the terms hitherto demanded from the Mahsuds may be necessary, according as events shall develop; but all proposed modifications must be referred to this Government for orders, and the Political Officer must not, of his own authority, change the terms which have been sanctioned by the Government of India.

8. Levies may be called out, if you consider this necessary, for keeping open the lines of communication with the force, or for other duties.

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No. 737.

Copy of above forwarded to Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department, for information.

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Telegram, dated 13th April 1881.

From—Tank,  
From—GENERAL KENNEDY,

To—Lahore,  
To—Lieutenant-Governor.

*Tank, 13th April.*—Following message, dated 12th, from Quarter Master General:—*Message begins*: "Clear the line. Simla, 12th April. Your plan of operations being approved of, you are authorised to carry it into effect without delay. Report movements regularly to this office."—*Message ends. My reply begins*:—"Tank 13th April. Your clear the line message of 12th, directing me to carry out my plan, shall be complied with as soon as possible. Reports shall be duly submitted."—*Reply ends*.

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No. 1575, dated Lahore, 13th April 1881.

From—COLONEL S. BLACK, Secy. to the Govt. of the Punjab, Military Dept.,  
To—The Brigadier-General Commanding Mahsud-Waziri Expeditionary Force.

I am desired to forward, for your information and guidance, a copy of the  
 1. Instructions to Major Macaulay. instructions issued in the Foreign Department  
 2. Proclamation to Mahsuds. to Major Macaulay, in respect to the political  
 scope and object of the expeditionary force now assembling at Tank under



your personal command for the coercion of the Mahsud-Waziris, and a copy of the proclamation which has been issued to the Mahsuds with the sanction of the Government of India.

2. His Honour has endeavoured to define Major Macaulay's political functions, so that they may in no way interfere with your military operations when the troops once take the field, or have to act in coercing the tribe into submission to the terms of Government, which have for their object a full reparation for the past misconduct of the tribe and some guarantee for future good behaviour.

All overtures for peace will be received by Major Macaulay as Political Officer, and will be considered by Major Macaulay and yourself, as stated in paragraph 6 of the letter of instructions; and His Honour feels sure that you will do all in your power to assist any negotiations that may be made to effect a settlement.

3. At the same time, His Honour wishes to leave to you a wide discretion in carrying out all the military details of the expedition, and he trusts that these will not in any way suffer by the action of the Political Officer. You will determine how the force should proceed, what valleys and strongholds shall first be visited, what time to stay in each particular locality, and the routes which shall be adopted, provided, of course, that your operations are not taken beyond Mahsud limits. If it should happen that in the midst of any of your dispositions for an attack any offer is made by the tribesmen to negotiate, it is left to you to determine, in consultation with the Political Officer, whether your operations should be delayed or not.

4. Major Macaulay will convey to you the political orders of Government, and he will be able to indicate the several chiefs whose punishment or capture or surrender it is desired to effect, and also what forts or towers or residences should be destroyed. But His Honour is anxious that if the conditions imposed are not complied with, the force should traverse and explore as much of the Mahsud hills as possible, and that your operations should be deliberate and free from all appearance of haste.

5. The general views of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor regarding the movements of the expedition are expressed in the correspondence which was forwarded to the Government of India with this Department letter No. 100-739 of the 24th February last, a copy of which has already been furnished to you. The course of operations has been much modified by the formation of a reserve brigade under your orders. You have submitted final proposals for the combined movements of the expeditionary force and the reserve in your telegram of the 9th instant to the Government of India, Military Department. In these proposals the Lieutenant-Governor generally concurs, though, with reference to what I have said above, the Lieutenant-Governor hopes that you will be able to procure surveys of such parts of the Waziri and Bhattanni country as have not been explored; and in this view he regrets that the valley of Umar Ragzha is not to be visited.

6. In making these remarks, His Honour does not wish you to consider them as more than suggestions, which may be carried out if practicable. He is aware that a very wide discretion must be allowed to you to act as circumstances may dictate, and he does not desire in any way to limit the exercise of that discretion, feeling confident that your own experience and ability will guide you to make use of the force under your command in the manner most conducive to the interests of Government.

7. You will observe from the instructions in the Civil Department (paragraph 8) that Major Macaulay has been authorised to employ a body of levies; but if these men are taken across the border, they are to be under your orders, and must not be employed, excepting with your approval. The number of men employed should be reported.

8. With reference to paragraph 4 of the Government of India's letter No. 340B. of the 12th March, in which it is stated that "it is by no means certain that these weapons (breech-loaders) may not be found with some of the Waziris,"—His Honour wishes you to bear this point in mind, and to endeavour during the course of your operations to verify the above statement. All the information before this Government leads His Honour to suppose that the Mahsud section, at least, have not better arms now than they had in 1860.

9. In conclusion, I am to invite attention to the Government of India's letter No. 342B. of the 12th ultimo, and to request that full reports of your proceedings may be telegraphed to the Adjutant General of the Army and to this Government.

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No. 1575A.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, for the information of the Government of India. With reference to paragraph 8 of the above letter, the Lieutenant-Governor wishes to be favoured with any information in the possession of the Government of India which supports the impression that the Mahsud section of the Waziris have any breech-loading weapons, or any firearms better than they had in 1860.

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No. 1575B.

Copy forwarded to Civil Department for information.

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Telegram No. 422, dated 13th April 1881.

From—Lahore,

To—Tank,

From—Military Secretary,

To—GENERAL KENNEDY.

Your message of to-day to Lieutenant-Governor. Letter of instructions regarding your relations with Political Officer posted to-day.

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Under the supervision of the Deputy Surgeon-General, Frontier Circle, he was directed by wire to communicate with Senior Medical Officer, Edwardesabad, and to complete hospital requirements. (Hitherto it was not understood that his supervision extended to General Gordon's Brigade.)

*Sunday, 17th, Tank.*—The river Zam visited by Assistant Quarter Master General and Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, and found to be in flood, which, however, appeared to be somewhat subsiding. The water in

places was 3' 6" in depth and very rapid, though doubtless with the crossings could be effected at less depth. It was stated by the detachment of the Zam outpost that the greatest flood occurred shortly after midnight of last night.

A smart thunderstorm, with rain, passed over Tank in the evening.

Lieutenant Blunt, R.E., Superintendent, Signalling, has utilised the spare evenings from 12th to 17th for camp signalling with 4th Punjab Cavalry, 1st Punjab Infantry, 2nd Punjab Infantry, 4th Punjab Infantry.

The following arrangements were ordered for forage on line of march (khasil). The force was divided off into 3 portions (1) 1st brigade, (2) 2nd brigade, (3) all others : each to give a forage guard.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lance was to give all orders as to the places whence khasil was to be cut. The forage guards were to report to him on halting days at sunrise—on marching days as soon as possible after reaching camp.

Camel guards were to graze under regimental arrangements, the commissariat camels under a guard of 1 native officer and 50 of 1st Sikh Infantry.

Transport animals were ordered to receive 1 seer grain on days when forage was plentiful, this allowance to be raised to 2 seers when it was scarce; Colonel Lance being deputed to issue the necessary orders regulating this.

*18th April, camp Zam.*—The force marched at 5-30 A.M. to Zam, distance about  $7\frac{1}{2}$  to 8 miles.

The baggage, &c., passed off without any hitch. The road had previously been worked on by No. 8 Company Sappers and Miners and 32nd Pioneers; small bridges over watercuts being widened, &c. West of the Zam post, the

\* Which runs in numerous ramifications of channels. Zam river was crossed; the stream\* was swollen and rapid, but presented no real difficulty to laden mules.

Camp was pitched about a mile north-west of Zam post and on right bank of the Zam or one of its branches, on ground very stony and sloping gradually from hills on the west, distant from camp about 1,500 yards; their underfeatures on the west almost melting on the camp boundaries. Altitude of crest 2,150 feet above sea.

The march having commenced at 5-30, the baggage of the force had filed off at 8-10 A.M. The commissariat camels, with general supplies began to file past at 8-10 and had all started by 10-15. The rear guard started at 10-30 A.M. and reached camp at 3-30 P.M.

Reconnaissances were made of the route to Kirghi by the Zam river and by a hill road over the range west of camp, but owing to the swollen state of the river, the hill road was believed to be preferable (*via* road known as the Zam and Giri).

In the afternoon the following Waziri chiefs having come in for the Azmat }  
Bahlolzai { purpose of discussing overtures of peace were allowed  
Boyak } to proceed to the Zam outpost, and a halt was ordered  
for the 19th.

Signalling with Sheikh Bâdin carried out, distance 28 miles.

The transport with which the force has been supplied is, generally speaking, excellent. Officers of some experience in the late Afghan campaign state they have never seen its equal on the whole.

Several of the camels are bad, some too young for hard work.

There is an alternative site for a camp for a large force about  $1\frac{1}{4}$  mile north of Zam post, but it is intersected by water-courses from the Zam. These are ordinarily dry, but have recently been filled on occasion, whilst the Zam has been in flood.

At Zam camp firewood (on the spot) scarce. Camel grazing sufficed for the camels of the force; grass little or none just now, though later on, it is found chiefly on the low hills west of camp. "Khasil" for cattle at about a mile south of camp. Water of the Zam good.

Arrangements had been made for a day's rations being sent to Zam, Kot Kirghi and Jhandola,\* so that the 12 days' supplies with which the force started, and 4 days' supplies in regimental charge should start intact from Jhandola.

\* By Bhittanni carriage.

There are rations altogether with the force for 16 days complete.

*19th April, Zam.*—Halt. Omur Khan, Matin, and Hashim (son of Yatin) surrendered to the demands of Government. They were formally made prisoners and marched to the Zam post under an escort of 1 Native officer, 50 picked men, 4th Sikh Infantry, under Major Scott, Bengal Cavalry, and on the following day were marched to Tank, and Omur Khan was thence sent in by mail cart to be imprisoned in the jail at Dera Ismail Khan.

*20th April, Zam.*—Halt. Reconnoitring parties were sent out to report on the state of the river Zam which had considerably reduced in volume. Early in the morning a jirgah of Mahsud Waziris was received by the political officer and Brigadier-General in camp.

Arrangements were made for carrying the telegraph wire to Jhandola.

The road to Jhandola was reconnoitred by Lieutenant Manners-Smith, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.

*21st April, Kot Kirghi.*—The force marched to Kot Kirghi at 5-30 A.M., distance  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles.

The artillery and 2nd Punjab Infantry marched by the zigzag or Girni† route over the low hills west of camp. The rest of the force by the ordinary Zam road. The river was in no places (care having been taken to mark out with stones the line of fords the day previously) more than about 2' 6". On the 19th April Major E. Codrington having proceeded sick to Punjab Field Force Head Quarters, Captain Roupell, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Musketry, was nominated Assistant Adjutant General of the Field Force.

The space required for Camp was as follows :—

		Square yards.
Native Infantry Regiments	$50 \times 150 = 9,000$ 8 regiments	= 72,000
1st Battery	$80 \times 100 = 2\frac{1}{2}$ British ditto.	= 16,000
4th Punjab Cavalry	$130 \times 100$	= 13,000
1st Punjab Cavalry	$80 \times 100$	= 8,000
Sappers and Royal Engineer Park	$50 \times 100$	= 5,000
Head-quarters	$60 \times 60$	= 3,600
Political camp		= 4,000
Commissariat, field hospital, transport officers		= 20,000
	Total	141,600



If the flank—front admitted of about 150 yards for either face; total about 300; the face would be about 500 yards, the most convenient form. The above includes intervals of 10 yards between corps.

*21st April, Kot Kirghi.*—Plateau, all, except 1st Sikh Infantry, 32nd Pioneers, Royal Engineers, Signalling party and all Commissariat cattle. These latter were encamped at the Kachi at the foot of the cliffs under Kot Kirghi, on right bank of Zam. The Kirghi plateau is about 150 feet above level of the Zam to which the drop is precipitous (a cliff of conglomerate). The plateau affords an excellent encamping ground for an unlimited number of men; ground stony, but the stones are mostly small and of no practical inconvenience; natural drainage good; soil more or less sandy and dotted with small tufts of grass. (The plateau just now is fairly well covered with the "prophet flower.")

The water-supply is more or less of a difficulty. From the Zam post, about 200 yards south, two roads lead down to the Zam river, distance from the post about  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile; road good, and north of it are two bad tracks down to the water, distance to water perhaps  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles.

Firewood none, except that brought in by contractors. Green crops in the Kachi below the post. Camel fodder sufficient.

Signalling communication with Sheikh Bûdin, at a point 300 yards north of post, distance 35 miles.

*22nd April, Jhandola.*—The force marched at 5-30 A.M. The rear guard started at 2 P.M. and arrived at 5-15 P.M. Distance about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles. The water of the Zam, which is crossed frequently, was swollen and in places somewhat difficult from its velocity, though with care, crossings could be effected at 3' throughout if not less.

Camp was pitched on the Chin-Chin Kachi about 1 mile past the Innis Tangi. At this spot on the left bank of the river is a considerable irregular-shaped level, under grass, and another level rising from it a few feet with an average width of 220 yards and of very considerable extent east to west. From this northerly rises a low ridge about 60 or 100 feet, the top of which is a stony plateau on which a considerable force could be encamped.

Grass plentiful; a few isolated trees dotted here and there. Camel-grazing fairly plentiful. Firewood sufficient. A road report was made by

\* Distance to Sheikh Bûdin 40 miles. Lieutenant C.M. Smith. Signalling with Sheikh Bûdin\* was carried out by an intermediate post

† Altitude 3,500. on the hill† rising south of Innis Tangi. Sheikh Bûdin was, however, unable to communicate with Dera Ismail Khan (by reason of summer haze it is presumed).

A field telegraph office in camp was opened.

The orders for the cavalry were to lead (on reaching openg round, and, leaving  $\frac{1}{2}$  the number at Jhandola on picquet duty, to reconnoitre as far as Dotak (the junction of the Shahor and Zam).

A cavalry reconnaissance was made as far as the Shahor Tangi and tools were issued to Waziri workmen for road-making purposes.

The change in temperature at Jhandola (especially at night) was appreciable.

The force having crossed the British border, the men became entitled to free rations from this date, and followers to Kabul rates of pay.

As an indication of the nature of the encamping grounds and the measures necessary for rendering them secure against night attacks, it might have seemed useful to record the number of men on picquet duty each night. On second thought, however, it seems this would be fallacious, considering that the Waziri tribe, *en masse*, cannot be considered hostile and that (where intelligence shows that no large gathering is possible), precautions have to be taken against thieves rather than against a regular night attack, as a rule.

Picquets doubtless will not be considered superfluous, but their strength so far is much less than a state of active hostility would demand.

Having observed the 4th Sikh Infantry to have a very neat looking cooking pot equipment, I asked the Adjutant to oblige me with a copy of the orders under which it originated. This is attached.

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*Extract of a letter from COLONEL H. BOISRAGON, Commanding 4th Sikhs and Dera Ismail Khan District, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force,—No. 31-Q., dated Dera Ismail Khan, 10th March 1880.*

\* \* \* \* \*

3. The following is the plan of the cooking utensils now made up.

One side of the mule are the Sikh degchies, &c., as originally proposed, *viz.*, 2 degchies Bombay pattern with covers, one going into the other, 10 batties fitting (not too exactly) one into another, 10 lotahs glass pattern in sets of 5, one fitting into another, 4 tawas, 1 spoon in two pieces, screwing one into the other.

As it appeared unadvisable to put the Purbeah and Dogra cooking dishes, &c., into the Mahomedan degchies, the following arrangement was made for the other side of the mule :—

*For the Mahomedans—*

2 degchies with 2 covers half the size of the Sikh ones, one fitting into the other, 6 batties, 3 tawas, 4 lotahs in two sets, 1 spoon in two pieces as before.

*For the Dogras and Purbeahs—*

15 batties, 15 lotahs in 3 sets of 5, one fitting into the other, glass-shaped, but with rims for convenience of cooking dal in 4 tawas.

These two sets of cooking utensils (*viz.*, the Mahomedans and the Dogras and Purbeahs) are of the same weight as those of the Sikhs, and balance them on the other side of the mule. On the top of the mule instead of one large loh, two small ones have been made, the larger of the two for the Sikhs, the smaller for the Mahomedans.

On testing these cooking utensils, a difficulty appeared in matter of some vessel for holding water in, while the cooking operations were going. This has been overcome by making up three goat-skin mussucks, two for Sikhs, &c., one for Mahomedans. Besides these there are also by regulations one per company. Before cooking commences, these are filled and left on the ground, the men helping themselves as they require.

Round the top of each set of degchies and round the Dogra and Purbeahs' vessels is placed a piece of *tūt*, which is drawn taut by string, and keeps the whole thing firm, and prevents anything shaking. Instead of

straps, as before proposed, the cooking vessels are carried in small Tangars made up for them; this appeared more serviceable and did away with a probable objection on the part of the Purbeahs to their vessels being carried inside leather.

4. On the 21st ultimo, I had these cooking utensils tested under the superintendence of Lieutenant V. C. Tonnochy. A company of full strength (*i.e.*, 112 men) were set down to cook their food, bringing nothing with them, the utensils and food being supplied on the spot. They were allowed, however, to make use of the "kauls" (little drinking cups) that each man carried in his haversack on service. This is an old custom in my regiment. Lieutenant V. C. Tonnochy reported that the whole thing took, if anything, under two hours including the making of the "chúlas" or fire places.

The men ate their usual morning meal; were the company smaller and more haste required, the cooking could be done in much less time.

5. The weight of the whole of the cooking apparatus is 77 seers 12 chittacks, that of the mussucks is 4 seers 9½ chittacks, and the total of the whole, including the *tāt* and the "tangars," is 181 lbs., which is a little above the regulation Kabul scale; but this could not be avoided in making up a set for the first time. It will be observed, moreover, that as a mule can carry much more than 181 lbs. (the regulation being 2½ maunds) there is plenty of room for a few pounds of camp followers cooking things if it be necessary, but in general the latter would eat with their companies.

Batties are dishes like very flat bowls used by the Hindus. The Mahomedan dishes are called "tashes" or "thalis," and are more like an ordinary plate. A "tawa" is shaped like a saucer, and is of thin wire.

The cooking utensils are marked with the company letter (in vernacular) and with class (as "Sikh" "Mussalman" "Dogra" "Purbeah").

*Cooking utensils of one Company 4th Sikh Infantry Service Scale.*

Details.		Nc. of cooking utensils per company.	Height of each.		Width of each.		Depth of each.		Total weight of each set.		
			Feet.	Inches.	Feet.	Inches.	Feet.	Inches.	Seers.	Chittacks.	
<i>Sikhs' cooking utensils.</i>											
Outer degchie	} copper	2	1	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	1	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	10	10	
Cover of degchie		2	...	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	...	...	2	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Outer glass	} brass	10	...	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	5 $\frac{3}{4}$	...	...	6	...	
" batti		10	...	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	2	...	...	10	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	
" spoon	... wood	1	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Tawa	... iron	4	...	...	...	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	1	1	
Loh	... "	1	...	...	2	4	...	...	6	4	
Mussuck	... goat-skin	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	
<i>Mussalmans' cooking utensils.</i>											
Outer degchie	} copper	2	...	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	4	...	...	6	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Cover of degchie		2	...	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	1	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	...	...	2	2	
Outer glass	... "	4	...	5 $\frac{3}{4}$	...	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	1	13	
Plate or dish	... "	6	...	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	5	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Spoon	... wood	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Tawa	... iron	1	1	5 $\frac{3}{4}$	...	...	...	...	...	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Loh	... "	3	...	...	...	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	...	13	
Mussuck	... goat-skin.	1	...	...	1	8	...	...	4	1	
		1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	14	
<i>Dogras and Purbeahs' cooking utensils.</i>											
Lotah, outer	... brass	15	...	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	6	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Batti "	... "	15	...	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	1	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	11	15	
Tawa	... iron	4	...	...	...	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	...	...	1	1	
Tangars, &c., per company	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	9	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Scale of 2 lbs. = 1 seer.											
Total		...	86						mds. seers	chs.	
Total weight each company ...									2	10	1 $\frac{1}{2}$

Measurements, height and width, are of the outer vessel of each set.

Parties detached from 4th Sikh Infantry during the Mahsud-Waziri Expedition with the cooking utensils apportioned them:—

1. STANDING ESCORT TO COMMISSARIAT.

Mahomedans—		20 Rifles.		Dogras and Purbeahs.	
3 thalis	...	Sikhs—	3 battis	...	5 battis.
2 glasses	...	...	3 glasses	...	5 glasses.
2 tawas	...	...	2 tawas	...	3 tawas.
1 degchie and cover.					
1 mussuck.					



The above being detailed at Tank, were, in addition to the 6-company sets taken by the regiment, and were in excess of what would otherwise have been given :—

## 2. EXPEDITION TO PIR GHAL MOUNTAIN.

### 100 Rifles.

<i>Mahomedans—</i>	<i>Sikhs—</i>	<i>Dogras and Purbeahs.</i>
9 thalis	... 14 battis	... 12 battis.
9 glasses	... 14 glasses	... 12 glasses.
2 degchies and covers	... 2 degchies and covers	... 4 tawas.
1 lotah	... 2 tawas.	
1 mussuck	... 1 lotah.	
	... 2 mussucks.	

## 3. DETACHMENTS FOR OUTPOSTS SENT OFF FROM JHANDOLA.

### Girni, 31 rifles.

<i>Mahomedans—</i>	<i>Sikhs—</i>	<i>Dogras and Purbeahs.</i>
3 thalis	... 1 degchie and cover	... 3 battis.
3 glasses	... 3 battis	... 3 glasses.
3 tawas	... 3 glasses	... 2 tawas.
1 mussuck	... 3 tawas.	

### Jatta, 50 rifles.

<i>Mahomedans—</i>	<i>Sikhs—</i>	<i>Dogras and Purbeahs.</i>
4 thalis	... 4 battis	... 5 battis.
4 glasses	... 4 glasses	... 5 glasses.
1 degchie and cover	... 1 degchie and cover	... 3 tawas.
1 lotah	... 1 lotah.	
1 mussuck.		

### Manji, 30 rifles.

<i>Mahomedans—</i>	<i>Sikhs—</i>	<i>Dogras and Purbeahs.</i>
3 thalis	... 3 battis	... 3 battis.
3 glasses	... 3 glasses	... 3 glasses.
1 degchie and cover	... 1 degchie and cover	... 2 tawas.
1 lotah	... 3 tawas.	
1 mussuck.		

The above distribution was made entirely by the Native officers. At no time during the expedition was any complaint made that these utensils were insufficient.

They stood the work well. The wooden spoons got broken, but were serviceable, and one glass was lost. The mussucks were used indifferently by Sikhs and Mahomedans.

V. C. TONNOCHY, *Lieutenant,*  
*4th Sikh Infantry.*

*Strength.*  
80 sabres Cavalry.  
250 of 1st Sikhs.  
250 „ 4th „  
250 „ 1st Punjab Infy.  
250 „ 32nd Pioneers.  
Sappers (detachment).

23rd April, Jhandola.—Halt. A reconnaissance was ordered under Lieutenant-Colonel Rice's orders to the Shahor Tangi, starting at 5 A.M., and to return by sunset.

Lieutenant Manners-Smith, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, accompanied.

*Note.*—It should have been mentioned that a spirit vendor was all owed to accompany the camp, with a small supply of rum, &c., also a flock of milch goats. Throughout the campaign this shop was not abused, and to certain Native officers, &c., it doubtless proved a great convenience.

The Engineers were employed (chiefly in blasting) on road-making through part of the Shahor Tangi.

*24th April, Kach.*—Marched to Kach. The route survey was made by Lieutenant Manners-Smith. Distance 9 miles. At Haidari Kach, or at least after issuing from the Shahor Tangi, there are 3 camping grounds, (1) that on a plateau at the angle between the junction of the Shahor and Spalita. This is an excellent ground (but about 200 feet above water level) as a defensible position for a large camp, it is all that could be desired; (2) that at the foot of this in the Spalita Algad which is sufficient for a considerable force; (3) Haidari Kachi the open space on 2 banks, Shahor and S. of above-named plateau. It afforded the force a very good camp, but a rocky range of hills, shut it in from the south, necessitating pickets.

In addition to the supplies with which the force marched, 2,058 sheep were driven. These were sheep of the plains. For future expedition the Commissariat officer recommends that, if possible, hill *doombas* be procured. Our sheep soon began to suffer from foot-soreness.

The orders for the cavalry were to precede the force to the Shahor Tangi, and there to draw up in line and await the arrival of remainder.

The lower parts of this Kachi are liable to irrigation from deep and broad water-cuts brought down from the Shahor.

Grass plentiful; camel fodder ditto; firewood fairly ditto. Green crops available.

In the Spalita Algad, which was reconnoitred, there were no signs of cultivation or habitation for about 2 miles at all events.

It was generally remarked that this camp was not so airy as Jhandola, and apparently warmer in spite of the increased altitude.

Hitherto not a trace of any habitation from Jhandola onwards has been seen, nor flocks, herds, nor signs of life on this day's march. The camels began to file past at 9-30 A.M., and although sappers and pioneers were working on the road yesterday and to-day with a good deal of blasting, the last of them did not reach camp till 11 P.M.

(As an instance of the impoverished state of the country, it may be remarked that a Waziri to whom a reward was about to be made for some minor service, was offered Re. 1. This he declined, begging that in lieu a seer of atta might be given him.)

The force having left Jhandola, the line of telegraph wire was left in charge of Bhattannis, the office establishment returning to Kirghi.

Signalling communication with Sheikh Bûdin from the summit of Kar Gundi, distance 46 miles.

*25th April (Toorun China as in map or more correctly Tarun China).*—The short distance was appreciated by the camels, which arrived late yesterday, and had no food.

The report of route was done by Lieutenant Manners-Smith.

Tarun China\* is the name of a spring "The Spring of Tarun." It issues near the foot of a low hill jutting out on to the right bank of the Shahor. Its capacity is about 1,000 gallons per minute (roughly estimated), and after

\* Tarun China to top of Spalita Narai, say 6 miles, and thence 3 miles on to Mashak's village. For the last 1½ miles pass several villages of Abdul Rahman Kheyls (or caves rather) and patches of cultivation. The highest of all the caves was Mashak's.

being worked upon by the Royal Engineers. The water-supply for cattle was in a stream, about a mile south of camp, plentiful. Camel-grazing plentiful. Wood in sufficient quantity. The force encamped on right bank of stream, commencing at the low hill above mentioned. Ground is ample; part of the force was encamped on cultivated ground; crops having been cut (and paid for) but irrespective of this is an uncultivated space sufficient for the camp of a large force; ground good, and bounded by a ridge of hills.

The rear guard leaving Haidari Kach at 9-50 A.M. arrived at 1-45 P.M.; distance 5 miles. The cavalry reconnoitred to within 2 miles of Barwand. A reconnaissance of Sarmashi which had previously been ordered was countermanded.

At Tarun China is the small square insignificant mud fort of Mula Haibat (Sheikh). A signal party ascended to Tijal Kheyl hill, altitude about 4,600, and signalled to S. Bûdin, which was clearly distinguished, but did not succeed in obtaining a reply.

*26th April, Barwand.*—Distance about 7 miles, and quite easy.

About a mile, after leaving camp, a broad level open treeless plain on right bank of Shahor Nullah was traversed for some 2 miles (waterless); parts of it are cultivated at times apparently. The land belongs to the Shaman Kheyl; that on the left bank of the Shahor to the Alizai. Then the road drops down into the Shahor at a point where a low hill juts out on to its bank. Thence forward the road traverses the Shahor if the encamping ground at Barwand is to be on the left bank of the Shahor, or if it is to be on the right bank, after following the bed of the nullah for about a mile and at a point where another hill juts out on to its right bank, it ascends the right bank, which is generally scarped, and traverses a level plateau.

Camp was pitched at the west of this plateau with one side resting

\* Right. Total distance about 7 miles. on the high bank\* of the Shahor. Water plentiful in the Shahor. Camel-grazing excellent.

Firewood available. Khasil crops sufficient for requirements.

A very severe thunderstorm came on just as the camp was being pitched, rain continuing (heavy at first, afterwards slight) for about 2 hours. The rear guard, starting at 8 A.M., reached camp at 12 o'clock noon.

A portion of the force under command of Colonel Chambers accompanied by Head-Quarters marched at 4 A.M., for Mashook's residence in Spalita, up the nullah running north from Tarun China, crossing a range to south of the Spalita by the "Spalita Narai Kotal" it dropped into the Spalita Algaḍ and looked up Mashak's village, which was found deserted. The green corn was eaten up (say 4 jaribs, representing 40 maunds) and 2 caves blown in and terraces of

cultivation thrown down; damage in this matter alone say 200—300 rupees. Then proceeded in drenching rain 4 miles up Spalita Algaḍ and commenced ascending to south-west boundary of that valley on to a high plateau, on which was Umar Khan's Kot,† walled enclosure, about 40 yards square, 8' high wall, low flat-roofed houses; walls loopholed. This was spared.

† Mashalli.

The troops then struck a rugged and steep path to the Shahor so steep that horsemen had to dismount. Total country traversed, estimated as 18 miles. The rear guard was fired at on the steep descent down to Shahor.

(Above from notes by Colonel Clifford.) A vidette 1st Punjab Cavalry on camp picquet duty wounded by a bullet, this being the first casualty. Sheikh Bûdin visible from hill north-east of camp, but clouds prevented communication being opened up.

27th April.—During the night some firing at the picquets took place, no damage being done on our side; unfortunately the dâk-bearer was shot by the 3rd Punjab Infantry picquet. The Force marched at 5 A.M. with the object of reaching Narai Ragza reported to be about 6 miles off.

About 3 miles the column advanced, cavalry leading to a point where the hills close in. The 1st Sikhs were then ordered to form an advance guard, the cavalry falling back.

In this formation the troops advanced to within about a mile of the Narai Tangi defile. At this spot,\* about 6 miles from Barwand, a road branching off to the right (north-west) stated to be fit for camels and to turn entirely the Narai Tangi, was reconnoitred, the advance guard at the same time pushing through the Narai Tangi. The road on the right was found impracticable for camels (except on a pinch). Further, the Narai Tangi was quite impracticable. Its width would hardly enable a laden camel to pass through. A huge round rock rolled down from above has caught between the sides of the pass and rendered it virtually a short narrow tunnel. The height to this rock is sufficient to allow mounted men to pass under.

\* Raghza Tangi, alt. 4,750 (in original maps apparently "Sarfa-rez").

The words Narai and Tangi are apparently the same and mean "narrow."

The depth of water, when the river is at its (apparent to-day) normal depth, is about 3 feet in this Tangi.

The river-bed in this defile being, say, 4,800 feet, the hills on the north-west rise to a height of about 6,000 feet. It presents no real difficulties to infantry, and may be described as an isolated hill (connected with others on its north by a low saddle gap); over this gap the road made for the next day's march passes.

On the south-east of the pass the hills, though high, are not in reality very difficult for light infantry, if only opposed to matchlock men.

No signalling (to Derajat). Sheikh Bûdin not visible from any hill near camp.

Up to date no commissariat supplies have been purchased. To-day 1 maund of "goor" was bought by the Chief Commissariat Officer for Rs. 20.

It being impracticable to move on (either through the Narai or by the hill road to the north-west to Narai Ragza), camp was ordered to be pitched at the spot where the road branches off.

One brigade encamped on heights on left bank of Shahor, and 2 infantry regiments and all commissariat stores below, close to the stream. The rest of the force on the irregular spaces on the right bank. The commissariat camels arrived by 2 P.M. There is ample space for the encampment of a large force on heights (scarped to river's edge) on right bank of Shahor here;



but these heights are about 200 feet above river, and no good road down exists. Three faces of camp would be secure; the fourth or southern might require picquets, however, out some distances on hills, which command it from the south. Water excellent; camel-grazing ditto. Grass apparently scarce, khasil crops sufficient. Slight rain fell in the evening.

It is evident that the Waziri hills (in these parts at all events) become rounder and easy for infantry (by comparison with the hills on most parts of the frontier) the further the higher spurs are penetrated.

During this last march a few very insignificant hamlets were passed, also two water-mills and some curiously and ingeniously contrived water channels for irrigation purposes carried round ledges of rock and sometimes as such tunnelled. The destruction of these would cause great loss to the holders.

*28th April.*—A party of 100 men from each infantry regiment of the Punjab Field Force (7 regiments) and Pioneers and Sappers and workmen had been ordered over night to continue the work commenced previously by the Pioneers, road to next camp (Narai Tangi). A cavalry reconnaissance was to shoot ahead of these and to report on the road to Kundi Wam. It was found, however, that the Waziris to the extent of a few hundred were ready to contest the road, and the reconnaissance under the circumstances not being convenient, the road-making party was strengthened with the whole of the 4th Punjab Infantry, 3 guns, No. 4 Mountain Battery, and a company 6th Punjab Infantry.

There was a good deal of firing during the day, resulting in, it is believed, perhaps, 12 or more casualties to the Waziris, and 4 wounded on our part.

In the afternoon a very severe storm set in, and heavy rain continued until late at night. The night passed quietly. The letter bags to and from Kot Kirghi were plundered. The Field Hospital has been empty so far.

*29th April.*—The force marched about 7 A.M.; distance 4 miles. After marching about 2 miles, it was found the Waziris in great force were in position the same as yesterday. A reconnaissance in force and working party being necessary on the onward road, the whole force, except a part left to guard camp and the line of march of baggage, moved on, driving back the Waziris who, though making a show of resistance, in reality offered no opposition to the advance which was made as far as the Kotal, overlooking Kundi Wam. Casualty 1 man wounded. The last of the Commissariat camels did not reach camp till 11-45 P.M. (midnight.) The night passed generally quietly, a few shots only being fired by picquets at a few men prowling about.

On the 28th most of the men had a severe day's work; many of them were out road-making or covering working parties up to late hour, and for some time in a cold drenching rain. The picquets one and all (and a large number were necessitated by the nature of the ground) were in drenching cold rain, (minimum thermometer 56.5). Next morning it was noticed by several officers how cheerful they were on the bugle sounding for the march.

*30th April.*—The force marched at 5 A.M. The route lay up the bed of Kundi Wam. Distance officially stated as 7 miles. Should say 6. J. D. the Shane Wano stream, which was followed for about 2½ miles, gradient easy, bed sandy, a little trickling water in the bed.

This pass is in one sense easy in that a few men posted on the right and left on certain obvious situations command it well, the ascents to these generally being easy, but there is a good deal of brushwood and cover in ravines, in which adepts like the Waziris could find ground for lurking and annoying a long string of animals. The ascent then turns off to the Shane Wano Narai Kotal, and the road had to be made by the Pioneers. The summit of the Kotal is 5,850 feet, and taking into consideration that the last camp was 5,450 feet, the total rise from the bed of Shane Wano stream (which is descended to, immediately after leaving camp) to the top of the Kotal can only be about 600 feet; the actual pass itself, from where the road leaves the Shane Wano, is perhaps a rise of 300 feet in  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile.

From the summit of this pass a good view is obtained west-south-west.

Hence the road had to be made for  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile or so when it struck the Shane Zawa Nullah, a sandy bed, trickling stream, broad; easy descent with easy hills on either side. This was followed for about 2 miles and opened into the Kundi Wam hollow.

Camp was pitched on the west end of this hollow, one face overlooking the Khisora stream but about 200 feet above it. One face first under a ridge of hills at west of the "Wam" and taking in the country between this and the two large villages of Shabi Kheyls, and the rest of camp perpendicular to or parallel with these faces. The villagers were invited to retain possession of their villages undisturbed.

The camping ground had to be cleared of khasil before pitching.

This hollow is apparently sometimes known as Manzara.

The headmen are—

Kundi Wam, village under a tower	...	Head Pir Dad.
Shabi Kheyl (2 large villages)	...	Head Azam.
Kachi Kheyl	...	Head Daod Shah.
do. (?) (small hamlet)	...	Head Nadah.

It abounds in hill trout. Very good eating; and officers with leisure found amusement in fishing too; the fish were small.

Water abundant from the Shahor stream, here known as the Khisora. Grass apparently scarce. Camel fodder good. Wood sufficient.

The camels on this march did not leave camp till 6-45 P.M., reaching camp by 2 A.M. A few Waziris attempted to follow up the retirement and suffered a few casualties at the hands of the 4th Punjab Infantry; it is believed on the whole they showed no real opposition at a pass where they might have given a good deal of trouble.

From the ridge of hills west of camp (about 250 feet) above camp a good extensive view is obtained of the Khisora valley to the north-north-west and the well-to-do looking villages\* west of this hill in the direct

\* Of the Nana Kheyls.

road to Wano, which runs in a south-south-west direction, are apparently much frequented

tracts.

(From Kundi Wam it is said that men will start in the early morning, reach Kanigoram, make their purchases there, and return the same evening without any difficulty.)

A telegram was sent through Kirghi, directing General Gordon to march on Razmak with the hope that he would arrive there on the 6th, our own arrival at Kanigoram being timed for 5th May. The Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, was asked to arrange to have supplies for this force with him, so that operations might be extended in the direction of the Dawar country, if ordered by Government to operate therein.

The Kundi Wam or Manzara villages were found deserted. The inhabitants had gone mostly towards Kundi Ghar. One reason why they were vacated was stated to be that the fleas render them at this season uninhabitable!

*May 1st, Kundi Wam, halt, Sunday.*—Received letter bag from Tank. Time occupied in transit 44 hours.

With concurrence of principal medical officer and in consideration of possible scarcity of supplies later on, the following scale of rations was ordered for the future:—

		Fighting men (meat-eating.)	Fighting men (non-meat-eat- ing).	Followers.
Atta	...	10 chittácks.	16	10
Meat	...	6 „	0	0
Gram	...	2 „	2	2
Ghi	...	$\frac{1}{2}$ „	1	$\frac{1}{2}$
Salt	...	$\frac{1}{2}$ „	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Dhall	...	2 „ every other day.	2 daily.	2 daily.

(Telegram despatched from here to Kirghi on 1st May reached Kirghi 7 p.m. 2nd May.)

A telegram from the Military Secretary, Punjab Government, dated 1st May 1881, stated Major Macaulay had been informed, the Government did not approve of advancing on Kanigoram unless necessary to secure a admission of Nana Kheyls and Mashak.

*2nd May, Kundi Wam, halt.*—A reconnaissance strength as per margin started at 4-25 A.M. for the Kundi Ghar, mountain arrangements for safe conduct having been made with Shah Salim, Muchi Kheyl Alizai by the political officer.

Captain Martin, Survey Officer.  
Lieutenant Blunt, R.E., Signalling Officer.  
Major V. Rivaz, Commanding.  
1st Sikh Infantry Rifles 200.  
4th „ „ Rifles 200.  
1st Punjab Infantry „ }  
2nd „ „ „ } 50 each.  
3rd „ „ „ }  
4th „ „ „ }  
6th „ „ „ }

None but good climbers were to be allowed to go, one surhai dandy per regiment with 10 kahars, 1 pakhali mule per regiment (2 for 1st and 4th Sikh Infantry). The start was made at 4-35 A.M.

The following officers accompanied Lieutenant Manners-Smith, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Captain Dempster, Lieutenant Bunbury, Lieutenant Tonnochy, 4th Sikh Infantry.

1st Sikh Infantry	} Lieut.-Col Ross.
	} Lieut. Pollock.
Surgeon J. Sykes,	Surgeon C. Lukin.
Lieutenant Willcocks,	Transport Officer.
Captain W. Aitken,	Lieutenant W. Frith.
Lieutenant W. Carter,	1st Punjab Infantry.
Lieutenant E. Rodwell,	2nd Punjab Infantry.
Major Trotter,	32nd Pioneers.
Captain H. C. Halkett,	Pioneers.
Lieutenant E. de Brath,	"
Surgeon H. McKay,	"
Lieutenant Shone,	R.E.

"least one spring in the bed."

"From Kotal a very fair-made road leads down to a nullah which has a broad bed and though stony in parts, has on its bed a lot of black gravel; walking light and easy hills bordering it very pretty; rounded knolls densely covered with oak. Followed this nullah up for three-fourth hour and at 6-30 A.M. struck  $\frac{1}{2}$  right up a broadish spur by a path through the oak jungle. The spur narrowed as we ascended and the path became rather steep and rugged. Reached a neck between 2 high knolls at 6-55 A.M. (height 6,800 feet) spring below neck in glen, water very good. Time from camp 2 hours 20 minutes including 15 minutes halt. Kundi Ghar top lay to our right front from this neck. A path from it goes round the north side of the knoll east of the neck, I presume, to Barwand. Halted here for 1 hour and 20 minutes to fill up with water."

#### Phase II.

"8-15 A.M. Began ascent of knoll west of neck: ascent steep; bushes get sparser at top. Rocks many, both in slabs and boulders; difficult for horses; they however ascended to the top of Kundi Ghar as well as pakhali mules with  $\frac{1}{2}$  filled pakhals. At top of this high knoll, which is northerly of the mountain top first saw Wano open country with many villages. Wheeled left to reach the summit and followed the ridge southerly, passing over 3 or 4 knolls, reached the summit at 9-40 A.M., 1 hour 25 minutes from the neck and 3 hours 30 minutes going from camp. Add 1 hour 35 minutes' halt, and the time of ascent may be called 5 hours."

"The upper ridge of Kundi Ghar is rather bare of trees. The west slopes over Wano seem precipitous. I should say the ascent from Barwand is not difficult. The top over-looks Barwand camp and is marked by a grove of oaks under which grow larger and very sweet violets. There is a lot of dry hill grass on the top ridge. A kind of orchid (scentless) abounds. Also very sweet wild thyme and a small kind of cowslip which has little scent. There are also violets, forget-me-not, and a kind of small tulip (yellow)."

#### Views.—

"*Southerly*.—Across Wano and many ridges and peaks unknown to me. The line of the Gumal is seen marked by haze as the course of a river is by mist."

"*Westerly*—over Waziristan to the mountain of Pir Ghal and Shoi Dar."

"*Northerly*.—It seems the Gubber and beyond it the hills up to Kuram with the long line of the snowy Safed Koh closing the view."

"*Easterly*—the Derajat, yellow and hot, with haze and dust. Sheikh Budin looks small. Too hazy to see the Indus. Girni Zir close by with its queer, titled up rock strata. Takht-i-Suliman on this side looks craggy, serrated and rocky, and wants the look of repose the mountain has from the Derajat view."

"*Descents*.—Left 2-10 P.M. and got to Camp 5-45 P.M., 3 hours 35 minutes including a halt to assemble at the neck. Height of Kundi Ghar 8,400 (Martin)."

The following notes are from Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Ross, 1st Sikh Infantry:—

#### Phase I.

"Starting at 4-35 A.M. dipped off the camp plateau with a dry stony nullah just above its junction with the Kin Tak or Shahor stream."

"Ascended opposite bank by the village on that bank and kept outwards along the hill face to a glen south-east of camp, where we halted 15 minutes."

"Struck to our right up this glen just above the junction of its water with the Kin Tak. Marched up glen to a Kotal, reached at 5-45 (70 minutes) glen rocky, rough and narrow. Hills not very high, covered with oak. Water in glen comes down from the Kotal and also from at



Signalling-Lieutenant Blunt worked with Sheikh Bûdin with a 5" glass (distance 60 miles) received 5 and despatched 13 messages. Later on 28th Sheikh Bûdin was clearly visible, and signals could be read without glasses. Communication also kept up with Camp Kundi Wam during the day.

Major T. Bruce, 6th Punjab Infantry, Commanding.

1st Wing, 6th Punjab Infantry, Major Bruce.

1st Wing, 3rd Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant Gaitskell.

Colonel Godby, Major Fier-son.

Colonel Lance, Major David-son.

Colonel Clifford, Lieutenant Vaughan.

A reconnaissance was made of the Tangi, leading from Nari Ragza Tangi to Kundi Wam. Party as per margin.

The route follows the Khisora stream direction north-east and north-north-east generally.

At first and for about  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a mile from camp there is nothing to present any difficulties, the hills low on either side and the nullah bed some hundred yards broad; depth of water about 2 feet at deepest.

If requisite to force this pass it would be necessary first to hold the Gurgara hill on the north (left) and a similar one on the right. These being held (about 1,300 feet above it) the rest as to fighting would be simple. These hills are easy in parts and in parts stiff with slabs and rocks; some brushwood on them also.

At about 1,200 yards from Kundi Wam the sides of the Khisora close in to 60 yards the slope from the bank on the right easy, on the left rugged. At 1,000 yards on the right precipitous slabs and rocks. At

\* Probably no engineering skill save such as could be laid out very leisurely and costly could render this stream passable for general traffic.

1,800 yards rocks, water-falls, slabs and big boulders render the stream bed impassable.\* Here a road ascends to the right about 100 feet. It is very rough. At present mules with compact loads might go (with some difficulty) for a few hundred yards.

The sides of the water course here close into a few yards. On the left are great rugged slabs and rugged edges of rocks for some few feet also on the right.

Doubtless with considerable expenditure of labour and powder this road could be made good and easy, and it would cut about 2 miles off the road traversed by the force on the 30th April.

The Commanding Royal Engineer thought it would take—

1 regiment pioneers } 2 if  
1 company sappers } not 3  
and miners. } days.

The total distance to Nari Ragza Tangi is about 3 miles. About 700 yards before reaching that place, the road again drops down to the bed

of the stream which it follows, and the ragza can be ascended at one or two places on the left by ravines. A good deal of traffic evidently follows this route, but it is now said by the natives that the road made on 30th April by the force will be the one universally followed by the country people in future.

*Shah Alam Ragza in Shikai, 3rd May, 6 miles.*—The force marched at 5 A.M., with a view to halting at a ragza about a mile beyond Tora Wam, but on arrival there it was found that an eligible site for camp existed on the Shah Alam Ragza, about 2 miles further on, and it was accordingly preferred. Distance about 6 miles. Route very easy. A little road-making only being required for camels. On the way the following villages, &c., were destroyed by the pioneers and No. 8 Company sappers and miners, under the supervision of Major Pierson, Commanding Royal Engineer.

Ali Mahomed, Nani Kheyi	...	...	Tower.
Juma Khan	...	...	Fort.
Jora	...	...	2 Towers.

*Route report by Lieutenant Manners-Smith.*—The road follows the bed of the Khisora Nullah for about 4 miles. Not long after leaving Tor Wam, the water in the Nullah disappears and is not found again for some miles higher up. The force marched at 5 A.M. The rear guard reached camp at 6 P.M.

Just after reaching the first Ragza on which camp was to have been pitched, a reconnaissance having been made, it was found that the Waziris in some force and strongly entrenched held the higher hills\* commanding the onward route, and it was necessary to dislodge them. What occurred will be described best in Colonel Rice's report (1st Sikh Infantry). The Waziris who took part in the action are supposed to have been all Balolzais of Memal Kheyl Division, I. Nazar Khel, Section of Nana Khel Division, II. Abdul Rahman Khel, III. Gogai Khel, IV. Nekzan Khel, V.  $\frac{1}{2}$  the Kokerai and of the Shingi Division the 6 Boia Khel and Karra Khel sections.

The site is an excellent one for camp with the sole exception that it has a good deal of underwood, holly bushes (ilex, &c.) round the south-west—western and eastern faces of it. The water-supply also is not very plentiful. A small spring (which was promptly improved by the pioneers) in the bed of the nullah on the south of camp running north-west to south-east gave a somewhat scanty supply. A large supply was available in a nullah some little distance north of camp.

From the ragza a splendid view is obtained of the Shikai† Valley which has spread out below it. To the north-west is clearly seen the Dre Narai Pass leading to Kabul from Kánigoram, an apparently well beaten track.

Camel fodder rather scarce except ilex or evergreen oak, regarding the suitability of which for camel fodder there seems some diversity of opinion.

After much enquiry it appears that camels accustomed to this fodder eat it readily, others refuse it. Mules sometimes take it readily, also horses.

The field force orders of the day record that the enemy were repulsed by a "spirited advance of the 1st Sikh Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, who specially mentions Lieutenant-Colonel Ross and Captain Begbie under whose steady leading the skirmishers of the 1st Sikh Infantry were not to be denied at the various stands made by the enemy who, when their last position had been carried and occupied and eventually withdrawn from, did not fire a shot or follow up as they invariably do unless thoroughly beaten."

The enemy's chief loss was Mad Mir (Mahomed Amir) Nazar Khel, Aimal Khel, Bahlolzal and Gulzada Kekrie Nana Kheyl and about 20 others.

Our casualties in the engagement were—

	Killed.	Mortally.	Wounded	
			Severely.	Slightly.
1st Sikhs	2 sepoy	1 non-commissioned officer since dead	1 sepoy	2 non-commissioned officers, 4 sepoy.
2nd Punjab Infantry	0 ...	0 ...	0 ...	0
3rd Punjab Infantry	0 ...	0 ...	1 ...	
4th Punjab Infantry	0 ...	0 ...	1 ...	

\* The Commanding Royal Engineer's opinion is that a real scientific road should follow the river and go through both these "tangis" instead of the turning routes made by the force.

† The Shikai Valley contains 11 substantial villages built of mud and stones. The houses in this valley alone were estimated by one of the Kanigoram Syads as being worth Rs. 20,000. The valley is laid out in terraced cultivation, water being as usual ingeniously laid on from higher level of stream.

A copy of the letter to the  
*Civil and Military Gazette* de-  
scribing the action of Shah Alum  
is attached :—

# THE FIGHT NEAR SHAH ALUM RAGZA.

"*Civil and Military Gazette*," 18th May 1881.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

*Camp Kanigoram, May 5th.*

On the 3rd May we moved camp from Kundi Wam with the intention of fixing our next place at Tor Wam, distance  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles. On reaching the latter place, information was brought in that the Mahsuds were collected about a couple of miles on ahead. The cavalry were sent on to "feel" for them, while the mountain batteries and infantry followed in support. The enemy were found where they were said to be, so the 1st Sikhs were pushed on, the enemy opening tolerably smart fire on them. The Waziris occupied a capital position. They were on three low hills, while a huge ravine separated them from the plain on which the 1st Sikh skirmishers were extended. The latter advanced, descending the ravine, while the enemy's bullets fell about them, doing no damage, however. The first position was taken, the Waziris retiring to the second and third hillocks in rear. Turning them off these was not difficult, our skirmishers advancing under the fire of the supports, which held the points lately occupied by the enemy. Driven off the last hillock, the enemy disappeared like magic into the thick jungle of holly oak. The 4th and 6th Punjab Infantry were now brought up, while the artillery opened fire on groups of men high up on the hill side. The 1st Sikhs and 4th Punjab Infantry were sent up on two different ridges, to keep the enemy from coming down and annoying us, while the camp was being selected and pitched, and the 6th Punjab Infantry were held in reserve. The advance of the two regiments was not opposed, but the Waziris kept firing at our men whenever they got a fairly good chance through the openings of the jungle. The men were halted as soon as positions had been taken up, sufficiently advanced to keep the enemy from coming down. Almost the only firing going on anywhere was that of the artillery, who shelled various knots of men on knolls. We were told that the Waziris were going to have a big "jang," or fight in this wood of Laré Lar; but as there had not been much sign of it up to the present, we began to think they were wanting in the courage to carry out their boast, when all of a sudden there came a yell, or rather succession of yells, and the Waziris came bounding down the hill, sword in hand, on the advanced guard of the 1st Sikhs. These sent a volley at them, and advanced with fixed bayonets. Two companies of the 1st Sikhs under Captain Begbie formed the advanced guard thus attacked. Having put out detached parties when he halted, that officer had allowed the rest of his men to sit down. The Waziris thinking it a good opportunity for a surprise had begun to collect behind a gentle slope quite unseen owing to the dense forest. The moment, however, that they began to creep forward, the detached parties saw them and gave notice. It was only the work of a second or two to load and fix bayonets, and move towards the Waziris, who, now that they knew they were perceived, came rushing down hūlling as loudly as they could. The volley from the advanced guard checked most of them, but some bolder spirits still came on;



one was bayoneted, and another cut down with a sword. The Waziris failing in their favourite plan of attack—the sword—opened a smartish fire. This was returned, and the enemy kept at bay. Two more companies under Colonel Ross having been pushed on from the supports, an advance was made. The enemy retired slowly, firing all the while. Moving through the thick jungle was a matter of great difficulty—the men getting separated, whilst seeing anything beyond a few yards was next to impossible.

Halts had therefore occasionally to be made to collect the men, and these the enemy mistook for checks, for twice they attempted to charge down again, but, being met by a volley each time, were staggered. It was a long and stiff ascent to the crest of the hill where the enemy had hastily thrown up a breastwork. When our skirmishers arrived under the breastwork, the Waziris fired very sharply on them, and then took to hurling down rocks and stones, many of which did damage. It was a matter of some three minutes before the path up to the crest could be found, and in this time two men of the 1st Sikhs were shot down, while some twelve were wounded, principally by stones. Colonel Ross had a narrow escape. He saw a Waziri hurl a boulder at him, which he dogged by inclining his head to one side; missing him, it hit a man behind him, cutting his cheek open; another stone hit Captain Begbie on the leg. The pathway found, our men rushed up, whilst the Waziris bolted over the crest and down the other side under a hot fire.

The enemy had retired most obstinately through the wood, which was borne out by the fact of all their killed, save one man, having fallen facing us.

The great "boss" of the Waziris, who had been most instrumental in collecting men to oppose us, was among the killed. He was Mahomed Amir (called by the Waziris Mad Mir), chief of the Nazar Kheyl section of the Mahsuds. The politicals say he was a man of great influence, and, in reality, of greater importance than Umar Khan himself. Not having, however, been a participator in the Tank raid, he was not one of the men demanded by Government. The enemy left over twenty dead on the spur up which the 1st Sikhs went. They must have lost many more, as those who bolted down the side of the hill caught it hot from the 1st Sikhs reserve, and the 4th Punjab Infantry must have accounted for others. So thoroughly disheartened were the enemy from their losses, especially from that of their chief, that they did not attempt to follow our troops as they came off the hill.

The General, it seems, had not intended to engage the enemy that day, but it was fortunate the brush came off when it did, for on the next day (the 4th) we came through a low pass, bordered on both sides with thick jungle of holly-oak for four miles or more. At this place, so admirably suited for inflicting heavy loss on us during our passage through, with but little danger to themselves, the enemy intended to have fought us had not the previous day's defeat discouraged them so completely. Had they held this pass, no amount of skirmishing or of flanking parties could have secured us from being incessantly potted at during our march through.

There is much variety of opinion regarding the number of the enemy in the action of the 3rd. The General, we hear, estimated them at 50 only? The officers and men engaged (who ought to know best) consider that they had some 300 men against them in the wood, while some hundreds more remained on high ridges, watching the course of events. The general idea is that we shall have no more fighting, as spies say the Waziris are much dispirited



at the loss of their leader and of so many of their own side, *viz.*, 28 killed and 12 dangerously wounded, of whom some have since died.

(I am not aware of the author of the above—*J. D.*)

Captain Begbie, 1st Sikh Infantry, who was present through this engagement, says :—

"The above account is the most accurate I have seen in any paper. \* \* I will, however, tell you how I got into the row. When Rice had driven off the Waziris from the three small hills they first held, we saw the 4th Punjab Infantry coming up on our right and working along a spur on which apparently there were many of the enemy."

"Rice saw that by advancing some 500 or 600 yards, and then wheeling to the right, we could get on to the main spur of the hill, and so get the Waziris between us and the 4th Punjab Infantry. He sent me with two companies for this purpose, he himself following and picking up our skirmishers *en route*. During my advance a few shots were fired at my two companies, only one of which took effect on a man's turban."

"When I got on to the spur, I wheeled to the right, thus facing the hill. I had not advanced some 300 yards when orders were sent to me to halt."

"Thinking there was some mistake in the order (as the place was utterly unsuited for halting), I had the order repeated, and found to my disgust that there was no mistake in it. We were in a dense wood, and couldn't see more than a few yards ahead, and altogether a more unsuitable place for stopping in could not be found. However, I had to halt, so throwing out a few look-outs, my men and I sat down. The utter absence of any shots or signs of the enemy somewhat threw me off my guard, and I little expected an attack."

"We had been nearly 20 minutes squatting when my look-outs called out 'agya—agya,' and simultaneously the Waziris broke out into yells on all sides of us. Instead of waiting to receive their charge, or to see exactly their position, I thought our best chance lay in delivering a countercharge, which I did, having first given a volley into the wood. I don't know what prevented the Waziris from continuing their charge, for, with the exception of a very few men, none came to actual close quarters. It was difficult to know which way to go, for by their yells they seemed to be on all sides of us except in our rear. I was more over hampered with the order to halt, and without any supports near me (which I did not know till afterwards were within some 200 yards, and which, owing to the dense wood, I had not seen), I was diffident about going on, although I knew my best chance lay in taking the initiative. However, under the circumstances I thought it better to remain where I was, so we and the Waziris contented ourselves by firing at each other. The enemy's fire was tolerably smart, considering the slow-loading weapons they had; but nearly all their shots went over our heads and fell near the reserve (or support as it became now, for Ross with two companies was advancing to my assistance). One man of the new support was mortally wounded, while my men and Ross's were untouched. In the first charge the Waziris had two men shot, one cut down by a sword, and another bayoneted, whereas our casualties were one man wounded in the hand and another in the leg (both sword-cuts). On Ross reaching me, we went up, driving the Waziris before us, who however retired obstinately. From this point to the final taking of the *sungar* I can't improve on the account in the *Civil and Military Gazette*. I can only add that we several times thought we had reached the summit of the hill, only to find out we had to go further. When we actually got near the summit, none of us knew it, for we had been so often disappointed before. Just as we got below the enemy's breastwork, a shell came over our heads, but fortunately did not burst short, or some of us might have been damaged. We had to send back some men into an open space, to show the artillery that we had got up, which they luckily understood and stopped firing. Our casualties were not rightly given in the *Civil and Military Gazette*. They were—

" Killed	...	...	...	...	...
" Dangerously wounded (gun-shot)	...	...	...	...	1
" Slightly	"	(sword-cut)	...	...	2
" Ditto	"	(gun-shot)	...	...	1
" Ditto	"	by stones	...	...	10

"If the 4th Punjab Infantry had been allowed to advance, we must have got a good bag; but unfortunately there was plenty of room between the 4th Punjab Infantry and ourselves for the enemy to escape, which they took advantage of."

4th May.—Started shortly after 5-0 A.M. for Kanigoram by the Shaoranza Kotal or most direct road. The Pioneers had been on the road yesterday, and had made it good for about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles.

After leaving camp (the general direction of the route being north-north-east), the route ascends gradually to, say, about 300 feet. It then descends to a small trickling stream, perhaps 200 feet in 800 yards. This stream is then followed as the route. On all sides is a dense forest of oak, maple,

† *Belut* (oak).

ilex,† a few pines. On either side rounded under-features from the higher ranges slope down to the stream; they also are covered with thick forest, with every here and there an open path. This ascent is easy until a point about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles from camp. Here the real kotal climb ascends apparently about 250 feet in 1,000 yards up a spur, then for a few hundred yards tolerably level and more open. From camp to kotal, say, 4 miles. The kotal† was reached at 7 A.M., flank-

† Altitude 7,300.

ing arrangements on the right being more or less simultaneous; those on the right being somewhat outstripped. After turning up the spur above mentioned for the last climb, no water is met with. On the summit a halt of 1 hour was made for signalling and other purposes, and the descent commenced at 8 A.M.

From the summit of the Shoaranza a capital view is obtained of Pir Ghal. Kanigoram not visible. The slopes towards the north are easier and less dense as to forest. At about  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile from summit, the descent being rather rugged, a small trickling stream is reached, and becomes the onward course. Route east-north-east. About a mile onward the Badar Algad stream is approached and left on the left. It is a fine stream, about the same volume as the Khisra; its banks rather steep and confined.

(This march is officially entered as 5 miles. I should say 6.—J. D.)

The surface is covered with violets, species of cowslips, wild thyme, clover, and various scented shrubs or grasses.

North-west of this a few miles is the Lare Lar route. It is said to be very similar to the Shaoranza, but not so good. It goes through a similar forest; therefore troops operating by that road would practically be no assistance to others operating by the Shaoranza, with whom they could not communicate the intervening country, being dense forest. The Lare Lar route branches off from Shah Alam (in Shikai), crosses the range, and, dipping on to right bank of Badar, joins the Shaoranza Kotal road about 1 mile westerly from Moghul Kheyl.

It may almost be said that the whole of the march is through more or less of a forest, requiring much flanking care and anxiety if likely to be held by an enemy. The last 2 miles or so from the summit of the kotal are less thick as to forest, and the last mile or so into camp was open on the left, being flanked by the Badar Algad, from bank to bank of which is from 150 to 300 yards; its bank generally high and steep. Camp was pitched at Mana Salar, the first open ground reached, about 2 miles short of Kanigoram. Half the force pitched on the open ground about 800 yards beyond and separated from the rest by a ravine and water-course.

\* Mana Salar belongs to Mání Khan, now resident of Bannu (Soudan Kheyl) Ahmedzai. His tribe being at enmity with the Mahsuds, who formerly destroyed some of his villages, &c., they are unable to cultivate the land. He also owns some land at Tarun China.

Along these wooded underfeatures the edible pine or "*chilghoza*" abounds.

News having been received about 3 P.M. that about 100 mullahs from Khost, &c., were in Kanigoram, the cavalry turned out after them, but without result, they having fled.

The rear guard to-night arrived at 9-15 P.M., a few shots by thieves being fired at them after dark. The casualties of to-day were one sepoy, 4th Punjab Infantry, mortally wounded, died in evening, and 1 sepoy, 1st Sikh Infantry, wounded.

A slight shower came on about 8-30 P.M. with thunder, &c.

A ragza, with the ruins of an old village or fort, is on the right bank of the Badar Algad.

Moghul Kheyl is the village on the *left* bank of the stream. Zor Karam is the old ruined fort belonging to the Darvesh Kheyl, between whom and the Mahsuds is a long standing enmity.

A telegram, to-day, dated 3rd May, was received from General Gordon, saying he had been stopped in his advance by the Punjab Government, but that he would reach Razmak on 8th.

The scenery and surroundings here remind one of Cashmere.

The difference in temperature, especially at night, between this valley and Khisora is very perceptible, this valley (Badar) being much the hotter, though Kanigoram is 1,000 feet higher than Kundi Wam. The natives have always said we should find Khisora the coolest.

It is observable that the mules and ponies of the transport establishment are suffering from sore feet.

"Gogai Kheyl" *alias* Gizzai Kheyl "alias" Girzai Kheyl." The headmen "Saudazar," "Samati," "Gulmast," and "Kalandar Shah" having so far sided with the Nana Kheyls, and representatives of the section having been engaged in the fight on 2nd May at Shah Alam, were yesterday given up to this morning to submit to the Government terms, or take the consequences. No satisfactory reply having been received from them up to this morning, their towers and fortified enclosures were blown up and burned.

*5th May.*—The force marched at 5 A.M. and encamped about 1,000 yards

\* Sailai Razh, 3 miles. west of Kanigoram on left bank of river on a splendid sloping grassy meadow\* (scattered with a few boulders), part of the camp near the river

being a grove of fine large oaks or rather two groves. Ground sloping from south and in terraces. The cavalry preceding the force about  $\frac{1}{2}$  hour laid out the usual camp picquet, and then proceeded to protect the various shrines about Kanigoram, and the property stored there. Soldiers and camp followers were forbidden to enter Kanigoram except at a stated hour in the afternoon, any desirous of seeing it being paraded at that time.

The word Kanigoram is a corruption of Kanri Gram (stone-village), "the village made of stones"; or "Kanri" and "Giran," large stones.

Telegrams despatched by messenger from Kirghi at 2-20 P.M. of 3rd May arrived about 7 A.M., say, 40 hours *en route*.

When the force marched from Moghul Kheyl, a force, strength as per margin, moved up the Badar Algad to punish some of the Gogai Kheyls under the immediate orders of the Brigadier-General, the political officer accompanying.

4th Sikh Infantry.  
2nd Punjab Infantry.  
Sappers.  
1 troop 1st Punjab Cavalry.

$\frac{1}{2}$  battery No. 2 Mountain Battery.

Colonel Clifford describes what occurred thus: Proceeded up left bank of Badar Algad for about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles above Moghul Kheyl, passing several Ahmedzai (Hetti Kheyl) villages *en route*. Some of the inhabitants had remained in these; a few women were seen in them; but no men, no flocks, nor herds. There was a good deal of culturable land about these villages, which apparently had not been under cultivation for two years probably owing to the enmity existing between the Ahmedzais and Mahsuds. The ruins of an Ahmedzai village were passed. It had been destroyed by Mahsuds.

The Giga Kheyl or Gogai Kheyl villages to which we were bound lie at head of the Badar Valley; *i.e.*, there is no culturable land above them, and the valley seemed to narrow considerably beyond them, but the head of the stream was not reached; in fact, according to the map, it is *much* higher up. The Gogai Kheyl villages consist of several detached hamlets and bore a well-to-do appearance: the houses had stone-walls laid in mud, and flat roofs containing magnificent deodar beams; one that I noticed was 30' to 35' in length. There were four towers in the hamlets, three of which were most successfully blown up; they were well built and substantial, the lower portion of stone, and the upper part of kutchha brick. The 4th tower was rather a poor affair, and somewhat flimsy in structure; a quantity of wood was put in it, and the house to which it belonged was set on fire. The Gogai Kheyls number 200 fighting men, and own no houses but those visited to-day; the chief man, Saudagar, owned the best towers in the villages; the houses in its enclosure were set on fire. We halted for about 3 hours whilst the Sappers were mining the towers, and during that time the horses and mules were grazed on the green corn, but not nearly all the khasil was eaten. There was a very considerable amount of land ploughed and ready for seed, only a small proportion being under wheat. The guide said indian-corn was the chief crop. Judging by the backward state of the wheat (only just coming into ear) I should say it is not possible to raise both a *rabi* and *kharif* crop off the same fields here. The water-supply was good and plentiful. There were a few apricot and mulberry trees about the latter only just bursting into leaf. The Gogai Kheyl villages are at the foot of a spur of Pir Ghal, the ziarat on the summit of which was visible with binoculars.

We were not molested in any way. On leaving Moghul Kheyl, we saw 20 or 30 men on the hills over the right bank of the Badar, a few of whom marched parallel with us for a mile or so; they were perhaps 800 yards from us, but did not fire. At Gogai Kheyl we saw a few men on the hill above us watching us about a mile distant; one was grazing goats.

The inhabitants of Kanigoram say the valley produces fruits superior to those of Kabul or elsewhere; but that the ill-feeling existing between different sections and clans prevents their growing them now-a-days.



A few sheep and fowls and some tobacco was brought for sale, but at the prices asked were enormous—fowls, Re. 1, sheep Rs. 7 to 10, eggs 2 annas each, honey in small quantities. Wood, a cooly-load, from 2 to 3 annas.

8 maunds ghee bought by Commissariat @ Rs. 50 per maund.

10	„	salt	„	„	„	4	„
2	„	goor	„	„	„	20	„

We noticed Syad Akbar Shah to have a breech-loading revolver, the cartridges of which had been made at Kanigoram. The two head “mistris” there now (or rather they were not present at the time the force encamped at Kanigoram) are Zardar Khan and Hakim Khan. When the Kabul rupture took place, these men’s services were secured by the Kabul Government.

The land at Kanigoram has the reputation of being specially good, and is therefore very valuable.

*Kanigoram, 5th May, continued.*—For part description, see MacGregor’s *Gazetteer* (page 98). It is built on a spur jutting out in a south-east direction. To the north a low bleak ridge, distance say 1,000 to the west-south-west; it is commanded by a knoll, distant 300 yards; height above it, say, 300 feet. Streets very narrow, and, as described in *Gazetteer*, it is built in terraces. To the north a good strip of cultivation. The hills to the south and on the opposite bank of the Algad do not command it certainly for a distance of over 1,000 yards. These are not wooded in their lower slopes; one grove of trees to south-east and one to east some hundred yards. A good strip of cultivation south-east and east.

Water-supply, the river, distance 600 yards; also a stream in the Tangi (northerly). Village found deserted; a good deal of property left for safe keeping in the various adjacent “ziarats.”

Trees, mulberry, willow, thick sort of poplar, walnut, apricots, plums.

The supports made of “chir” (pine) used for the structure of the houses were not very fine specimens.

*6th May, halt, Kanigoram.*—Letters were sent by messenger to General Gordon and to Mr. Udny asking them to ride out with escorts from Razmak towards Makin on 9th to meet General Kennedy; and Udny was asked to arrange to give supplies as early as possible after 9th May either for the Dawar scheme or for the return of this force to Bannu, if Government should not sanction that project.

In the afternoon a telegram from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, dated Simla, 7 A.M., 5th May, intimated that no advance on Dawar was sanctioned, and that as soon as the real objects of the Mahsud Expedition were accomplished, the force was to return.

*7th May, Sam Kanigoram.*—A sepoy of 2nd Punjab Infantry, having in disobedience of orders gone outside the sentries by night for purposes of nature, was shot by a Waziri.

The force marched at 5 A.M. to Sam Kanigoram about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles (a little east of Kanigoram). The course lay along the bed of the Badar Algad, a rocky bed. The right bank generally is the high one, sometimes a sheer perpendicular drop of about 200 feet; the left bank is easier, the country mostly in terraces of cultivation, the village of Kanigoram being passed at a little less than half way. At the kotal, half way up Pir Ghal (Dze Manzi), Lieutenant Blunt signalled to Sheikh Bâdin: “Rather cloudy; no reply.” The camping



ground is just beyond where the Trekh Kána Algad issues to join the Badar, and is a fine ground, about 320 yards in broadest part, narrowing to 120, and about 300 in the longest. It sufficed for all the force except 2 infantry regiments and 3 guns, which were on a ragza, a little to the north-east and just above a village, the right resting on a tower.

*Rear-guard reached camp 1-30 P.M.*—On the north-west of the camp is a ridge of hills, some 300 feet high; in the opposite direction is the river, to which the banks of the ragza are more or less steep, with two or three places for approach. Patches of cultivation around the villages south-east of camp, and the cultivation around Kanigoram is sufficiently near to be made use of.

The water of the Trekh Kána Algad is particularly good.

A few shots were fired by thieves at the camel guards or grass-cutters, cutting khasil, and a few stray shots into camp by night.

In the afternoon a reconnaissance was made of the pass leading over the southern boundary of Kanigoram Valley.

The following is from notes by Lieutenant-Colonel Lance, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, who reconnoitred this :—

"From Kanigoram the road after crossing the Badar Algad crosses the range that forms the south-east boundary of the valley by the Karwan Narai pass, the summit of which is 1,500 feet above the stream. The first half of the road is steep, and in its present state impassable for camels (laden); the upper half of the road is at an easy gradient. The whole is very stony; 400 men could prepare the road for laden camels in 8 hours. The summit of the pass is  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Kanigoram. The descent to Káráma, 5 miles from Kanigoram, appears easy. Camping ground at Káráma is a ragza, appears fairly open; water and crops in fair quantity."

2. "There are two roads to Úda Wám from Káráma, distance 8 miles, down two branches of Shinkai Algad. The east branch is called Shinkai Khushk, and the west Shinkai Tand. The road down Shinkai Khushk is said to be fair and to be the better of the two."

"Úda Wám is at the southern end of the Umar Ragza; crops are scarce, and water also said to be so."

3. "From Úda Wám to Shingi Kot, distance 7 miles, the road lies down a nullah running through the Hinjor Tangi, and is said to be fairly good."

"This is the most direct route from Tank to Kanigoram, and is much used by Waziris."

Captain G. Martin, Survey.  
Lieutenant Blunt, R.E.  
Lieutenant Smith, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.  
Lieutenant W. Hughes, 1st Punjab Cavalry.  
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Ross.  
Lieutenant-Colonel Tonnochy.  
Captain A. H. Campbell.  
Captain A. H. Turner.  
Lieutenant R. Davies.  
Lieutenant A. Daniell.  
Lieutenant A. Urmston.  
Surgeon P. D. Pank.  
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Clifford.  
Lieutenant A. Eardley-Wilmot.  
Captain W. Campbell.  
Captain W. Frith.  
Major H. Lugard.  
Major T. O. Underwood.  
Captain C. Mansel.

A party, as per margin, started at 5 A.M. under Colonel McLean, C. B., 1st Punjab Cavalry, for the ascent of Pir Ghal.

The following is from notes by Lieutenant-Colonel Clifford, 2nd Punjab Cavalry:—

"The road first wound round the north end of the hills to the north and north-west of camp, and then entered a narrow valley marked in them 'Pir Ghal

\* Escort 140 rifles each from the 1st Sikh Infantry, 4th Sikh Infantry, 1st Punjab Infantry, 2nd Punjab Infantry, 3rd Punjab Infantry, 4th Punjab Infantry, 6th Punjab Infantry; rations for 2 days—bedding; 40 rounds in pouch, 2 Lushai dandies and double crews, 2 pukka mules, 3 spare mules.

Lieutenant E. Inglis.

\*Lieutenant E. Vansittart.

\*Captain C. Dempster.

Lieutenant W. Newell.

\* Lieutenant C. Grant.

Lieutenant E. Nodwell.

Captain C. P. Egerton.

Lieutenant F. W. Egerton.

Lieutenant F. W. Hancock.

Captain A. Shepherd.

Lieutenant C. Vaughan.

Major J. Trotter.

Captain H. C. Halkett.

Lieutenant E. deBrâle.

Surgeon H. K. McKay.

Those marked\* did not ascend to summit, but were left in charge of details

at Ze Manzai.

"Algad, up which our track lay in a westerly direction."

"For a distance of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Kanigoram, except at its mouth, there is no cultivation in this Algad; it is very narrow, and the hills on each side are thickly sprinkled with jungle. Before we had gone far, some armed men appeared on the ridges, and were promptly

"hailed by our guide Sir Kamand, a malik of the Nazar Kheyl Memal Kheyl, Balolai, who seems to have acted faithfully towards us throughout the whole trip. One of his men was sent forward to meet a delegate from the armed party and explain our peaceful intentions. When we had proceeded about 4 miles from Kanigoram, the track leaving the Piri Algad ascended the two ridges to our right by a very oblique line and brought us into the Skpe Darra, another narrow valley—so narrow, indeed, that it may almost be termed a tangi. Water good and abundant, and Nazar Kheyl hamlets and cultivated terraced plots scattered plentifully on its sides, and at its western termination. Its length is about 2 miles; a stiff, but short, kotal brought us into a more open valley, still inhabited by Nazar Kheyls; at the further end of this valley the road wound up a very stiff kotal, about  $\frac{1}{2}$  a mile in length, and landed us on an open plateau known as Manzai. We were now some 10 miles from Kanigoram."

"An unarmed group of Nazar Khels was seated here, who entered into friendly conversation with Colonel McLean; their leader was a malik, Baramad, apparently a well-to-do man. He hinted in no unmistakable terms that we ought to pay our footing, but was referred for information on that subject to Major Macaulay. A halt of 2 hours was made here to enable the baggage to close up. It had long been apparent to all that General Kennedy's wish that we should return to Kanigoram that night was utterly impossible to carry out; the mules had been obliged to travel in single file the whole road; and as we had 230 of them carrying the men's great coats and bedding and 1 day's food, and the track was in many places exceedingly rough and steep, they made a long line to guard. Two non-commissioned and 10 men were with the baggage of each detachment; the 6th Punjab Infantry in rear of all. Immediately in front of the baggage were the 4th Sikh Infantry, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Punjab Infantry, while the 1st Sikh Infantry formed the advanced guard. When the baggage had all closed up, we left Manzai, and after a short descent from the plateau entered a pine forest and wound up a glade, 2 miles long, down which a small stream of excellent water was running. Here we found scented and dog violets growing in abundance, and the notes of the cuckoo were constantly heard. We marched with the baggage, and in about an hour or little more reached the head of the glade, where a steep rise of 200 feet brought us on to an open level plateau, 120 yards long, 50 wide, bare of jungle, and with steep and almost precipitous sides, except at its northern extremity, where a tongue of land joined it to the main hill. It was the very spot for us to halt; and as it was now 3 p.m., it was determined to bivouac for the night. With a little squeezing the whole of the force managed to fit in for the night, the horses and baggage animals were picketed down the centre, and the detachments from the various regiments were disposed of round the edges of the plateau."

"A strong picquet was placed on the tongue, which was strengthened by a breast-work by 1st Sikh Infantry and by *abattis*. Another picquet was thrown out 80 yards beyond the tongue up the hill, and a third strong picquet held the road by which we had arrived, which also guarded our water-supply. Then small picquets of 6 or 8 men were posted all round the steep sides of the plateau, a few yards down the hill, which was thickly covered with pine and ever-green oak. Alarm posts were told off for each detachment and the roll call was taken."

"It was now sunset, and just as the men were about being dismissed from roll call, two shots were fired at us from a spur of the main hill; but we were beyond match-lock range. Sir Kamand at once sent out two of his men to warn off the intruders, and a trustworthy man was also sent up Pir Okal to let the refugees there know that we intended

\* This Pir Ghal Algad is the same as the Trekh Kana.

"ascending in the morning. Sir Kamand and his friends were made over to the friendly charge of a Pathan Native officer, and regaled with a "doomba" supper, but were at the same time given to understand that, although they were honored guests, they would be in extreme danger of their lives if any bullets were flying about during the night. As it was not a shot was fired all night long.

"*8th May.*—We rose at dawn after a very cold night. We were at a height of 9,600 above sea, and at 2 A.M. an icy cold wind had sprung up. We had all slept in our clothes, the men accoutred. I was shivering half the night even with a durree, a strip of numdah, a huge ulster and choga. At 5 A.M. we started for the summit, 500 men being left on the plateau under command of Captain Turner, 2nd Punjab Infantry, to guard the baggage animals and horses, all of which had to remain behind. The orders given to Captain Turner were that he was to have the mules loaded in time to start at 11 A.M. for the Manzai plateau, and there await our return from the summit. We proceeded in the same manner as yesterday, except that the 4th Punjab Infantry were the rear guard. We had first a long stiff pull up a range which hid the summit of the mountain for us. This took us 50 minutes, the path lying all the way through a pine forest; a picquet of 70 rifles was left here till our return. We rested here for a few minutes, and then had a steep descent of some 500 feet still under the pines across patches of snow about 1½ feet deep. Then our way lay up a stiff rocky gorge, an hour's work at which brought us to grassy slopes, still steep, and 10 minutes more brought us to the top of the mountain. The leading regiment, 1st Sikhs; arrived at 7-30 A.M., yet I do not think the distance from the bivouac was much more than 3 miles; some officers considered it 5 miles. Colonels McLean and Ross called it nearly 4. On the summit of Pir Ghal are a rough stone walled house and shrines, the former capable of holding 20 men; the latter most appropriate to the Waziris, the "Thief's Saint." The view from the mountain embraced an immense extent of country towards the north; the snow clad peaks of the Safed Koh were shining in the morning sun, Sika Ram and the Shuturgardan being easily recognised."

"Lieutenant Blunt with his heliograph was conversing with Sheikh Bûdin, nearly 70 miles away to the east; but a heavy haze hung over the hot plains, and reading was somewhat difficult. Beyond Sheikh Bûdin a long range of hills was faintly visible, which some opined to be the Himalayas; my own opinion is they were the Salt Range. To the west the haze was thick and heavy, and the hills said to be near Ghazni were but dimly visible, and I could recognise no old acquaintances among them; the guides, too, seemed rather ignorant of that part of the country. Towards the south Wanu and the Shal Valley were plainly visible. What most struck me was the utter desolation of the country to the west, while numerous gorges to the eastern slopes of the mountain showed streams of water in abundance, and every valley had its hamlets and patches of cultivation; to the west not even with binoculars could I discern a single stream of water or a single field of green corn."

"Hills scantily covered with herbage and thickly sprinkled with bushes appeared to stretch as far as the eye could reach in the direction of Ghazni, not a human being was to be seen, nor did any curling smoke betray the sign of an habitation."

"I have omitted to state one important particular, *viz.*, that our guides told us that they had not brought us to the summit by the regular track. Where we halted for 10 minutes after our first 50 minutes ascent, the regular track does not dip down, as we did, for 500 feet, and then take the steep ascent by which we had come; it runs along the backbone of the ridge, and gradually circles round to the right, till the summit is reached. This is a more circuitous, but a far easier route than we travelled; but the guides avoided it, lest we should come in contact with any hostile Waziris, as they considered themselves answerable for our meeting with no opposition."

"It was nearly 10 A.M. when we commenced the descent. We picked up Captain Turner's 500 men and the mules at Manzai, and the rearmost party of the rear-guard reached Sam Kanigoram a little before sunset, about 15 to 17 miles."

"From the top of Pir Ghal heliographic communication was opened with General Gordon's column which was encamped at foot of the Razmak Pass, and we learnt that Major Holdich was at that very moment on the Rehza Sir making a peep into Upper Dwar. Captain Martin's plane table was erected on the roof of a house on the top of the Pir Ghal, and for 2½ hours he was there busily at work."

*Note.*—With reference to the ascent of Pir Ghal, it may be observed that the political arrangements were such as to secure the most perfect safety of the force so far as any arrangement could possibly do so. The guides, influential men in these parts, could not have played false; their families, &c., were then residing in Dera Ismail Khan.—J. D.



8th May, Sam Kanigoram, halt.—Heliograph communication was opened up from a hill overlooking camp with General Gordon on the Razmak pass; but constant clouds prevented very easy signalling.

General Gordon was desired to advance to Razmak on 9th (General Kennedy's force marching that day to Makin), and to ride on half way to Makin to meet General Kennedy to give him supplies, and to be prepared to march back to Bannu by the Shakto Algad.

Colonel Lance with a party reconnoitred the route to Makin direct over the hills which had been reported easy and short. He ascertained it to be impracticable for laden animals owing to the steep nature of the numerous ups and downs, though there is nothing to prevent unimpeded infantry (or cavalry) using it.

Accordingly it was decided to march only as far as Doya Toya on 9th, and Makin 10th.

General Gordon was told that on 10th five days' supplies would be required from his force for ourselves (to be delivered half way between Makin and Razmak); that the marginally noted troops would be made over to him and two guns No. 1 Mountain Battery from him to General Kennedy's force; that on 11th he should start down the Shakto. From Pir Ghal, Lieutenant Blunt signalled to Sheikh Bâdin, distance 66 miles: "Weather cloudy, and only a short stay on the hill. Opened communication with General Gordon's force, his party being on the ridge north-east of Razmak plain; communication with camp also."

On 8th May the ordinary ration which had been reduced on the 1st May was resumed.

The following supplies were received from General Gordon :—

						Maunds.
Atta	...	...	...	...	...	1,126
Dal	...	...	...	...	...	143
Ghi	...	...	...	...	...	61
Salt	...	...	...	...	...	3
Grain	...	...	...	...	...	1,413

9th Doya Toya, 8½ miles.—Marched at 4-30 A.M. to Doya Toya, the junction of the Badar and the Makin stream (Route Report by Lieutenant Smith).

The road lies down the bed of the Múrdar Algad (joined by the Badar); and though presenting no difficulties to mules or camels, would be difficult to force in the face of opposition, owing to the steep and numerous hills on both sides.

The camping ground is at the juncture of the streams. There are here two "kachis" on right bank of Badar, one "kachi" on left bank of Badar. One long narrow slip on left bank of Makin stream, and a broad open space at the junction, fit for a large number of camels, among sand and boulders. About 6,000 men and 3,000 camels could encamp; but all the high hills rising in all directions about 500 feet and higher require picquets; excellent crops sufficed for the fodder of all the transport animals; wood abundant; camel grazing fair.

Doya Toya belongs to the Shabi Kheyls. Rear-guard arrived 6 P.M., having had a few shots *en route*, by one of which one sepoy and a kahar (since dead)

was wounded ; also Lieutenant Tonnochy's (4th Sikh Infantry) horse, he himself having a very narrow escape. A slight shower in afternoon.

This is a basin, and the hills bounding it gave no means of communicating either with Razmak or Sheikh Bâdin.

*10th, Makin, 6 miles.*—The following troops marched at 4 A.M. to join General Gordon's column to proceed down Shakto :—

No. 1 Mountain Battery, two guns under Major Morgan, R. A., joined General Kennedy's force. The remainder of our force marched to Makin, starting at 6 A.M., an easy march up the Makin stream to Toda China ragza, and camped there, about 8 miles from Razmak and 1 mile east of Makin, on a ragza about 220 yards broad east to west and several hundreds of yards north to south, with good drainage and open and level, all that could be desired for camp ; excellent water in the Toda China stream (plentiful), the banks of which are about 200 feet high with one or two roads leading down to it. About 250 yards to north of camp an old ruined fort of Mani Khan, Darwesh Kheyl, 70 yards square, forming a good picquet post. Rear-guard arrived 2 P.M., shooting two men and capturing one.

4th Punjab Cavalry, 200 sabres.

2nd Mountain Battery, 3 guns.

No. 8 Company Sappers and Miners.

32nd Pioneers.

Took over about 1,000 camels from General Gordon and 6 days' supplies.

Very heavy clouds over Pir Ghal.

General Kennedy and others rode over to General Gordon's camp.

Wood not plentiful ; camel grazing (kâhû) in the low hills which are about  $\frac{1}{4}$  mile off. Westerly the Paka Licha hill.

Heavy clouds over Pir Ghal and Shoi Ghar, and a slight storm about 8 P.M.; night fine.

Major Pierson, R.E., and Lieutenant Shone, R.E., accompanied the 32nd Pioneers and No. 8 Company Sappers and Miners to join General Gordon.

The water of the Toda China is not supposed to be very wholesome.

The flanking parties on the left reported having seen numerous rough iron smelting furnaces in the course of their march.

*11th May, Makin, halt.*—General Gordon and staff rode over from razmak, some of the officers of this column returning to his camp to stay the night.

The inhabitants of Makin were clearly seen with a telescope, and on the high hills to the west, whither they had fled with their flocks and herds. The emigration is a yearly one in the summer, but has been hastened this year by the advent of the Waziri Field Force.

The escort to the survey party on Shoi Ghar, despatched by General Gordon's column, were clearly seen by our telescope.

A smart shower in the afternoon and heavy clouds all the evening, which however cleared off about 7 P.M.

*12th May, Makin—halt.*—Makin is the residence of Arsala and Boyak.

It is situated at the foot of the Potma hill, which rises about 1,500 feet above it. Elevation of Makin about 6,000 above sea. It is built in tiers and on two spurs; that on the south is a little higher than that on the north, and a little larger. The Potma hill, from which there are offshoots, is almost precipitous. The only apparent approach from an easterly direction would be the southern of the two above spurs, and where the spur shoots out from the higher hill it would be exceedingly difficult of approach for even the best light infantry.

From a Mahsud-Waziri point of view solely Makin is a strong position, giving a stiff line of retreat, up which the inhabitants could hardly be followed; but it is a position (*i.e.*, the village) quite untenable against modern arms of precision, for, about 1,000 yards off, or less, are two hills easterly, from which it could be battered.

The approach to it from the east is an open valley, a few hundred yards wide, with cultivation in terraces. On the south of this valley of approach is a hill rising perhaps 400 feet, sloping down gradually to east by a spur easily ascended by mountain guns.

On the right (north) is another hill not quite so high (on which is a tower and small hamlet). From this hill in a north-westerly direction rises (not very stiff) a spur surmounted by a strong stone wall running for several hundred yards. This was made by the Mahsuds as a protection against the Darwesh Kheyls about 1850 A.D.

There is a good deal of iron smelting, &c., carried on here. Iron (the best) is found in the Hingamal Hill and in Stara Nazmári and Káma Nazmári; also at Shahmira Lada near Maidan and Gadao overlooking the Múrdár Algad.

A road to Pir Ghal branches off from Makin, but it is not nearly so easily approached from here as it is from Kanigoram. The top of Pir Ghal is barely visible from Makin (or rather from the Sah Rágha camping ground).

Coal is found between the Shuza Pass and Kotkai, but it is not appreciated by the natives, who apparently turn it to no use. Some specimens were brought in during the day.

Heliographic communication opened with General Gordon at 6-30 A.M., who reported having found the pass into the Shakto impracticable, and that in consequence he was falling back on Razzani with a view to entering the Shakto Pass lower down.

A very heavy thunderstorm came on about 3 P.M. lasting about an hour; much hail fell, covering the lower hills with a snow-like coating. Snow appears to have fallen on Pir Ghal. The excellent natural drainage of the camp prevented any inconvenience being felt. A bright sun and gentle breeze dried the tents quickly. A few drops of rain fell about 8-30.

It may here be noted that officers who are more or less intimately acquainted with the Waziri tribes, as far as any one can be, remark that they are now growing more or less imbued with fanatical teaching. At Kanigoram we heard much of mullas from Khost and elsewhere. These were more or less at the bottom of the Shah Alum gathering of 3rd May, and it was said that a large number of them were then present; and all kinds of absurd rumours of their supernatural powers were spread.

At Kanigoram about 100 mullahs were collected just before our arrival there.

*13th May, Janjal, 8 miles.*—Marched at 4-30 A.M. for Janjal, for about  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile over plateau and down bed of a dry nullah to junction of Toda China and Darra streams. The water of the Darra slightly swollen after last evening's rains. The Darra bed is here about 600 yards wide, low hills on bank. Thence easterly banks high, and now and again precipitous (about 150 to 200 feet), surmounted by plateaux and low hills.

At about  $1\frac{1}{4}$  mile passed a little cultivation on right. At  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile the banks close into 50 yards, but are easy on left; scarped on right; after a few yards the Darra opens out to a few hundred yards, and shortly after some cultivation on left, and the hills again close in; high on right. At 2 miles a few acres of cultivation on left, and then again the hills contract the Darra bed to a few yards.

At  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles small hamlet on high precipitous left bank; on right a little cultivation. Hills here (on right), high and wooded; bank precipitous. About 3rd mile a large strip of cultivation on right. About 4 miles after passing through an open bay, the hills again close into a few yards, and for a few yards on left, 300 or 400 feet, and scarped to water; on right easy; after a few yards again an open bay.

Do Toya is reached at about the 5th mile; hence course is north-east through a short narrow defile, and after a few hundred yards turn abruptly south-east; hills on either side high. Here there is a good strip of cultivation on left. The Darra bed then becomes much more open (300 to 400 yards), the hills on either side being much easier for infantry. At about 6th mile the Shamanzai nullah, apparently an easy one, meets the Darra from the left. Hence a road runs up to Shahwali Darvesh Kheyl and Shabi Kheyl village, said to be distant about 6 miles.

At about  $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles on the left is the Piazza nullah, similar to the Shamanzai leading to Dir Narai of the Shabi Kheyls (distant, it is said, 5 miles). This nullah is the boundary between Shabi Khels and Shingis. Shortly after this the hills close in, those to right exceedingly stiff, with perpendicular faces for some 200 to 300 feet, the river taking a bend east-south-east.

Janjal is reached at about 8th mile. Advance guard starting 5 A.M. (and with two halts of about 15 minutes in all) reached Janjal at 7-45.

Rear-guard arrived at 2 P.M.; one shot only being fired at it, and a sepoy being hit (but not hurt) by a spent bullet.

Janjal is a broad strip of cultivation about 200 yards at east (narrowing considerably at west) and about 450 east to west under cultivation and on right bank of Darra (or Badar). On the south the hills are precipitous almost for some hundred feet in some places; in others accessible. The river bed is 100 or 200 yards broad, and from the northern or left bank high hills, irregular in shape, arise with dry nullahs running up. Much picquet duty necessary to encamp a force in security; but the chief safeguard against mischief is the fact that there are several hamlets in the neighbourhood which could be harried on any damage being done. A few fruit trees here, mulberry, fig, &c.

During this march the water is frequently crossed.

Heavy mail bags were received and distributed.

A slight thunderstorm about noon. Afternoon bright and cloudless.



"Khasil" ample; camel grazing sufficient on hills on left bank of river.

Wood, sheep, and a few fowls brought in for sale.

The arrangements for the march (Field Force Order No. 329, &c.) were as follows:—

- (a) First Sikhs leading (as advance guard) conducting the flanking of the column, the flanking parties to remain until relieved by the flankers of rear brigade.
- (b) No. 3 Mountain Battery, 6 guns.
- (c) Leading brigade (three regiments infantry).
- (d) Two guns No. 1 Mountain Battery.
- (e) Rear brigade (three infantry regiments).

All cavalry (except twelve sabres attached to advance guard and detached to rear guard) to be distributed along the line of baggage and to see the baggage locks up.

All the four infantry regiments in front to be followed by entrenching tools on line of march.

We received here an accumulation of several days posts, and among others papers copy of the *Gazette of India*, G.G.O. No. 248 of 6th May 1881, detailing the strength of the force (or its composition), the appointments gazetted, and the distribution of columns, the Tank column being designated No. I and the Bannu column No. II. Copy of the *Gazette* is subjoined:—

#### FIELD OPERATIONS.

##### No. 248.

The following appointments to the command and staff of the Mahsud-Waziri Expeditionary Force have been sanctioned by the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, with effect from the dates specified:—

Brigadier-General T. G. Kennedy, C.B., Bengal Staff Corps.	Commanding the Force ...	12th March 1881.
Major E. C. Codrington, Bengal Staff Corps.	Assistant Adjutant General	12th " "
Major J. Davidson, Bengal Staff Corps...	Assistant Quarter Master General.	22nd " "

##### FIRST COLUMN.

Brigadier-General T. G. Kennedy, C.B., Bengal Staff Corps.	Commanding ...	12th March 1881.
Lieutenant C. H. M. Smith, Bengal Staff Corps.	Deputy Assistant Quarter General.	25th " "
Lieutenant E. Blunt, R.E. ...	Superintendent of Army Signalling.	11th April "
Lieutenant-Colonel W. C. Chowne, Bengal Infantry.	Provost Marshal and Baggage Master.	.....

##### Medical Department.

Surgeon-Major A. P. Holmes, M.D., Ben- gal Medical Service.	Principal Medical Officer	10th April 1881.
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*Engineer Department.*

Major W. H. Pierson, R.E.	...	Commanding Royal Engineer.	18th March 1881.
Lieutenant W. T. Shone, R.E.	...	Assistant Field Engineer.	22nd " "
Lieutenant R. A. Wahab, R.E.	...	Ditto ditto	20th " "
Lieutenant H. Appleton, R.E.	...	Ditto ditto	18th " "

*Survey Department.*

Captain G. W. Martin, Bengal Staff Corps... Survey Officer ... 28th March 1881.

*Commissariat Department.*

Captain C. M. Keighley, Bengal Staff Corps.	Principal Commissariat Officer.	24th March 1881.
Captain A. C. LeQuesne, Bengal Staff Corps.	Transport Officer	5th April 1881.
Lieutenant J. Willcocks, 100th Foot	Ditto	19th March "
Veterinary Surgeon R. Pringle	In veterinary charge of Transport.	

## Troops.

No. 2 Punjab Mountain Battery.	1st Sikh Infantry.
No. 3       "       "       "	4th       "       "
No. 4       "       "       "	1st Punjab Infantry.
No. 8 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.	2nd       "       "
1st Punjab Cavalry (detachment).	3rd       "       "
4th       "       "       "	4th       "       "
32nd Bengal Native Infantry (Pioneers)	6th       "       "

SECOND COLUMN.

Brigadier-General J. J. H. Gordon, C.B., Bengal Staff Corps.	Commanding	...	27th March 1881.
Lieutenant J. C. F. Gordon, Bengal Staff Corps.	Depy. Asst. Qr. Mr. Genl.		27th " "
Major H. G. Grant, 78th Foot	...	Brigade Major	...
Captain R. H. W. H. Harris, 70th Foot	..	Supdt., Army Signalling	...
Lieutenant J. E. Nixon, Bengal Staff Corps.		Provost Marshal	...
			27th March "

*Medical Department.*

Brigade-Surgeon R. Wolseley, M.D., Principal Medical Officer 7th April 1881.  
Army Medical Department.

*Ordnance Department.*

Captain G. G. Monek-Mason, R.A. ... Commissary of Ordnance 25th March 1881.

*Engineer Department.*

Captain S. C. Turner, R.E. ... Field Engineer ... 12th April 1881.

*Survey Department.*

Major T. H. Holdich, R.E.,	...	Survey Officer	...	28th March 1881.
Lieutenant the Hon'ble M. G. Talbot, R.E.		Assistant Survey Officer		11th April "

*Commissariat Department.*

Lieutenant E. C. C. Sandys, Bengal Staff Corps.	Executive Commissariat Officer.	1st April 1881.
Lieutenant W. R. Yeilding, Bengal Staff Corps	Commissariat Officer ...	27th April "
Lieutenant R. B. W. Fisher, 10th Hussars	Brigade Transport Officer	5th " "
Second-Lieutenant J. C. Pyne, 54th Foot	Transport Officer ...	29th " "
Veterinary Surgeon J. B. Savage ...	In Veterinary charge of Transport	.....

*Troops.*

No. 1 Battery, 8th Brigade, Royal Artillery.	14th Bengal Native Infantry.
No. 6 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.	20th       "       "
18th Bengal Cavalry.	21st       "       "
4th Battalion, Rifle Brigade.	30th       "       "

5th Punjab Infantry.

*May 14th, Sarimanja Kach, 10 miles.*—Started at 4-35 A.M. down bed of Zam hills, right and left fairly easy.

At  $\frac{3}{4}$  miles the hills close in to about 100 yards (a little cultivation on right) on left high, with queer tilted strata, on right, low and easy. At 1 mile is the Harin Darra, from right a short cut (for light footmen) which leads up to Kanigoram (a waterfall of perhaps 50 feet is visible here about 300 yards up). The nullah also leads to Suliman Shah. On left, formidable hills with contorted strata, rising 400 to 500 feet. At  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles a large strip of cultivation, and on right bank a line of willows, on left the Shin Kan Pass leading (for footmen only) to Shakto. At 2 miles on left the Kazha Kacha of Shahman Khels. On right bank perpendicular for about 150 feet, a few willows and poplars. At  $3\frac{1}{4}$  miles, Bangiwalla Kachi on left, a long narrow strip of cultivation washed away in part since General Chamberlain's force encamped on it. It is also said there was a fine plot of cultivation on right bank which has now been washed away. The existing plot belongs to Nazim Khan, Shahman Khel; lower down is another slip owned by Zafie Khan, Shahman Khel, with several trees dotted about; opposite it on right bank is a small "killa" of Lall Shah, Shahman Khel, and shortly after a plot of cultivation, Ahmed Wam Kachi of Lall Shah. At about the 6th mile enter upon what may be called the commencement of the Barara Tangi. A ridge (knife-like in its aspect from this side) comes down from the right, but viewed further on after passing it it is seen to be accessible from the other side. It rises to perhaps 300 feet. Then follow one or two more somewhat similar ridges. Then, on the right is a small strip of cultivation and also one on the left fringed with trees. A few hundred yards on is a hill shutting in the pass on the right surmounted by a square tower. Here to

The Sarkai.

the right connected with this hill rises a barrier ridge apparently almost perpendicular from the S.E. side, and apparently impracticable for infantry. Opposite to where this tower is, on the left, runs down a pass (which is sometimes called the Barara Tangi); this is a road for light footmen to Shakto.

Suddenly after issuing from the pass here (it is at this point only about 50 yards broad), the hills on the right end and the river bed is bordered by the usual Ragza about 200 feet above it—an irregular plateau.

On the left the hills are very formidable and continue so for a long distance, being not only very high but stiff, and cut up with ravines. Still this would be undoubtedly the line of attack from the S.E. and doubtless Snider rifles would very soon render any position taken up on the pass quite untenable by a badly armed enemy. It is understood that at the S.E. exit of the pass was a large strip of cultivation when General Chamberlain's troops forced the pass; this has been washed away.

At  $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles is a strip of cultivation; the river bed about 500 yards broad, right easy, left much cut up with ravines, &c., &c., and stiff hills; in places precipitous.

At  $8\frac{1}{4}$  mile a good strip of cultivation on left known as Kand of Shahman Khels; where this ends the hills are exceedingly difficult with great fissures, perpendicular drops, &c., the hills rising, perhaps, 600 feet above river. On to the right pass Shahmira Kachi with groves of fine mulberry trees, and on left Dam Kach Kai a very large plot of the Shahman Kheyl; the right bank here is a sheer perpendicular drop of some 200 feet; a good many large mulberry trees. About 10th mile reached Surimanja Kach, a fine large plot of cultivation several hundred yards long and from 100 to 250 deep, on which camp was pitched, the crops being cut. Some of the crops were just ripening; one or two plots had been cut. This is on right bank. Camp was ample as to space; camels on river bed. The hills on left bank here rise some 500 feet and are in some parts precipitous; on the other side is a Ragza and Sur Rogha Ragza some 250 feet high. The banks down to the cultivation stiff. During the march the water had to be constantly crossed (about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  feet at deepest). The baggage came in well, the rear being in camp before 12 noon. Letters were received from General Gordon reporting all well.

Two hundred and thirty men on night picquet duty, but had the neighbourhood been actively hostile, a larger number would probably have been required.

*15th May, Marghaband, 11 miles.*—Marched at 4-30 A.M.

After about 600 yards, a fine grove of trees on left and cultivation. At  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile, cultivation and trees on right; hills on right, low and easy. At  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile cultivation on right. At 1 mile cultivation on left and trees. At  $1\frac{1}{4}$  miles high hill on left and the bed of the Zam about 250 yards from hill to hill. Here the Ahnai Tangi may be said to begin from this side north (the actual Tangi is some distance down). A little cultivation on left. Hills on left a sheer precipice, and those on right perpendicular and with queer contorted strata; at about  $1\frac{3}{4}$  mile cultivation on right; on the left a very formidable hill about 500 feet high with fissures, slabs and perpendicular rocks.

At 2 miles a stupendous rock, perpendicular, rising to a point (Boballi); a good land mark from the north; about 600 feet high; here the river is about 300 to 400 yards.

At  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles is the Drermai nullah, on right (Alizai country) leading down from Sarwe, distant 3 miles. At the 3rd mile is the actual Ahnai Tangi, 50 yards broad and about 100 long (or less); it is merely a cleft in the rocky strata through which the Zam flows; on either side precipitous, on left about 250 feet, on right about 50 to 100, and on issuing is a large patch of cultivation, on right Gahnai Kach with a grove of trees. This pass (though apparently very formidable when in it entering from the north) is not really difficult and could not be held by a badly armed enemy. A force attacking from the south or Shingi Kot direction, especially with the advantage of breech-loading weapons *versus* matchlocks could easily gain the hills on the left (proper right of stream). These being gained, there would be no difficulty in forcing the pass, though the hills on the other side are the commanding ones. These hills also could be ascended apparently without very great difficulty, by light infantry, on the right (proper left of stream).

After issuing from the pass southerly, the stream suddenly opens out to a very great width, the hills become diminutive and there are several patches of cultivation on the banks.



Camp was pitched on an excellent plot of land on left bank about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles below Jhingi Kot known as Marghaband. There is camping ground here for about 6,000 men; camels camped in bed of stream which is some hundred yards broad. On right bank of stream a precipitous bank rising some 200 feet surmounted by a plateau. On the N.E. are low hills sloping down to the camping ground; on the east a hill some 500 feet high. The crops were partly cut, and in part almost ready for harvest.

The Shingis brought in grass,\* wood in small quantities. Their crops in the vicinity of camp were ordered not to be cut.

\*About 200 maunds. The rear guard arrived at 1-30 P. M. Letters received from General Gordon *vid* the Shakto, dated 14th, reporting all well.

The Deputy Commissioner is of opinion that the total losses sustained by the Waziris have been about 35 killed. The numbers of wounded cannot be at all arrived at even approximately.

Camel grazing in abundance.

16th May, Jhandola, 9 miles.—Started 4-45 A.M. following the bed of the stream.

The morning not unpleasantly hot for the time of year. The Zam stream is very broad here.

After about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles, leaving the river to the right, we ascended a small, low pass, the Sheikh Narai, moved on for about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 miles between low hills at one point rather high on left, but nothing formidable. Easy going and soft to the feet, an appreciable change from the stony river bed.

After about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 miles (total about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 miles) drop down to the river at a bluff and after a few yards again ascend to the left, about 200 feet easy (about 1,000 yards before reaching Palosin Kach) to the Spin Ragza a broad, level, stony plateau with a good made road, a few bushes, and some ravines, easy going. This brought us to Jhandola.

At Jhandola we found Mr. Shaw, Assistant Superintendent, Telegraphs, who had been ordered to proceed there to open a field telegraph office and to roll up wire on our departure.

The Bhittannis had brought in supplies of grass and wood.

\*As matter of fact, the baggage might have come by this road with a very little pick and shovel work to improve it; this would have saved about 2 or 3 miles.

The Commissariat\* cattle, &c., came round by the river, a longer route, but one deemed advisable, as the tracks we had taken were not very good-going for cattle.

The advanced guard reached camp at 7-10 A.M. and the rear guard at 10 A.M. A cool wind made the heat of the day quite bearable.

One day's rations was here found awaiting us (sent out under Commissariat arrangements) also 1,000 maunds grass bought from 1st Punjab Cavalry.

The following is a brief sketch of the survey work performed.

Captain C. Martin has been with the Tank column, Major Holdich, Lieutenant the Hon'ble M. Talbot, R.E., and two natives, one of whom is a valuable explorer, a Bozdar, with the Bannu column. Many peaks in the Zhob, Gumal, Wano, Shawal, and Birmul valleys, will be fixed, also peaks on and

about the Kand mountains. The officers with General Gordon have also fixed points westward, and have joined their triangulation on to the work done by Colonel Woodthorpe and Captain Martin when with Sir F. Roberts in Kuram and Khost.

The amount of new country actually and carefully surveyed lies between—

Lat. 32 15	to	32 40	} About 300 square miles.
Long. 69 32	to	69 45	

And besides this, approximate sketches on a smaller scale of Shina, Wano, Shawal valleys and of the courses of the Zhob and Gumal.

The blank space in the old map west of Nara Ragza, Tangi, *viz.*, Khysor, Tor Wam, and Shakdi valleys has been filled in.

The mountains found most useful have been Kar Gundi, Kundi Ghar and Pir Ghal. From Kundi Ghar a beautiful view was obtained (worked for 3 hours) Pir Ghal 11,583; the day was not very lucky, a haze supervened.

The Bozdar, above referred to, has been up Gubbergurh, a large part of Dawar has been mapped. General Gordon's column will have filled in the Shakto-Shinghi country. Officers who have been acquainted with the Waziris for long, notice how much of late years the Shingis, a clan noted for their thieving propensities, have tamed down. They have done us good service in carrying our mails, telegrams, &c., faithfully, and seemed quite agreeable, inclined to more or less welcome us—a marked contrast to the bearing of the rest of the Waziri tribe who have certainly given the cold shoulder if no more, as a body.

(Above from Notes by Captain Martin, Assistant Superintendent, Surveys.)

*17th May.*—The force marched to the mouth of the Zam, encamping about 1 mile N.N.E., of the Post, and on banks of one of the Zam streams.\*

The 1st Sikh Infantry and No. 3 Punjab Mountain Battery, also 1st Punjab Cavalry, were allowed to move into Tank.

Distance from Jhandola about 12† miles. Rear guard arrived 11-30 A.M.

The march down was quite easy, the water being very easily fordable every where.

*18th May.*—Marched at 4 A.M. to Tank. The rear guard arrived at 9 A.M.

A.—1st Sikhs.  
3rd Punjab Mountain  
Battery.

The following arrangements were ordered for the break up of the Field Force. Abbottabad troops under Colonel Rice, Commanding 1st Sikhs to march to Paizu to-night.

\* After issuing from the hills about 5 miles from Kirghi, the Zam branches off into several streams.

Some of the camels are reported as suffering from blindness, and it is said that a similar fate befel those employed in General Chamberlain's campaign, and that now, as then, these symptoms were first discerned at Makin, the disease seems confined to the camels received from General Gordon's force. Some went totally blind, refused to move, and had to be left behind.

The sarwans attributed the cause to their eating some poisonous grass up the Khisora *en route* from Bannu.

† Officially stated as 10.

Dera Ismail Khan troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Bainbridge, Commanding 4th Sikh Infantry, to march on morning and evening of 19th, escorting all stores intended for return into store there of *all* descriptions.

B.—2nd Punjab Cavalry.  
4th Sikhs.  
3rd Punjab Infantry.  
1st Kohat Mountain Battery.

C.—2nd Punjab Infantry.  
4th Punjab Infantry.

Bannu troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Close, Commanding 4th Punjab Infantry, to-morrow (19th) night to march to Paizu.

D.—1st Punjab Infantry.  
6th Punjab Infantry.

Kohat troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Chambers Commanding 6th Punjab Infantry to march to Kundi.

Remainder of 1st Punjab Cavalry after relieving 2nd Punjab Cavalry detachments at outposts to march on Dera Ismail Khan to-day.

It was notified in Field Force Orders that the chief object of the expedition had been the coercion of Mashak into certain terms of the Government which Mashak and certain Chiefs of his section, the Nana Kheyl, had not accepted. His and their possessions have been visited and punished, and the result has been the partial attainment of the object "and a reasonable ground for expecting it will shortly be fully realised. Much new country has been unveiled and valuable survey operations have been secured."

The following extracts from diaries of one regiment of 1st Brigade and one of 2nd Brigade (Infantry) will give an idea of the work undergone.

*4th Sikh Infantry (in 1st Brigade).*

*18th April 1881.*—Marched for Tank to Zam, 513 rifles; sick 2, night picquet, 1 native officer, 30 rifles.

*19th April 1881.*—Halt, 2 sick; night picquet, 2 native officers, 60 rifles.

*20th April 1881.*—Halt, 1 sick returned to field hospital, Tank. Major Scott, v. c., escorted, with 50 picked rifles political prisoners to Tank and returned; night picquet, 1 native officer, 60 rifles.

*21st April 1881.*—Kirghi regiment on rear guard and under arms 4 A.M. to 6-30 P.M., a hot march up the Zam; sick none, picquets none.

*22nd April 1881.*—Marched as 2nd regiment of leading brigade; reached Jhandola 10 A.M., night picquet, 1 native officer, 60 rifles, 1 sick.

*23rd April 1881.*—Halt; sick 2; night picquet; 2 native officers, 60 rifles.

*24th April 1881.*—Marched in rear brigade; reached camp Haidari Kach 12 noon, night picquet none, sick 9.

*25th May 1881.*—Marched in advanced brigade, reached camp 11 A.M., night picquet; 1 native officer, 65 rifles, sick 11.

*26th May 1881.*—Marched in rear brigade, reached camp 11 A.M., tents arrived late; terrible rain after arriving; all drenched; picquets *nil*, sick 17.

*27th May 1881.*—In advanced brigade; tents pitched by 2 P.M.; heavy rain, wetting the men entirely; night picquets.

To the credit of the Waziris, it must be said that throughout the whole of our stay, a month, in Waziri country, not one instance of fanaticism here occurred in our camp, though as many as 500 to 800 Waziris have often been in one camp fully armed, not a person has been damaged by them. (This remark does not apply to injuries received outside of camp limits of course).

The Political Officer being the supreme authority and the director of operations, all responsibility for information seems to have rested with him, and he being the officer who has had special facilities for previous knowledge of the country, it was only natural that this should be so. He had in his camp men from various parts of Waziri land, who volunteered to give him a good deal of information which on the whole turned out to be very good, as to distances, &c.

*28th April 1881.*—Two British officers, 6 native officers, and 288 rifles, sick 21. Tangi Ragza; halt, 200 rifles out all day as covering party and 100 rifles to protect foraging party; all returned drenched: night picquet, 2 British officers, 6 native officers, 288 rifles, sick 20.

*29th April 1881.*—Tangi Ragza and Narri Ragza, regiment on rear guard; baggage clear of camp 6-30 P.M.; regiment reached camp 11-45. P.M.; sepoys had to cook and were not asleep till 5 A.M.; picquets *nil*; sick 20.

*30th April 1881.*—Marched 5 A.M. in advanced brigade; employed all day on flanking duty; reached camp 5 P.M.; night picquets, 35 rifles, sick 23.

*1st May 1881.*—Halt. Kundi Wam. Picquets; 35 rifles, sick 21.

*2nd May 1881.*—Halt. Kundi Wam. 200 rifles under Major Rivers formed part of survey escort to Kundi Ghar; returned same evening; picquets 35, sick 25.

*3rd May 1881.*—Shah Alam. Regiment in rear brigade and flanking column of baggage to right; reached camp 4-30 P.M.; night picquets; 2 native officers, 95 rifles, sick 23.

*4th May 1881.*—Moghul Kheyl. In advance brigade; reached camp 10-30 A.M.; night picquet, 1 native officer, 50 rifles, sick 24.

*5th May 1881.*—Regiment marched up the Badar valley to destroy certain towers, &c.; returned to Mogul Kheyl 2 P.M.; reached Kanigoram 4 P.M.; night picquet, 1 native officer, 60 rifles, sick 26.

*6th May 1881.*—Halt at Kanigoram; night picquet, 1 native officer, 60 rifles, sick 28.

*7th May 1881.*—Marched to Sam Kanigoram with advance brigade detaching 160 rifles to make the ascent of Pir Ghal; night picquet, 30 rifles, sick 42.

*8th May 1881.*—Sam Kanigoram, halt, 80 rifles under a British officer to protect foragers.

The 140 rifles returned from Pir Ghal 6 P.M.; sick 39, night picquets *nil*.

*9th May 1881.*—Doya Toya, on rear guard; regiment fired on in Doya Toya pass.

1 kahar wounded (since dead).

1 sepoy.

1 horse ("Adjutant's").

Reached camp 6 P.M.; night picquet *nil*; sick 45.

*10th May 1881.*—Makin; marched with advanced brigade; reached camp 10 A.M.; working party 50 men, road-making; night picquet 2 native officers, 80 rifles, sick 46.

*11th May 1881.*—Makin; halt; picquet *nil*, sick 45.



12th May 1881.—Makin; halt; picquet 1 native officer, 80 rifles, sick 48.

13th May 1881.—Janjal; marched in rear brigade; reached camp 3 P.M.; the whole regiment utilised for flanking the line of march; night picquet *nil*, sick 44.

14th May 1881.—With advance brigade; reached camp 9-0 P.M.; night picquet 1 native officer, 70 rifles, sick 40.

15th May 1881.—Suri Manja Kach; on rear brigade; reached camp 10 A.M., night picquet *nil*, sick 40.

16th May 1881.—Jhandola; with advance brigade; reached camp 8-30; picquet 60 rifles, sick 43.

17th May 1881.—On rear guard; reached camp 11-30; picquets 15 rifles, sick 41.

18th May 1881.—Tank; force dispersed, sick 34.

In the matter of intelligence, Lieutenant-Colonel McLean has made valuable additions to his previous knowledge of the Waziri tribe. His notes will in due course be available, also some on the Bhattanni tribe.

In Field Force Order No. 383 of this date, the thanks of the Brigadier-General were recorded to all ranks for marked and willing obedience to orders. The soldierlike spirit shown on all duties, often arduous and fatiguing, was acknowledged, also the very excellent conduct throughout the expedition of the troops and followers.

The Deputy Commissioner has been able to obtain much information topographical and tribal; and of the country bordering on Waziri land, Wano, &c.

His notes will doubtless be available for reference to the Intelligence Branch through the Foreign Office. Ressaldar Nasir Khan, 4th Punjab Cavalry, has collected much information in the vernacular. This will be available through the officers of the 4th Punjab Cavalry. Ressaldar Sekandar Beg, 4th Punjab Cavalry, also has submitted some notes which have been sent to the Officer Commanding the 4th Punjab Cavalry for translation.

As before remarked, the rivers traversed by the force abound with fish mostly about  $\frac{1}{4}$  to  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb., with, occasionally, mahseer of 1 to 5 lbs. As variety of food is one of the difficulties for troops in an expedition such as that recently finished, it would seem worth while to make up fishing nets for regiments. Kahars at all events would benefit thereby if no one else did, and it is to be noted that this class alone numbered 1,358 in the expedition of 1881.

The camels have been voted more or less of a nuisance (in the hills). Coming down hill from Makin they have done well, but the record of the march from Narai Ragza to Kundi Wam, (say 5, or at utmost 6 miles) which occupied from first to last twenty hours, speaks for itself.

The camels have had on the whole good food, fair loads (not over 4 maunds), and have come back on the whole in very good condition.

In regard to the arms of the Waziris, it has been noticed that they have only matchlocks as in the previous campaign. In the small affairs of 28th and 29th April and in the action at Shah Alam on 3rd May, it was believed by officers that there were perhaps 2 or 3 (not more) men with enfields (not sniders). The Deputy Commissioner thinks there are 2 sniders in the whole tribe.

They have however become much impressed with the efficiency of breech loading arms, and if the Kabul Government extends its influence to them, it is only to be expected that they will very soon invest in some better arms than they now have, the worthlessness of which has been demonstrated to them.

*Diary of the 6th Punjab Infantry.*

The Officer Commanding 6th Punjab Infantry was asked for the favour of a brief diary showing how his regiment was employed during the expedition. Unfortunately he has only given the following particulars.

Out of a daily average of 510 native ranks available for duty, the following was the average "on duty."

Camel grazing ...	...	6	} By day.	Exclusive of 40 men on baggage guard, 10 officers' orderlies, and 4 camp color men.
Forage guard ...	...	11		
Quarter guard ...	...	12		
		29		
Regimental night guards ...	...	27		
Night picquets ...	...	33*		* Furnished on 19 nights of the expedition only.
		60		

*19th May.*—Brigadier-General Gordon's column reported arrival at Karkawom, 11 miles from Jani Khel, which outpost they were to reach on 20th May and thence disperse.

*Conclusion.*

Throughout this diary I have studiously avoided any entry which may even approach to criticism on any point whatsoever, and have confined the entries to the mere daily occurrences so far as I was aware of them.

Nothing of a "Political" nature has been touched upon. Major Macaulay's despatches, diary, &c., will of course be available to the Intelligence Department for reference hereafter in regard to political matters.

A reference to the meteorological table at the end of the notes will show how very fortunate the force was (especially in comparison with that of 1860) as to weather.

Heavy rain had fallen for several days or weeks before the force entered the hills, and thanks to this, the weather was exceptionally fine for April, May, and most propitious for camping purposes, being unusually cool.

At the end of this diary will be found a table of maximum and minimum thermometer readings and a few weather observations; and on the pages preceding some statistics showing strength of force, transfers to and from General Gordon's brigade, casualties, &c.

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THE WAZIRI EXPEDITION.

*"Pioneer," June 10th, 1881.*

The uncalled-for stringency of the rules regarding the supply of information to the public by officers serving with our troops in the field—especially

in the case of the barbarous enemies with whom it seems our fate to be constantly engaged—is sufficiently shown by the meagre notices, which we find in the home papers, of the recent operations of the army on the Waziri frontier. The service, as usual, has in no way gained by these restrictions; for, as often pointed out, the military considerations involved, where an illiterate enemy is concerned, are of the slightest possible consequence; while to the home public, at least, the present loss has been great, and affects not only the masses who hold that, as paying for the war they have a right to such entertainment as is to be derived from it; but also the more important classes who are capable of criticising military movements with profit to themselves and their neighbours, and generally to all who take an intelligent interest in public affairs.

The Waziri Expedition has been, as we know in India, in no way of an unimportant or uninteresting character; and the chances it had at the outset of surviving in history, and of enlisting the sympathies of the British public, were increased by its prosecution during the comparative lull of the Easter recess. The fact that it has hitherto, to a great extent, failed in the latter essential point is well worthy of the attention of the Indian military authorities, as entailing a possible loss of honours, if not actually on the framers of these rules and their immediate advisers, at least upon a large body of officers who have carried them out with characteristic loyalty.

Compared with previous frontier campaigns, this second Waziri expedition occupies an intermediate position between the old and most objectionable practice of "punitive raids," and the modern and certainly more effectual procedure of deliberately occupying the enemy's country until security is obtained for future good behaviour. The nature of the former system is sufficiently well known to a large body of our readers, either from reading the military history of the frontier compiled by Colonel Paget, or from their having themselves played a part in the spirited events which he describes. Of these expeditions, it is sufficient to say here, that they were too often but a feeble imitation of the tactics of the enemy with whom we were engaged; that the punishment which we inflicted very generally fell upon the women and children, or the aged and sick of the tribe, rather than upon the fighting members of the community; and that the rapid and frequently hard-pressed retirement of our troops, which formed an essential feature of such expeditions, was, to say the least of it, undignified, and calculated to impress the enemy with the idea that we were unable to meet them upon equal terms. The credit of introducing the more modern system, which we hope will in future be our ordinary method of dealing with frontier difficulties is due, in a great measure, to the Government of Lord Lytton. The Jowaki expedition, which was conducted on these principles, was, it is true, the subject of some adverse criticism at the time; but it must be remembered that both of the General Officers engaged were hampered by so-called political restrictions, which forbade their adopting the measures essential, from a military point of view, to securing success within a reasonable time; and the delay taxed somewhat severely the patience of the public. Judged by one of its results alone—the subsequent conduct of the whole Afridi nation during the Cabul campaigns—we have no hesitation in saying that the expedition was of permanent utility; and it is by the latter standard only that the value of such undertakings can be estimated. General Kennedy's expedition, of which we are now treating, so far belongs to the old type of frontier wars, in so much as it was no secret that a limited number of days was allowed for its completion, supplies being calculated accordingly—

a condition which must have been as well known to the Waziris as to every sepoy in camp. But as regards other features, the expedition was conducted on principles affording a fair hope of permanent results.

The period allowed for the duration of hostilities was prefaced—in a way rather calculated to damp the ardour of the public—by a halt of some duration at or near Tank, in the case of one of the two brigades into which the force was divided; and by the still more prolonged detention at Meerean of the troops under the command of Brigadier-General Gordon, which formed the second brigade. The first of these delays, it will be remembered, was ascribed to difficulties in collecting the usual amount of extra equipment which was carried by the force; and also to the necessity for completing certain political arrangements. The detention of General Gordon's Brigade at Meerean was less open to criticism. It was in some measure essential to the general plan of the campaign; and did not, as in the case of the halts made by General Kennedy, add to its ultimate duration, or expose, at a later season, the troops under canvas, on their way home.

The force which collected near Bannu under General Gordon was at first designated as "the Reserve;" an unpromising title, which the ambition of its leader seems before long to have changed to that of "Second Brigade." Even as a reserve stationed at Bannu, it was rightly judged that this column, by threatening the enemy on the line of the Khisora and Shakto Passes, would greatly facilitate the march of the first brigade towards Kanigoram; and its subsequent concentration at Meerean near the mouth of these passes, as well, indeed, as its ultimate advance on Razmak, were further extensions of the same strategical ideas, for which all credit is due to the officers by whom they were elaborated. As explained at the time, it was not at first in any way contemplated by the Government of India that General Gordon should advance beyond the British frontier; and his eventual march to the Razmak plateau was only sanctioned on its being shown that supplies could not otherwise be conveniently conveyed to the first brigade at Makin. The movement in question was, however, a sound one, for other reasons as well. Not only were the troops suffering from prolonged inaction—an attitude which has the further disadvantage of being liable to misconstruction by an Oriental enemy, but their advance to Razmak and junction near that place with the column from Tank, as well as the subsequent opening up of a new line of communication between the interior of the Mahsud country and British India, by the Shakto valley, must have combined to show the Waziris that a prolonged occupation of their territory could have been at least as easy to us, as its temporary invasion.

General Gordon, therefore, is to be congratulated on the opening up of the Shakto valley, which operation, together with the surveys conducted by Captains Holdich and Martin, and the knowledge we have gained of a new road to Kanigoram up the southern tributary of the Tank river—are the chief results of the campaign, as regards the important subject of the military geography of the frontier. It will be seen from the accounts given to our readers during the course of the expedition, that General Gordon not only ascertained the practicability of the whole of the route by the Shakto valley from Razzani to the frontier, and made use of it throughout the greater part of its strength for the retirement of his troops to Bannu; but also traversed, with the column under his command, a road forming a lateral communication between the upper waters of the Khisora and Shakto, which proved to be of considerable military importance.



The political negotiations, which we have mentioned as being among the reasons assigned for the comparatively tardy advance of General Kennedy's columns, deserve fuller notice than can here be given them; and it is chiefly on the influence which such negotiations continue, in spite of much intelligent opposition, to exert in purely military affairs on the Punjab frontier that we desire, on the present occasion, to comment. The subject is a delicate one; but having lately expressed an unqualified approval of the resumption by the Quarter Master General's Department of an important branch of its duties, which had hitherto been left in the hands of our frontier diplomats, we may still further try the patience of the more conservative of our trans-Indus readers by pointing out the weakness of some of the other anomalies which have so long flourished upon their border.

Letters, which we have had the advantage of perusing, for more than one frontier officer of experience, speak of the time passed by General Kennedy's column amongst the boulders at the debouchure of the Tank river, as a brilliant feature in the history of our arms, from the fact, perhaps not sufficiently well known to military men, that on no previous occasion have the Maliks of a frontier tribe been induced to surrender themselves at the summons of a political officer. But there is another way of looking at it. The position of a general, who—in addition to the command of the forces in a remote country—is entrusted with diplomatic powers, is an intelligible one. He risks, indeed, being hanged or rewarded after his return home, according to the fancy by which, for the time, the mob may be affected; but his duties while still in command are clear, and he is unhampered in their execution. In more civilized countries, also, his work and responsibilities are so distinct from those of any civilian whom he may be brought into contact, that any kind of clashing is impossible. Everywhere in fact, except upon our Indian frontiers, diplomacy is supposed to end where war begins; and again resumes its appropriate action when the work entrusted to the army is accomplished. Here, however, the case is widely different; and except where the military officers employed are to the manner bred, it is not difficult to see that some friction must accompany the working of the complicated machinery. We place, as in the present instance, a large army in the field, to punish a neighbouring State which has invaded our territory, sacked a considerable town, and which, throughout negotiations lasting two years, has rejected with scorn the proposals for a pacific accommodation which our weakness, or motives of economy, have induced us to make. Every precaution is taken, at a vast expense, to ensure our superiority to the enemy at every possible point; and when the frontier is reached, and everything ready for what promises to be a successful and useful campaign, all military considerations are thrown to the winds, and diplomatic—or, as we still call it, in the quaint language of the late Honourable E. I. Company, "political"—negotiations again become the order of the day. Space would not serve to follow the fortunes of our unfortunate generals—when they are at last allowed to cross the frontier and find themselves cabined, cribbed, confined in all their combinations, dictated to as to their movements, and alternately escorted and jostled off the road by a brilliant *corps diplomatique*, composed of a young "political" and a score of ragged rascals on longtailed ponies, whose presence they are obliged to tolerate in their head-quarters camps. But enough has been said to show why the term "political officer," and still more the phrase "political triumph," are not without reason thought words of evil omen by a large body of our leading military men.

On a future occasion we must notice the leading tactical and other military lessons to be deduced from this on the whole ably conducted expedition. The loss of men was not great on our side; nor, considering the nature of the weapons employed, on that of the enemy—a circumstance which, taken in the abstract, we shall hardly be suspected of deploring, though we may regret that this was attributable rather to our diplomacy than to the terror of our arms, or to the overwhelming nature of the forces and combinations employed. We have expressed an opinion on the disadvantages which, for so many years past, have attended the employment of our political officers, when events have progressed beyond the sphere in which their action is either dignified or profitable. The association with our arms of this theoretically peaceful agency has hitherto in no way tended either to mitigate the horrors of war; nor—by confining its necessary evils to the portion of the community it is intended to affect—does it lessen the permanency of the bitter feeling with which we are regarded by the tribes whom we find it necessary to coerce. It is due to General Kennedy, no less than to the Department the irregular action of which we are criticising, to record that the present expedition has been marked by the absence of the “atrocities” alluded to; and all credit should be allowed for this desirable innovation upon the former practice. The fact that the expedition was ever undertaken may also be claimed as a very legitimate “political triumph,” by the departmental officers concerned; whose action, in persistently pressing the necessity for it upon the Local Government has put an end to a most discreditable and hazardous state of things upon the frontier. In other respects, the satisfactory results obtained are due solely to our arms; for ordinary methods, unaccompanied by this *ultima ratio*, had been tried for only too long a period, and had failed at every point. It is the misfortune of the system, that we have by no means made this as clear to the tribe we have been at war with, as it may be to ourselves; and we fear that traditions of the invaluable assistance afforded to us by the tribal sections who found it convenient to class themselves as our allies, as their villages were successively threatened by the advance of our troops, will form an essential feature in the version of the campaign which will become current in the Mahsud hills.

The Government of India has advantages, in respect of men and material, for placing a force in the field adopted for hill warfare, such as are possessed by no other nation in the world. The power to do so is essential to our prestige in Asia, and is invaluable both as a deterrent influence on our aggressive neighbours, and for the punishment of such outrages as, with our present frontier, we must remain constantly liable to. It is only by acting on the maxim *à la guerre comme à la guerre* that we can hope to make full use of our great facilities for the prosecution of these essential and practically pacific ends; and the sympathies of the public will be enlisted in favour of any department that makes the first move towards the removal of the anomalies of which we complain.

(The author of the above is unknown to me.)

13th June 1881.

J. D.

#### THE LESSONS OF THE WAZIRI EXPEDITION.

“Pioneer,” June 20th, 1881.

In the stirring incidents which render military history attractive to the unprofessional reader, the recent Waziri campaign has been, from the

nature of the case, somewhat deficient; and though a full record for its events will be undertaken, we hope, by some well-qualified writer for the *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, it would be out of place here to attempt a more detailed narrative than has already appeared in our columns. What concerns the general public more nearly are the lessons—applicable alike to the conduct of future operations on our frontier and to the general improvement of our military system—which it may be possible to deduce from the facts at our disposal. The organization and equipment of General Kennedy's columns, as well as the manner in which it was proposed that they should be employed, were discussed upon the frontier with a degree of warmth which showed at least that much was to be said in favour of both sides of the questions involved; and it seemed from the first that the task of deciding, where so many capable doctors disagreed, might with advantage be deferred till fuller light was thrown upon the problems presented for public consideration. Foremost among the subjects occupying the attention of military men at the time in question was one we alluded to the other day—the propriety or otherwise of restricting a general officer to a limited time for the execution of a carefully prescribed programme; as proposed to the system of a military occupation of the enemy's country, with the expressed intention of remaining there till our objects be accomplished. We have already, on former occasions, set forth the superior merits of the latter procedure, and propose now to show in what ways it was peculiarly applicable to an expedition for the coercion of the Waziris; and we shall also notice some of the difficulties—in our opinion by no means insurmountable—which seem to have led to the adoption of the older and less satisfactory system.

Our military system on the frontier has been always remarkable for the entire absence of any recognised agency for the collection or collation of "Intelligence;" though the excellence of the notes furnished some years ago for Colonel MacGregor's *Gazetteer* by Colonel McLean, Major Davidson, and other officers still connected with the frontier, shows that nothing more than ordinary organization has been needed to rectify this evil. As it was, however, adequate information was not to be had, when it was required for the preparation of the general scheme for the late expedition; and it was found needful to restrict General Kennedy in all important matters to the programme worked out by General Chamberlain, whose despatches of 1860 were practically the only authority which could be depended upon, as regards the resources and military features of the country to be traversed. The amusingly servile manner in which the movements of General Kennedy appear to have been regulated by those of his predecessor, was, to some extent no doubt, accidental; but it will be seen, on reference to Colonel Paget's account of the former campaign, that this reproduction extended not only to the adoption of the same lines of advance, but in many instances to making exactly the same marches and halts on the identical days of the month of May. The effect of such a procedure on the minds of the enemy can hardly have been otherwise than unfortunate; they probably inferred that any other course of action was beyond the limits of our power. Other reasons, as will be shown presently, may have added weight to the considerations in favour of an advance by the Khisora and Tank river routes; but the fact of these roads having been used in 1860 not only constituted no sufficient reason for employing them again on the present occasion, but in itself formed a strong argument for the selection of entirely new lines of advance. On some few occasions, the prescribed rule seems to have proved too much for the patience of the General; and digressions

were made, in the interest of the surveying operations; the most important being that to the top of the Pir Ghal mountain, from which point results of great scientific value were obtained. It appears, however, that the news of these outbreaks of originality was by no means so favourably received as it deserved to be, by the Government of India; and the effect of the reconnaissances was also somewhat marred, as regards one at least of the principal objects of the expedition, by the political intrigues whereby, more than once, the safe conduct of the escort was provided for. The Russian frontier generals have of late years reduced operations of this kind to a system which is worthy of the consideration of our military authorities; and the model of the less sanguinary of Russian "scientific reconnaissances" might perhaps with advantage be adopted in our service. There is a report of the measures taken by General Abramof for the elucidation of the natural history and geology of the Upper Zarafshan Valley, in which, after describing the results of the investigation of the *savants*, Abramof mentions casually that opportunities were also afforded of testing the new pattern of rocket battery which was attached to the party, and which effectually disarmed the opposition contemplated by the inhabitants, who eventually proved of use in bringing supplies to his camp.

There is no measure which tends to the ultimate pacification of our frontier more thoroughly than the occupation by our troops of the remoter portions of the country inhabited by tribes who defy our authority. For it is only by such means that the conviction can be forced upon them that no strongholds which they possess are inaccessible to our arms. This course, which they themselves rather graphically describe as "lifting the *pardah*" of the tribe or section concerned, is essential to the permanent success of our military expeditions; and it is only when these expeditions are conducted on the principles now and elsewhere advocated, that such a procedure becomes possible. The adequate performance of this duty can only be hoped for when the force employed possesses the highest degree of mobility which can be attained by an army in the field: and to understand to what extent the projectors of the Waziri expedition were restricted, by circumstances, to a less satisfactory programme, it will be necessary to inquire how far it fulfilled this last condition when it crossed the frontier at Tank.

Among the points connected with the preparations for the expedition, one of the first which provoked a strong expression of opinion from military critics was the report that camels were being collected on a large scale for the carriage of the *impedimenta* of the troops. The subject of transport has of late become familiar even to those of our readers who are most widely disconnected from such questions. Lieutenant Barrow, whose prize essay recently won the gold medal of the Simla United Service Institution, opened the campaign against our old friend the camel, and seemed to wish that the animal should disappear at once and for ever from our camps. Another officer of the Quarter Master General's Department followed suit, in a second essay of the same series; but was inclined to tolerate the existence of the camel, on condition of his doing double work, and taking up the duties heretofore performed by the *dāk gharry* pony and hackery bullock. In the face of so much skilled evidence against him, we hesitate to take up the cause of this long-suffering beast, who all the same has done good service in his time. It must be remembered that mules, only, have of late years been employed upon purely frontier service; but the subject is one which should be considered in each case in connection with the general scheme of the proposed theatre of war.



The country occupied by the Mahsuds was known, from the accounts of General Chamberlain's march, to differ essentially from those in which our troops have more recently been engaged in the Yusufzai, Hazara, and Afridi Campaigns. Certain points in it, which formed the objective of the expedition of 1860 could, it was known, be reached by ascending the beds of one or more rivers which afford roads rising, by almost imperceptible gradients, to elevations of upwards of 6,000 feet above the level of the sea. So long then as adhesion to the old programme was insisted on, there was no objection, so far as the character of the country is concerned, to the use of camels. They had, it was known, rendered the march of General Chamberlain's columns extremely slow, but General Chamberlain had accomplished the object he had in view; and the same time being allowed to General Kennedy to cover the same ground, with superior facilities as regards arms for the protection of convoys, no unforeseen difficulties were likely to obstruct progress. The employment of camels—which was probably unavoidable owing to sufficient mules not being readily available—was objected to as marking at once the character of the expedition, and restricting the operations to the roads which these animals could traverse; but we are inclined to believe that this was already a foregone conclusion, to be referred rather to the unwillingness of the Home Government to embark on any undertaking which could not be limited to a definite number of days. Such difficulties as arose from the employment of camels in conjunction with mules might probably have been surmounted by more judicious arrangements regarding the equipment of the force and the distribution of the transport animals. The camels and mules required for the carriage of the troops were distributed to the brigades in proportion to their strength; and neither brigade had thus the advantage of a baggage train of uniform composition, the pace of the columns in each instance being regulated by the pace of the slower of the two classes of animals employed. The tasks allotted to the two brigades were, however, essentially different. That under the personal command of General Kennedy was entrusted with the primary invasion of the country; and if further measures had been contemplated by Government, the duty of occupying the chief strategical positions would have formed part of its work. In either case it should have been equipped so as to ensure rapidity of movement and to facilitate the exploration in force of all outlying valleys and settlements in which the enemy might imagine that they could hold out against us with advantage. The main object of the 2nd brigade was the conveyance of stores and provisions to the invading column; and the road selected for its advance, considered as a hill road, was well suited to the march of a convoy of camels. Had matters been so arranged as to utilise to the utmost the capabilities of the carriage, camels only would have been made use of with this brigade; leaving the whole of the mules at General Kennedy's disposal for equipment, on the lightest possible scale, of the column crossing the frontier at Tank, with which, as we have shown, rapidity of movement was of the highest importance. Opinions, however, differed among officers on the spot, and even we believe among the most intimate of the General's advisers, as to what degree of lightness was compatible with efficiency and with the exigencies of the climate and other conditions to be encountered; the chief point at issue being whether tents should or should not be taken with the columns. The question is a more important one than it may appear to non-military readers. The sepoys' palanquin, it is said, by certain alterations of its component parts, be reduced to an indifferent mule load. There was, however, no time to effect these changes; but even supposing they had been made, and the baggage

reduced in other ways that seemed possible, it is questionable whether sufficient mules were available to allow of the transport of the tents. The use of the tents thus entailed the addition of camels to the column; and the employment of camels, by diminishing the mobility of the invading force, necessarily modified the plan of the campaign. No principles, universally applicable to all countries, can be laid down regarding the respective merits of the systems of bivouacking and encamping, for this necessarily depends upon considerations of climate and elevation; but these conditions are so far identical along the frontier from Abbottabad to Bannu, that some general rules might before this have been arrived at from experience. Mistakes have no doubt been made, on many comparatively recent occasions, whereby both men and followers have suffered from too sweeping reductions in the weight of their "kits;" but speaking generally, all ranks, from the general to the camp follower, have, without loss of efficiency, dispensed with the use of tents during a series of punitive expeditions undertaken at the most inclement seasons during the last fifteen years; and it will be a pity if the entire reversal of this desirable precedent during the late campaign is allowed to pass unchallenged in military circles. It is, as already said, in no way possible or desirable that hard-and-fast rules should be framed on the subject, irrespective of locality and season; but some principles at least might be established, in the case of the countries which must necessarily form the scene of periodical military operations. Without such guiding principles, not only is it impossible for officers to study the capabilities of our frontier, with reference to future plans of campaign, but it becomes impracticable in times of peace to arrange for the possession by officers and regiments of the light equipment required to ensure comfort and efficiency when upon active service.

These remarks might be concluded by quoting the opinions of nearly every great captain, from Julius Cæsar to Napoleon, as to the merits of the *vita sub Jove* in its effect upon the health and morals of the soldier; but the subject, both in theory and practice, is already familiar to a large body of our readers. It will be absurd to contend, after the experience of the last three years, or indeed of the last quarter of a century, that our Indian army, British or Native, is less capable of enduring the cold or braving the hardships of a summer campaign, *patiens pulveris atque solis*, than were the troops referred to by the authorities we have mentioned; and great as are the vicissitudes of climate upon our Indian frontier, we believe that, during the seasons to which operations are necessarily limited, they are on the whole not so formidable as those of the countries which have formed the battlefields of Europe.

In making use of the late Waziri expedition as a text for observations upon the past and future conduct of affairs on the frontier, we have been compelled to dwell rather upon its weak points than upon its still more conspicuous merits. It furnishes the latest addition to the great mass of unadjusted information which has lain for years past at the disposal of our civil and military authorities; and the care and skill with which its operations were conducted add peculiar value to such new lessons as it affords. Neither ability nor inclination are wanting at head-quarters to make the most of this accumulated experience, and it is only by using it to the utmost that any progress can be made towards the adoption of a definite and satisfactory frontier policy.

(The author of the above is unknown to me.)

22nd June 1881.

J. D.

The following has been given by Colonel McLean, C.B., who, however, does not wish the list to be in any way made public until it can be verified in all respects.

### MAHSUD WAZIRIS.

#### I.—Alizai about 8,000, including Shāman Kheyl.

Division.	Sub-division.	Chiefmen.	Remarks.
SHABI KHEYL ...	1. Baromái ... 2. Astónái ...	Amir Khan ... Imám Shah, Siman, and Núrzi.	SHABI KHEYL.— <i>Strength.</i> Occupy three localities, viz., in Tor Wám on Kin Tak, between Wánú and Kánigoram.
2. Collectively Potia Kheyl. PALI KHEYL GIDI OR GADI KHEYL.	3. Patónái ... 4. Súltánái ... 5. Bibízai ...	Guleit ... Alibát Khan ... Kháná ... Khúshál ...	2. Bábar, a place behind (W) the Gabbar Mt. 3. Dótóla near Tauda China. Wánú to Kánigoram = a days' journey for a good walker.
	1. Múchi Kheyl ... 2. Abbas Kheyl ... 3. Salémi Kheyl ... 4. Gúri Kheyl ... 5. Bahádar Kheyl ... 6. Garéni ... 7. Mala Kheyl ...	Son of Sahib úlúk ... Umar Khan* ... Kail ... Wazir ... Bad-i-Gul ... Tirsúm ...	PALI KHEYL.— <i>Strength</i> ... AND Khissará, in Kwarra ... GIDI KHEYL.— <i>Do.</i> ... and in Shinkel.
	1. Langar Kheyl ... 2. Wazirgái ... 3. Kéi Kheyl ... 4. Bráhm Kheyl ... 5. Malikdínai ... 6. Chánd Kheyl ... 7. Targuddi (†) ...	* Yarak* Matin and Badrdin. Mahomed Gul and Shahmir. Zebal ... Baháwul Khan and Baháúdin. Misa ... Múshi ...	The upper Zam is divided into two main branches which meet at Jandola. That which comes from Makin, Razmak and Shingi Kot is called the Shi Tak. The other which rising in Shaki, flows through Tor Wam, Khisora, &c., is called the Kin Tak. The Shinkel nullah which rises near Kanigoram, joins the Shi Tak at Kot Shingi. Umar Khan's village is on a nullah leading into the Kin Tak between Spalita and Khisora.
3. SHAHMIRAI ...			SHAH MIRAI.— <i>Strength.</i> They are settled at Gurgúrei between Shinkie and the Shi Tak. There are also some at Kúramá between Gurgúrei and Kanigoram. The Shabi Khel are by some included in Potia Khel. Alizai and Shaman Khel are called collectively Munzai.

\* Men wanted by Government.

† Siman's nephew a prisoner at Dera Ismail Khan.

#### II.—Shamán Khel—strength.

Division.	Sub-division.	Chiefmen.	Remarks.
1. CHAHAR KHEYL	1. Kasim Kheyl	* Nazim, Sarmast Nassir	The greater part of Shamun Khel live at Maidan on the upper Shi Tak, near Razmak also Barará or Anéi, and the remainder in Shahor, a nullah which joins the Kin Tak above the Tangi not very far from Spalita.
"	2. Zaria Kheyl ...	A minor: Haji does the work.	
"	3. Brahmi Kheyl	Lall Shah.	
2. KHALI KHEYL	1. Badawái ... 2. Bangal Kheyl ... 3. Bahádur Kheyl	Ghazi Khan. Idádar. Gull.	
3. GULESHAI ...	.....	Saiad Amin.	
4. BADIMZAI ...	.....	Reshmin.	

\* Nazim, principal man of all Shaman Khel; after him in importance are Sarmait, Lall Shah and Ghazi.

## III.—Balolzai—strength about 6,000.

Division.	Sub-division.	Section.	Chiefmen.	Remarks.
1. IMMAL KHEYL	1. Abdúlái ...	1. Lalia Kheyl ...	* Boyak, Karim and Somad.	<i>Immal Khel</i> —Strength about 3,500.
"	" ...	2. Shahmak Kheyl	† Sher Ali and Ursala.	The Abdulai at Makin. The
"	2. Nazar Kheyl...	1. Kharmaz Kheyl	Madmir and Ashak	Nazar Khel in hot weather at
"	3. Maliksháhi ...	2. Aziz Kheyl ...	Siggi and Barám.	Tangi near Kanigoram and in
"	"	1. Langar Kheyl ...	Pirdád.	cold weather near Shingi Kot.
"	"	2. Kittí Kheyl ...	Khán or Khón.	The Malikshahi in cold weather
"	"	3. Yazid Kheyl ...	Shaistam.	near Shingi Kot. Abdulai
2. NANA KHEYL	1. Háibat Kheyl	.....	Kargál.	about 800 matchlock men. The
"	2. Jalal Kheyl ...	.....	Mir Ajab.	Malik Shai about 600 strong.
"	3. Kokarei ...	.....	Shakar.	
"	4. Abdul Rahman Kheyl.	.....	* Moshak and Toj	<i>Nana Khel</i> —Strength.
"	5. Górá Kheyl ...	.....	Sandagar,	Haibat Khel and Jelal Khel
"	6. Nekzan Kheyl	.....	Atamár.	live at Sirúna near the head of the
"	7. Umar Kheyl ...	.....	Shahdidar.	Suja pass, in the cold weather;
3. SHINGI ...	1. Mamia Kheyl	.....	* Azmat and Ayala.	and in summer at Darra in
"	2. Boiá Kheyl ...	.....	Janei and Futteh Roz.	Shál above Makin. It is im-
"	3. Kharmaz Kheyl	.....	Kalei and Fatteh Khan.	portant to remember that Shál
"	4. Kana Kheyl ...	.....	Mir Salaam.	belongs principally to the Dar-
"	5. Sohakei or Zokel.	.....	Mir Akbar.	wesh Khel Waziris. The
"	6. Umar Kheyl ...	.....	.....	Kokarei partly in the Sukdo
4. BAND KHEYL	1. Ekm Kheyl ...	.....	.....	and partly in Khisora, also at
"	2. Tutia Kheyl ...	.....	.....	Baspil near the Pir Ghal.
				Abdul Rehman Khel in
				Spalita in winter and in Badr in
				summer. Umar Khel in Makin.
				Shingi in winter at Shingi
				Kot or Kotkei and in Badr in
				summer.
				<i>Band Khel</i> —A small division
				in Makin.

\* Wanted by Government.

† Sher Ali is the head of all Balolzai.

C. McLEAN, C.B., *Lieutenant-Colonel,*  
*Commanding 1st P. C.*



*Transferred to and received from No. 2 column (GENERAL GORDON'S).*

	BRITISH.		Fighting men.	Followers of all classes.	Horses.	Ordnance mules.	CARRIAGE.								Ordnance, 7 lbs.
	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.					Mules.	Ponies.	Camels.	SICK CARRIAGE.					
										Bearers.	Dolls.	Dandis.	Pairs, Kajawals.		
Transferred to General Gordon's column.															
Royal Engineers ...	2	...	...	26	5	...	9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
4th Punjab Cavalry	7	...	221	328	235	...	72	216	8	74	2	12	3	...	
8th Company Sappers and Miners.	1	2	73	94	1	12*	70	9	...	39	1	6	...	...	
32nd Pioneers ...	8	...	441	349	8	...	270	30	44	149	1	26	5	..	
2nd Mountain Battery.	3	...	111	136	6	58	112	20	...	56	...	11	...	3	
4th Mountain Battery.	3	...	108	126	7	59	119	14	...	43	1	7	...	3	
Major Lugard ...	1	...	...	6	2	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Total ...	25	2	954	1,065	264	129	654	267	52	361	5	62	8	6	
Received from General Gordon's column.															
1st Mountain Battery.	2	...	79	61	5	39	23	2	33	16	...	2	...	2	
Commissariat ...	...	...	...	340	...	...	...	...	975	...	...	...	...	...	
Total ...	2	...	79	401	5	39	23	2	1,008	16	...	2	...	2	

\* Equipment mules.

Casualties during campaign to 18th May.

Died ...	Fighting men	...	{ In action or from wounds		...	5
			{ From disease		...	8
	Followers	...	{ From wounds		...	1
			{ From disease		...	3
						<hr/> 17

*Animals.\**

			Mules.	Ponies.	Camels.	Total.
Died	...	...	5	2	98†	105
Stolen or strayed	...	...	4	0	1	5
Captured by enemy	...	...	0	0	0	0
						110

\* As shown in return to Quarter Master General, dated 17th May 1881, compiled on 16th at 12 noon.

† The Chief Commissariat Officer on 18th May gives this figure as 123.

J. D.

*Strength of Tank column, Waziri Field Force, on 20th April 1881, showing fighting men, followers, horses and all transport.*

	BRITISH.		Native fighting ranks.	Followers of all classes.	Horses.	Ordnance mules.	CARRIAGE ACTUALLY PRESENT.								Guns, 7-pr.
	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.					Mules.	Ponies including those of grass cutters.	Camels.	SICK CARRIAGE.					
										Bearers.	Dulis.	Dandis.	Pairs, kajawahs.		
<i>Staff and Departments.</i>															
Head-Quarters' Staff	8	...	11	57	25	...	35	9	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Commanding Royal Engineer and Field Engineer and Signalling.	5	...	...	59	10	...	78	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Survey	1	...	2	16	2	...	8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Field Hospital	...	...	...	46	...	...	21	...	6	30	...	6	...	...	
Commissariat and Transport.	4	2	21 (of 4th Sk. In.)	917	5	...	73	...	2,204	...	...	...	...	...	
Total	18	2	34	1,005	42	...	215	9	2,270	30	...	6	...	...	
<i>Regiments.</i>															
1st Punjab Cavalry	4	...	115	166	119	...	89	60	10	30	1	5	2	...	
4th " " "	7	...	222	330	237	...	72	217	8	74	2	12	3	...	
2nd Mountain Battery.	3	...	111	136	6	58	112	20	...	56	...	11	...	3	
3rd " " "	5	...	205	156	9	110	156	13	2	59	1	10	2	6	
4th " " "	3	...	108	126	7	59	119	14	...	43	1	7	...	3	
8th Company Sappers and Miners.	1	2	73	94	1	12*	70	9	...	39	1	6	...	* Equip- ment mules.	
1st Sikh Infantry	7	...	545	345	7	...	273	36	45	142	1	24	...	...	
4th " " "	9	...	541	322	8	...	247	6	45	139	4	22	5	...	
1st Punjab Infantry	8	...	495	294	8	...	280	21	28	100	3	15	5	...	
2nd " " "	8	...	546	322	8	...	182	75	46	134	4	22	5	...	
3rd " " "	7	...	565	260	7	...	244	...	70	87	4	12	5	...	
4th " " "	8	...	546	332	7	...	185	112	53	129	4	15	5	...	
6th " " "	9	...	556	343	9	...	274	36	47	147	2	25	5	...	
32nd Pioneers	8	...	441	349	8	...	270	30	44	149	1	26	5	...	
Major Lugard, R.A.	1	...	...	6	2	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Regimental Total	88	2	5,041	3,531	443	239	2,575	649	398	1,328	29	212	47	12	
Add—Head-quarters, &c.	18	2	34	1,005	42	...	215	9	2,270	30	...	6	...	...	
GRAND TOTAL	106	4	5,083	4,676	485	239	2,790	658	2,668	1,358	29	218	47	12	

*Strength (as before) on 17th May 1881 (day before dispersal of Force).*

	BRITISH.		Native fighting ranks.	Followers of all classes.	Horses.	Ordnance Mules.	CARRIAGE ACTUALLY PRESENT.								Guns, 7-pt.
	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.					Mules.	Ponies including grass cutters.	Camels.	SICK CARRIAGE.					
										Bearers.	Dulis.	Dandis.	Pairs, kajawahs.		
Head-Quarters' Staff	8	...	11	57	25	...	35	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Commanding Royal Engineers, Field park, &c.	3	...	...	33	5	...	62	...	5	...	...	...	...	...	
Survey ...	1	...	2	16	2	...	8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Field Hospital	1	...	3	40	...	...	21	...	6	30	...	6	...	...	
Commissariat and Transport.	4	2	21	1,217	5	...	196	55	3,015	...	...	...	...	...	
Total	17	2	37	1,356	37	...	322	58	3,026	30	...	6	...	...	
Regiments.															
1st Punjab Cavalry...	4	...	115	179	165	...	94	61	12	30	1	5	2	...	
1st Mountain Battery.	2	...	79	61	5	39	23	2	33	16	...	2	...	2	
3rd „ „	5	...	205	155	9	110	114	13	6	58	1	10	2	6	
1st Sikh Infantry ...	7	...	541	355	7	...	271	35	77	142	1	26	5	...	
4th „ „	9	...	546	316	8	...	226	6	58	138	4	22	5	...	
1st Punjab Infantry	8	...	493	294	8	...	279	21	28	98	3	15	5	...	
2nd „ „	8	...	540	317	8	...	167	43	93	145	4	22	5	...	
3rd „ „	7	...	541	259	7	...	220	...	88	67	4	11	5	...	
4th „ „	8	...	544	324	7	...	159	85	81	135	4	21	5	...	
6th „ „	9	...	555	336	9	...	240	27	80	146	2	25	5	...	
Regimental Total ...	67	...	4,149	2,612	233	149	1,793	298	565	995	24	159	39	8	
Add—Head-quarters, &c.	17	2	37	1,363	37	...	322	58	3,026	30	...	6	...	...	
Grand Total	84	2	4,186	3,975	270	149	2,115	356	3,591	1,025	24	165	39	8	

*Meteorological observations supplied by Dr. Robinson, 4th Punjab Infantry.*

Maximum as shown in an 80-lb. Cabul tent, ends open.

Date.	Place.		Altitude above sea.	Maxi- mum.	Minimum.	Wind, rain, &c.
April 1st	Edwardesabad	...	1,279	74.0	68.5	Much rain.
2nd	„	...	...	76.5	61.0	Fine.
3rd	„	...	...	80.5	62.0	Cloudy afternoon.
4th	„	...	...	82.5	63.5	Cloudy evening.
5th	„	...	...	82.5	66.5	Cloudy evening, rain at night, light rain, morning.
6th	Nowrung	...	1,050	82.5	61.5	Very cloudy at night, slight rain, morning.
7th	Nowrung and Gambela	...	900	90.0	65.0	Cloudy evening.
8th	Gambela and Ghazni Khel	...	1,150	91.0	61.0	Fine.
9th	Ghazni Khel and Paizu	...	1,250	77.0	66.5	Much rain.
10th	Paizu and Kundi	...	850	80.0	71.0	Fine.
11th	Tank	...	980	81.0	69.5	Slight rain, evening.
12th	„	...	...	77.0	61.0	Light rain, evening, very heavy rain 5 to 9 A.M.
13th	„	...	...	77.5	60.0	Cloudy.
14th	„	...	...	81.0	59.5	Fine.
15th	„	...	...	88.0	64.5	Cloudy morning.
16th	„	...	...	90.0	68.5	Cloudy evening.
17th	„	...	...	93.0	68.0	Showery evening.
18th	Zam	...	1,350	94.0	74.5	Breeze in evening and at night.
19th	Halt	...	...	97.0	76.0	Hot breeze, constant.
20th	„	...	...	98.0	78.0	Hot breeze, constant.
21st	Kirghi	...	2,150	96.0	72.5	Warm breeze, increasing to slight gale about 8 P.M.
22nd	Jhandola	...	2,400	90.0	63.5	Fine, clear.
23rd	Halt	...	...	91.5	62.5	Fine, clear night, cool and breezy.
24th	Haidari Kach	...	3,050	95.0	61.0	Fine, clear, breezy at night.
25th	Tarun China	...	3,450	91.5	62.5	Fine, cool.
26th	Barwand	...	4,100	65.0	58.5	Cold, windy, very cold, rain.
27th	} Entrance to Nari Ragza and Defile or Tangi Ragza. }	}	4,750	77.0	57.0	} Maximum uncertain, heavy rain in even- ing.
28th				( P )	56.5	
29th				Narai Ragza and Tangi	...	
30th	Kundi Wam	...	5,550	73.5	52.5	



Date, 1881.		Place.	Altitude above sea.	Maxi- mum.	Mini- mum.	Wind, rain, &c.	
May 1st	...	Kundi Wam	...	5,550	74.0	48.0	Fine, breezy, cool at night.
2nd	...	Halt	...	5,550	77.5	52.5	Fine, cool.
3rd	...	Shah Alam Ragza	...	6,500	79.0	56.0	Fine, cool, breezy.
4th	...	Moghul Kheyl	...	6,800	83.0	53.5	Cloudy evening, slight thunder, storm, night fine.
5th	...	Kanigoram (or Salal Ragh).	...	6,550	87.5	58.0	Fine.
6th	...	Halt	...	6,550	88.5	60.5	Fine.
7th	...	Sam Kanigoram	...	6,300	87.5	60.0	Fine, cloudy.
8th	...	Halt	...	6,300	88.0	61.0	Fine.
9th	...	Doya Toya	...	5,250	91.0	63.5	Cloudy, showers in afternoon.
10th	...	Makin	...	5,800	87.0	65.0	Cloudy, slight showers, evening.
11th	...	Halt	...	5,800	81.0	64.5	Showers at noon, cloudy all evening, night fine.
12th	...	Halt	...	5,800	81.5	61.0	Heavy thunderstorm about 3 p.m. and slight rain at night.
13th	...	Janjal	...	4,800	78.5	64.5	Slight shower, noon.
14th	...	Surimanja Kach	...	4,100	94.5	68.5	{ Hot summer haze, but an agreeable breeze.
15th	...	Marghaband	...	3,250	101.0	75.0	{ Full Moon. Summer haze, cool wind.
16th	...	Jhandola	...	2,400	106.5	80.0	Summer haze, breezy.
17th	...	Mouth of Zam	...	1,350	109.0	92.0	
18th	...	Tank	...	980	111.0	78.5	Force dispersed.

The above data were taken from a "Casellas" maximum and minimum self-registering thermometer.

## Diary of the Waziri Field Force.

*Tank, Monday, 18th April 1881.*—The force marched to a position in front of (W) the Zam Post across the Zam stream on the right bank. A very stony, gently rising plateau, rising up to the range of hills, dividing British territory from the Bhattanni lands. The position of

ZAM.  
Bhattanni.

camp (which had 500 yards front by 400 depth) lay with its rear face on the bank of the Zam stream. The stream from considerable rains in the Waziri hills had swollen a great deal, but was still easily fordable, and the whole of the baggage got in early in the afternoon without accident. The road from Tank to Zam had been improved by the company of sappers and miners who had widened the bridges over water-cuts, &c. It is a constantly used road, lies within British territory, and so requires no special description. From Tank to

Mian Bagh.

Mian Bagh, after skirting the western side of the city of Tank, it is open and free of stones (distance 4 miles). From Mian Bagh to the Zam Post it lies across a stony plain intersected by the many smaller streams into which the main Zam breaks up after moving from the hills. The road is, therefore, stony, but good for all arms. The position selected for the camp was half a mile west of the Zam Post.

*Tuesday, 19th April 1881.*—The force halted. A number of the Mahsud Maliks with a following of about 150 men came in, laying down their arms at Kot Kirghi en route.

ZAM.  
Kot Kirghi.

*Wednesday, 20th April 1881.*—The force halted. Made a reconnaissance to Jhandola with Mr. Shaw, Telegraph Department, Lieutenant Lyster, R.A., No. 2 Mountain Battery,

ZAM.

and Lieutenant Appleton, R.E. The road lies from the Zam Post along the bed of the Zam stream. From our camp it was necessary to cross the stream to get into the regular frontier road to Kot Kirghi. There was more water than usual in the Zam; but there was nothing to prevent laden animals of all descriptions crossing at almost any point (depth of water  $1\frac{1}{2}$  feet). The road, after entering the Zam half a mile from camp, runs nearly west along

Sobat-i-Kach.

the stony bed of the stream for another mile, and then across the Sobat-i-Kach, an alluvial and fertile plot of land on the right bank of the stream. The Kach is about a mile in extent; the road then again descends into the bed of the stream, which has to be twice crossed from here to Kirghi. There is also a footpath up the right bank, which is good for footmen and practicable for mules, which avoids these crossings. Kot Kirghi is a frontier post occupied by 50 rifles under a native officer of the 2nd Sikhs and 8 sowars of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry. It is on the edge of the precipitous cliff overlooking the Zam stream and stretching back to the east in a flat stony plateau, which forms an excellent camping ground for a large force, the only objection to it being (1), the distance from water, which can only be got from the Zam stream; (2), there is no grazing for camels nor grass for horses; (3), wood is scarce. The plateau is stony, but

the stones are of no great size, and the drainage is good. There is also camping ground for about 3 regiments below the plateau on a small kachi immediately under the post. There is an alternative road to Kot Kirghi from Zam over the range of hills in front. This is good for mules and avoids the water, but is very rough and stony for camels; it is about the same length as the route by the stream, namely,  $6\frac{1}{2}$  miles.

The road on from Kot Kirghi to Jhandola is very much like that from Zam to Kirghi. There are, however, three routes:—

Jhandola.

(1) Along the bed of the Zam.

Ghanni.

(2) A path along the left bank called the Ghanni route.

Sibi.

(3) A path along the left bank called the Sibi road.

(1) The first is the one usually taken, and lies along the stony bed of the Zam stream, which has to be crossed and recrossed about 15 times from Kot Kirghi to Jhandola; the depth of the stream, which was running rapidly, was about 2 to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  feet, and was sufficient to cause considerable delay to baggage animals, especially small mules and ponies. There are several kachis on either bank of the Zam.

(2) The Ghanni route lies above the stream on the right bank and crowns the heights on that side to a considerable extent. It is a narrow, stony hill road, but good for infantry and practicable for mules and mountain guns. The infantry would have to go in single file in places. It is used by the Bhattannis when there is much water in the Zam for laden mules, bullocks, and even camels. It joins the Zam route close to the Innis Tangi, up to which point it

Innis Tangi.

avoids the water which is a great point in its favour.

The Innis Tangi is a narrow defile with precipitous sides, which on the right bank rise to a high point (1,100 feet above the stream). It is about 100 yards broad and is 400 yards long: the heights on both sides could be crowned without very much difficulty.

(3) The Sibi route branches off from the Zam at the Chakran, half a mile

Chakran.

below Kot Kirghi, which is a narrow defile running out of the Zam on the left bank. It is a route

which used to be much used by Waziri thieves in carrying off their stolen property, but it is a difficult route, and only good for footmen. It debouches at Jhandola on the other side (W) of the Innis Tangi into the Chapli Waja nullah.

The Zam at Jhandola, after passing through the Innis Tangi, opens out into a broad bed bounded by undulating plateaus with trees, cultivation, khasil

Chingan.

crops, &c., and an excellent camping ground on the Chingan Kach on the left bank. On the right

bank on a small eminence is the ruins of the old fort, which used to be held by the retainers of the Nawab of Tank, and was the chief place for collecting tolls from Mahsuds and others bringing merchandise into Tank.

*Thursday, 21st April 1881.*—Marched to Kot Kirghi. All the force

Zam.

encamped on the plateau, except the 1st Sikhs, 32nd Pioneers, sappers, transport, and commissariat animals, who were located on the kachi below.

Kirghi.

*Friday, 22nd April 1881.*—The force marched to Jhandola.

*Saturday, 23rd April 1881.*—The force halted at Jhandola, a very fine

Jhandola.                      camping ground at Chingan Kach on the left bank, with excellent camel grazing and khasil crops round it. A ridge bounded the east of camp, and on this the pickets were placed; on the west of the camping ground lay the broad stony bed of the Zam nullah. A reconnaissance in force, consisting of 250 of 1st Sikhs, 250 of 1st Punjab Infantry, 250 32nd Pioneers, the sapper company, and 30 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry, the whole under Colonel Rice, left camp at 4-30 A.M. to

Shahor Tangi.                      push into the Shahor Tangi: the pioneers and sappers were to repair the road and make it passable for the baggage animals. The road from Jhandola to the Shahor lies along the bed of the nullah. It is stony and rough, but the nullah is wider than it is lower down. It runs nearly north for about 2 miles from Jhandola, and then turns

Dotak.                              towards the west. A mile further on is Dotak, the junction of the water from the Shingi Kot stream\* and that from Shahor the former is said to bring down  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the water in the Zam and the Shahor  $\frac{1}{3}$ rd. Beyond the junction

Shahor.                              the water was muddy, and the crossing from 2 or 3 feet deep. The water of the Shahor, however, was clear and shallow. Two or three small patches of cultivable land were passed on each bank, none of these were under crops, however. About 2 miles from Dotak is the entrance of the Shahor Tangi. Two remarkable rocks like gate posts stand near the entrance in the bed of the stream. The Shahor Tangi is far narrower and larger than the Innis Tangi which we had lately passed and is about 2 miles in extent; its average width is about 50 yards, but it is as wide as 150 in places and again narrows in several places to 20 or 30 yards. The road was very bad and impassable for heavily laden camels and had it not been repaired by the sappers and 32nd Pioneers, would have delayed more than it actually did the long string of baggage animals which accompanied the force. Gun cotton was used to blow up the boulders, &c., with great success, and a practicable road was constructed right through the pass to its western entrance near the Haidari Kach. The sides of the pass are precipitous, rising up on the right bank to the Khar Gundi hill, height 5,150 feet, and on the left bank to the Chapri Sir, the road running along the bed of the nullah crosses and recrosses the stream very frequently, the depth of which, however, was only about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  feet. The heights on both sides of the pass can be easily crowned.

The reconnaissance and working party returned to camp before dusk.

*Sunday, 24th April.*—The force marched from Jhandola to Haidari Kach, distance about 9 miles. The route has been described as far as the western end of the Shahor Tangi

Shahor Tangi.                      in diary of 23rd. At this end of the Tangi the nullah branches off into two divisions, the main one, the Shahor, continuing a western direction, while the lesser tributary, the Uspaleto, runs N. W. This latter is narrow and difficult, commanded by steep hills with small "kachis"

Abdul Rahman.                      every here and there and is inhabited by the Abdul Rahman Khel section of the Mahsuds, the head of which section is Mashak, the only Malik who had not come in and surrendered to Government. The Mahsuds seem to live almost entirely in caves in these parts, and it was a

\* The Zam.



noticeable fact that not a single village had yet been met with, and the country seemed entirely deserted of its population, the only Mahsuds to be seen being that of the Jirgah accompanying the force. Mashak and the other members of his section living up the Spalita line entirely in caves which are constructed in the conglomerate rock near the kachis which they cultivate. A very small proportion of the country seems capable of cultivation; the whole face of the country being a mass of stone and rocks, and the only means of obtaining cultivable patches of ground being damming up patches of land along the banks of the stream, thus forming alluvial deposits of soil which are termed kachis.

Our route lay up the main stream of the Shahor. At the fork formed by the two nullahs is a fine piece of camping ground, a high, stony plateau which would form an excellent and easily defended position, commanding the entrance of the Shahor Tangi from an enemy coming down either nullah.

The Haidari Kach is a large, flat and fairly high piece of ground rising up to a high point on the south side and bordered on the others by the stream; it is about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the mouth of the Tangi and gave ample accommodation for the force, a portion of it on the east side was under irrigation and unfit for camping. The survey party went up to the top of the Khar Gundi. The rearguard did not get into camp till 11 P.M., owing to the narrowness of the Tangi, and the immense number of camels (carrying 16 days' provisions) with the force. The valley opens out from this point and stretches up into wider glens on each side of the nullah, but without a single vestige of habitation and but few patches of land which can be cultivated.

*Monday, 25th April.*—The force marched to Tarun China, distance 5 miles

Tarun China. about. The rearguard had one shot fired at them when leaving camp. The route lies first out of the nullah over a small stony plateau on the left bank, but again descends into the bed of the stream about a quarter of a mile on, near which point lies the Bambar Kach, a small cultivated patch on the left bank; on the right bank, the Char Gundi nullah runs into the Shahor stream at this point, stretching up into a picturesque glen; this is a fairly easy route into the Gumal, much used by thieves, and enters the Gumal by the Ormanai route behind Girni Sir.

The Shahor nullah now runs nearly due north for about half a mile, the left bank being precipitous and high, and the right bank rising more gradually to a *ragza* or stony flat plateau. The Shahor nullah then takes a turn to the S.W. for about  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile, at which point the Dana Wat ravine joins the Shahor; this leads by the roads into the Gumal, *viz.*,

(1) Khwajma.

(2) Mádijan.

the former is the lower route and the latter leads into Spin and so into the Gumal; there is plenty of water along both routes and both are fairly easy, especially the Mádijan.

The country on both banks of the Shahor now opens out and there is a larger piece of cultivation here (namely, the Shahor Kach) than any met with previously, except at Jhandola.

Shahor.

For the remainder of the route to Tarun China the road lies along the bed of the nullah in a N.W. direction, with a fine open plain of about a mile wide, covered with (mazari) dwarf palm and some cultivation on the right bank and bordered by the Dana Wat and the Shahor streams; on the left bank there is also a good deal of cultivation, but the hills are narrow and the cultivation lies in the small glens stretching up on this side.

At Tarun China the Shahor passes through a gorge formed by the two high ranges on each bank, but the nullah is about 200 yards wide here and after about 100 yards the country on the far side opens out into an extensive plain.

There is a small mud enclosure at Tarun China on the right bank near which, and under the foot of the high range on this bank the camp was pitched, with pickets on the main spurs from the range protecting the camp. On the left bank, hidden behind a small spur from the high range on this bank lies a small deserted village built of stones with rough thatched roofs, but no mortar or mud is apparently used in their construction.

The survey party ascended the hill on the right bank which they found occupied by a small party of Mahsuds who fired one shot at them and retired.

The old ruined fort or enclosure of Shahor Kach lies on the plain above-mentioned, on the right bank and about  $\frac{3}{4}$  miles south of Tarun China.

*Tuesday, 26th April.*—The force marched from Tarun China to Barwand, distance 6 miles. A portion of the force consisting of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery, the 32nd Pioneers and No. 8 Company Sappers and Miners, and 30 sabres 4th Punjab Cavalry, under General

Sarmasheh.  
Spalita.  
Mashak.  
Nanu.  
Umar Khan.

Kennedy, moved out at 4-30 A.M. to visit Sarmasheh in the Spalita Algad, the residence of Mashak, and so on to Nanu, the head-quarters of Umar Khan, and from thence to camp at Barwand, while the remainder of the force, with the baggage, &c., under Colonel

Godby moved to Barwand along the regular route up the Shahor nullah, leaving camp at 5 A.M.

General Kennedy's column moved up the Sureyla nullah for a distance of

Sureyla.

$4\frac{1}{2}$  miles, till its head was reached. The column then ascended a kotal up which a rather steep and difficult

road led. Up to this point the road from camp at Tarun China had been easy and chiefly along the sandy and shingly bed of the Sureyla with undulating, though commanding heights, on both side. After ascending the kotal the path lay across a high, level plateau with (mazari) dwarf palms growing on it extending for a breadth of  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile; from thence the path ran over the ridge bounding the plateau on the N. and E. sides. Up to this point the road had run in nearly a due northerly direction from Tarun China, distance about 5 miles; it now took a slight bend to the west, and after descending to the western side of the above-mentioned ridge ran across another elevated, though more undulating plateau than the former one. This plateau also extended for about  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile, past a number of caves which are the usual habitations of the Waziris of these parts. From here the road took a more decided westerly

direction till it reached the right bank of the Spalita Algad. This, as previously described, is a narrow ravine with a bed of 50 yards wide (on the average), with steep banks covered with wild olive; a good stream of water flows through this nullah. The route continued for a mile along the right bank of the Spalita and then descended into the bed of the stream, passing several patches of cultivation (kachis) belonging to the Abdul Rahman Khels which lay principally along the left bank; after traversing the shingly bed of the nullah for a mile and passing a few more collection of caves, the force arrived at Sarmasheh, the

Sarmasheh.

Mashak.

head-quarters of Mashak. Here a halt was called, and the place being found deserted, the crops of khasil belonging to this Malik were cut and destroyed and his cave was prepared for demolition by the sappers and pioneers, while pickets were sent out to the high points round. The force halted here from 9-30 till 12 noon, while the above work was being carried out. The mines having

Spalita.

been prepared, Mashak's two caves were blown up, and the force continued its march up the Spalita Algad towards Nanu, the head-quarters of Umar Khan, who is the chief Malik of the Mahsuds and belongs to the Alizai division

Nanu.

of the tribe, and who had surrendered himself at camp Zam. In the meantime a heavy storm of rain, with a piercingly cold wind, had sprung up, and the whole column got a thorough wetting. Two shots were fired from the heights above Mashak's holdings at the pickets without doing any damage however.

The road up the Spalita Algad resembled much the portion already traversed, a narrow, shingly bed with steep banks rising up in precipitous conglomerate cliffs in many places, and at the foot of which were several patches of bright green khasil fields which were watered artificially by canals from the stream running in the bed of the nullah; a mile and a half on from Masahk's lands brought the column to a point where the Spalita Algad branches off into two forks, on the high ground below which were a collection of caves, all deserted; here the road turned from the bed of the nullah up the right bank, with a steep ascent and rather difficult road and ran along the face of the spurs from the high range to the east. The path ran thus in a general southerly direction for 2 miles to Nanu, which is a square enclosure of stone walls with the dwelling houses on the river side. The enclosure is about 50 yards square, is roughly put together but well situated on a high, flat plateau with fields of khasil crops round it. Umar Khan is the son of Jangi Khan who was killed (previously to Sir Neville Chamberlain's expedition) in the raid on Tank, which was so gallantly repulsed by the small party of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, and whose stronghold, Jangi Khan Kot, was destroyed in the former expedition. Here, after a short halt, the column again moved off to Barwand where the camp and the rest of the force had arrived. The route lay in a south-easterly direction, and after crossing the plateau of about  $\frac{1}{2}$  a mile in extent on which Nanu is situated, the path wound down the fall of the hill by a stony and rather precipitous route on to the flat, open Ragza opposite Barwand on the left bank of the Shahor nullah. The Ragza is about 2 miles wide before it rises up into the craggy and precipitous range which we had first descended. From the summit of the plateau of Nanu the camp could be easily seen, and the rain having cleared off, a fine view of the valley was obtained. Near Barwand the country on both banks of the Shahor is more open than any we had yet seen, and studded up in fine open glens, especially on the right bank of the nullah.

The ordinary route along the bed of the Shahor from Tarun China to Barwand was reported easy and good for all arms and baggage, and the distance about 6 miles. The camp was up and all baggage in by 12 noon; a few shots were fired at the rearguard coming away from Tarun China and also at a reconnoitring party of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, one sowar of whom was slightly wounded.

During the night several shots were fired at the pickets but without doing any damage. The Waziris employed in bringing the dāk were accidentally fired upon by one of our sentries and one of them slightly wounded. The dāks were however recovered in the morning.

*Wednesday, 27th April.* The force marched from Barwand towards Nari Ragza; the route lay across the plain on which camp had been pitched for about half a mile, when it dropped into the bed of the nullah and continued therein in a north-westerly direction to Jangi Khan Kot, a distance of about 3 miles. The high flat plateau on the left bank stretched back to a distance of about a mile, where it was bounded by a high, rocky range of hills; one or two patches of cultivation (kachis) were passed. After about 2 miles from Barwand the bed of the nullah began to get narrower and the country generally

Kundi Ghar.

much more confined and close; the spurs from the high peak of Kundi Ghar running down towards the nullah on the right bank and extending in flat, high stony plateaus which extended to the nullah bed into which they abruptly ended by high precipitous cliffs. The country on the right bank was also much like that on the left, with the difference that the range of hills bordering the nullah was not so high and regular as Kundi Ghar. The nullah banks, however, were equally high and precipitous and intersected with ravines up towards the hills.

Jangi Khan Kot is a ruined building which was destroyed by Sir Neville Chamberlain in 1860, and has not been repaired; it lies perched up on the cliff on the left bank of the nullah.

From here the nullah takes a turn in a westerly direction which it continues generally to the Nari Tangi, a distance of 5 miles; the banks of the nullah, as above described, are high and precipitous, several small patches of khasil cultivation are passed in the bed of the stream and above the high cliffs; bordering the stream stretch flat plateaus, stony and covered with ilex and olive, of various extent, to the foot of the high hills on each side. A few caves in the nullah banks were passed and the villages of Abbas Kheyl and Para Khel on the right bank. Between these two villages, which are both small and were deserted, we passed some irrigation, tunnels and channels on the left bank, which must have taken much labour to make and showed considerable skill in their construction. These had been dug to carry the water into some kachi on rather a higher level than the bed of the stream where they were made. At Para Khel there was a good deal of khasil cultivation,

Nari.

and the advanced party having reported the road through the Nari Tangi impracticable for laden animals, and the road turning it on the left bank having been found impracticable also without considerable repairs, it was decided to pitch camp near the above village at the Nari Ragza or high plateau east of the Nari Tangi. Accordingly, the transport animals, cavalry, head-quarters, artillery, sappers, 1st Sikhs, 4th Sikhs, 2nd Punjab Infantry, 32nd Pioneers were encamped on the kachis along the bed of the stream, and the 1st Punjab Infantry on the high ragza on the right bank, while the 2nd brigade, consisting of the



3rd, 4th and 6th Punjab Infantry camped on the high ground above the nullah on the right bank. Pickets were posted all round on the high ground, and the sappers and pioneers went out under Major Pierson, Commanding Royal Engineer, to make the road turning the Nari Tangi on the left bank. The camels were sent out to graze on the high ragza on the left bank; and the camp was pitched, and all in, including the rearguard, early in the afternoon.

The Nari Tangi was by far the narrowest and most difficult place in the route we had come across so far, it is with difficulty that a horseman can ride through it, and it would have taken much labour and a great deal of mining and blowing up to make this a practicable road for baggage animals. The Tangi is not more than 5 to 10 yards wide, but is of no extent. The turning route was found passable with a certain amount of labour expended on it, and the sappers and pioneers made an excellent zigzag up the left bank of the nullah up to the ragza on that side and also across it to the slope of the hill round which the path lay by the evening. It was decided to halt here on the 28th to make the road on to the Nari Ragza. Two or three shots were fired during the night by the pickets.

*Thursday, 28th April.*—The repairs to the road were carried on most successfully, and working and covering parties from each regiment were sent out early in the morning to carry on the work. A report was brought in at about 7 A.M. that parties of Waziris were firing from longish ranges at the working parties, and reinforcements and No. 4 Hazara Mountain Battery (3 guns) were sent out; a good deal of shooting took place and the guns also fired a few rounds and kept the Waziris at a respectful distance, and work was continued without interruption. The guards protecting the camels out grazing were also fired at, and some skirmishing took place, when the Waziris retired, leaving one man dead and one wounded behind them. They lost a few men also, it is supposed in their attack on the working parties; our casualties there were 2 men of the 6th Punjab Infantry wounded.

It came on to rain about 2 P.M. and rained heavily all the afternoon till night, when there was a slight cessation. The working and covering parties and the reinforcement sent out all got very wet, and the prospect of being able to move on the next day did not look bright. The route from camp Nari Tangi to Nari Ragza as constructed by the engineers, and which, as above described, emerges from the nullah by a zigzag up the left bank and then over the flat, high ground and round the hill (in a north-westerly direction) which forms the eastern side of the Nari Tangi running through a gorge, over a slight saddle back and then turns south-west and through a rather dense mass of ilex and olive bushes and down again by a zigzag into the Shabor nullah again. On the northern side of the Nari Tangi the nullah breaks up into two streams which border the south, east and west sides of the Nari Ragza with steep, precipitous banks; up the south side of the ragza the engineers constructed a capital zigzag road up to the ragza which, when reached, proved an excellent camping ground, flat, open, and spacious, and though stony, covered with a certain amount of grass. Ilex and olive bushes grew along the edges and down the precipitous sides of the nullahs, and all three sides of the ragza were sufficiently distant from the hill on the right bank of the stream to prevent its being commanded by them. Water was abundant in the nullahs below.

*Friday, 29th April.*—The morning broke grey and misty, but the sun drove away the few remaining clouds and fortunately the day proved fine and there was nothing to delay the march ordered to Nari Ragza. The wind, however, was blowing very cold, and altogether there had been a very marked difference in the climate the last few days as we had ascended to higher regions. The road was found to be quite practicable for the camels and not injured in any way by the heavy rains of the previous night. The force moved out at about 6 A.M., and on turning the hill on the ragza above the left bank about a mile and a half from the last camp, clusters of Waziris were seen occupying the same positions as on the previous day on the far bank of the nullah and on the hills to the north, ready to annoy working parties or harass the line of march and baggage, if opportunity offered. A strong picket of them also were seen holding a small hillock at the extreme end of the Nari Ragza and more were seen on the high spurs and ridges. The advanced troops were pushed on quickly and drove off those occupying the ragza and the near hills. Pickets from the 1st Punjab Infantry were thrown out flanking the line of road and arrangements for laying out the camp on the Nari Ragza were carried out. When the troops had assembled on the new camping ground, and left the road clear for the line of baggage, the

Shane Wano.

advanced troops were pushed on beyond the Nari Ragza up the bed of the Shane Wano ravine along which our line of march for the following day lay. The heights on each side were crowned and cleared and the pioneers and sappers set to work at once to repair the road which descended from the northern end of the Nari Ragza by a steepish descent into the Shane Wano ravine, along the bed of which a stream of bright clear water ran; the path wound along the narrow bed of the ravine with steep, but easily crowned heights, on either side, culminating on the east in the Wajeh Ghur hill and on the west side in

Wajeh.  
Gawra.

a high point called Gawra, these two being connected near the head of the Shane Wano ravine by a saddle called the Shane Wano Kotal, height 5,850 feet.

The road along the bed of this ravine was so narrow, and in places so difficult, that even after extensive repairs and improvements made to it by the pioneers and sappers, camels and mules could only travel along it in single file. The reconnaissance was pushed on to the top of the kotal and down the opposite side into a ravine; along the bed of this a very good path leads towards Kundi Wam and so on to Wam. The pioneers and sappers completed the repairs to the road as far as the ascent to the kotal by the evening when the covering parties were withdrawn and all returned to camp on the Nari Ragza. Skirmishing with the Waziris was carried on more or less all day at long ranges. The Nari Ragza forms an excellent position for a camp; it is sufficiently distant from the hills to be out of matchlock fire, and is a high, flat plateau, with steep cliffs on all sides, which form a natural defence. There is a certain amount of camel grazing along the edges of these cliffs. The objection to it is the height it is above the water and the difficulty its ascent presents to laden animals. A capital zigzag road had been constructed up to it from the nullah bed by the sappers and pioneers, but in spite of the improvements made to the entire road from the last camp to Nari Ragza, owing to the difficulties of the ascents and descents, and the delay in starting off the baggage on account of the previous night's rain, the last of the camels and the baggage guard, consisting of the 4th Sikhs did not get into camp till past midnight, and the flanking pickets of the 1st Punjab Infantry were also out

till a late hour. A few shots were fired into camp and at the pickets from the western side of camp from across the ravine, but without doing damage. The Shahor stream after passing through the Nari Tangi runs direct to Kundi

Kundi Wam.  
Gawra.

Wam behind the Gawra hill, and had a route along its bed been practicable for animals this would have been our shortest and most direct route to our next camp. It was however reported very difficult and much more impracticable than the Shane Wano route, so the latter was decided on. The Waziris, however, use the Shahor bed route and even take their hill camels along it laden it is said. This route if passable would no doubt save several miles.\*

\* 3 or 4.

There was some firing at the pickets during the night on the west side of camp, but without doing any damage.

*Saturday, 30th April.*—The force started as usual at 5 A.M.; the whole of the troops, with the exception of the sappers, pioneers and cavalry, and a small advanced party, were distributed on each flank of the Shane Wano ravine to crown the heights on either side, while the above-named troops were pushed through to be immediately followed by the string of baggage. Parties of Waziris were seen on the heights on each side, and a few shots were exchanged as the heights were being crowned; and the party to move along the nullah bed were then pushed on, followed by the line of baggage. Some delay was caused by the extensive repairs required to the road from the ravine to the top of the Shane Wano Kotal, and in consequence the baggage did not actually move off till a later hour than usual. The steep descent into the Shane Wano nullah from the Nari Ragza, and the very narrow and difficult path along its narrow bed caused endless delays, the consequence being that the first camel did not reach the top of the Shane Wano Kotal, a distance of 3 miles only from the camp at Nari Ragza, till 4 P.M. and the last camel and the rear guard consisting of the 4th Punjab Infantry did not leave the ground till nearly 8 o'clock in the evening. It may be imagined easily, therefore, that the difficulties of the route along the Shane Wano ravine and the descent into it and the ascent out of it again on to the kotal were increased ten fold by the darkness, and a delay in the rear guard reaching the next camp at Kundi Wam was inevitable.

The route taken by the force has been described in yesterday's diary as far as the foot of the Shane Wano Kotal, from the top of which the view across the Khysor valley, inhabited by the Nana Kheyl section was extensive; one of the villages in this valley could be seen rising over the crest of the low, flat hills on the opposite side of the ravine.

From the foot of the Shane Wano Kotal the route runs in a westerly direction along the sandy bed of a ravine; the road is easy and capital going, and a very refreshing relief after the stony bed of the Shahor and the rough road from Nari Ragza; this ravine is bordered on the north by the low, undulating range which separates it from the Khysor valley, which is easily crowned, and on the south side by the spurs and lower underfeatures from the Gawra hill which are also easily crowned, and makes this portion of the route into Kundi Wam easy and good.

The road runs thus for about 3 miles along the bed of the nullah till the village of Kundi Wam on the north (left) bank is reached, here this ravine joins the Shahor stream which, as before described, runs round behind the Gawra hill; another branch also runs down into it from the north (and the

direction of Wano) the Shahor\* itself runs through the Khysor valley. Near the village of Kundi Wam a fine stretch of cultivated land borders the banks of the Shahor and this belt of cultivation stretches up the banks of this stream and is known as the Khysor valley and is dotted with villages. The names of the principal ones of which are—

\* The stream is not really called the Shahor any longer, the fact being that it bore that name only in the early part of our route as far as Tarun China.

1. Kundi Wam.
2. Wonzaiai.
3. Musa Kot.
4. Ghaza.
5. Kajal.

6. Kot Jokeh Khan, Nekzan Kheyl.
7. Jumai.
8. Ali Mahomed.
9. Kalandar.
10. Jarif Khan Sher Kai.

of these the largest is Kot Jokeh Khan. The valley† which runs up towards the Pir Ghal range in a north-westerly direction, is fertile and picturesque, and the above-named villages seem substantial and well-to-do; they nearly all possess one or two towers and are now surrounded with bright green khasil crops, and these are the first villages we have come across in Waziri land deserving of the name. The climate is perfect and delightfully cool in tents during the day, and at night one is glad of every available blanket. The crops of khasil are much more backward than lower down the Shahor valley, in fact they were only just springing into ear. The surrounding hills are covered with ilex and olive, and in the distance at the other end of the Khysor valley the Pir Ghal range is covered with pines, and on the peak of Pir Ghal the snow lies still in some quantity. The road leading into Wano from the Khysor valley seems easy; it runs for the first part as far as could be seen over the low undulating plateau to the north-west of Kundi Wam, and over a kotal at the foot of Kundi Ghar into the Wano country; the whole of the drainage from the western side of this kotal and Kundi Ghar runs, it is said, into the Gumal, while all on the east runs into the Shahor and forms the Zam stream.

The camp was formed on the cultivated land near the village of Manzara on the right bank of the stream, with a low range on the west side of camp on which *picquets* were placed. Roads up to camp from the bed of the stream were constructed by the Sappers and the whole of the mules and many of the camels were in camp before sunset, as also was the leading brigade. The rear guard, however, were not in camp till 2 A.M. On the morning of the 1st May a party of Waziris had taken up a position on the Waje Ghar above the Shane Wano Kotal, and these had all day been exchanging shots with our flankers and pickets at long ranges; these came down closer towards night and with evident intention of annoying the long line of baggage and rear guard. The 4th Punjab Infantry, however, were quite on the alert and ready for these tactics; after the last camel had moved down from the Nari Ragza just as it was getting dark, a few Waziris with a drum and loud shouts descended on what they imagined was the unprotected end of the line of baggage; these were allowed to come on to within about 20 paces, when a well delivered volley from a small rear guard under Lieutenant Daniell silenced their shouts, and the drum was not again heard; it is thought that several must have been hit in this little onslaught on their part, for no further annoyance in the pass itself was encountered, and only firing was kept up at the flankers. At the Shane



Wano Kotal again Captain Lewis of the 4th Punjab Infantry detailed a few men to lie down under cover of the edge of the slope after the rest of the rear guard had passed on to catch any Waziris who might be following up the rear. They had not long taken up their position when voices were heard, and one Waziri talking said to another "we ought to be very close to the camels now" and they moved up to the lately vacated picket fire of the 4th Punjab Infantry on the top of the kotal by the light of which they were easily visible, and a second well directed volley from the few men remaining behind told with excellent effect. No more shots were fired at the rear guard after this.

*Sunday, 1st May.*—It had been intended to send a party under a strong escort of about 700 infantry up to the top of Kundi Ghar for purposes of survey, &c. Owing to the late hour, however, of the arrival in camp of the rear guard this was postponed till the next day (2nd) and it was decided to halt at Kundi Wam and give men and animals a day's rest, which both had fairly earned and much required. The marches had not been long, but the route all along had been beset with exceptional difficulties and the long line of baggage entailed by our having to carry all supplies with us, caused a very large proportion of the force to be constantly on flanking and rear guard duties, added to which the constant marching through water and the heavy rain on the 26th and 28th April, and the increasing cold, which at night was really severe, had sent a good many men to hospital (the number having gone up to a little over a hundred). Up to date our casualties were 4 men wounded.

\* 200 1st Sikhs.

200 4th Sikhs.

50 1st Punjab Infantry.

50 2nd Punjab Infantry.

50 3rd Punjab Infantry.

50 4th Punjab Infantry.

50 6th Punjab Infantry.

Arrangements were made for an expedition to the top of Kundi Ghar, and with this view a party composed as marginally noted\* under the command of Major Rivaz, 4th Sikhs, was ordered to be ready at 3.45 A.M. Guides were provided by Major Macaulay.

*Monday, 2nd May.*—At a little after the hour appointed, the party assembled and many officers volunteered, besides those with the parties from each regiment, and the survey and signalling officers. The road lay, after crossing the small stream to the south of camp, over a little shoulder of a spur and then along the stony bed of a ravine which gradually ascending joined a larger and broader ravine up the sandy bed of which the party ascended. There was abundance of water, and at about 3 miles from Kundi Wam we passed Kiri Roga where there is water, and where there is usually an encampment of Waziris who go up there and to the other slopes of Kundi Ghar during the summer months. The hill sides were densely covered with ilex bushes. The ascent so far and for the first 5 miles from Kundi Wam is decidedly easy, though the walking is rough and over the stony bed of a mountain stream for the most part, in which ran a bright clear stream of deliciously cold water. About 5 miles from Kundi Wam the road left the bed of the nullah and rose up the hillside to the crest of a saddle back called "Peza," the distance being up to this point about 7 miles. On the further side of this, a little way down the hill there is a supply of excellent water from a mountain spring, and here the party halted for nearly an hour, while the soldiers refilled their water bottles and the pakals which were brought up by mules. Up to this point we had ascended about 700 feet from Kundi Wam, and the top of Kundi Ghar could be seen in front of us and seemed but a very short distance off; however, we had yet to go up 1,300 feet, and the hard route was just beginning. From the "Peza" we struck up a spur which rose up rather perpendicularly and gained the crest line along which we gradually ascended till the highest point, about 3 miles on, was

reached. It was extremely hard-going for the mules and officers' ponies, few of which latter were not more or less cut about by the sharp edges of rocks they had to go over. The whole of the hills and spurs running down from Kundi Ghar and the hill itself were thickly wooded with ilex, the only other shrubs being a few camel thorns on the top; there were several bare patches of grass which abounded with orchids, clover, and different kinds of grasses, and under the shade and protection of the overgrowing boughs of the ilex were clusters of violets of delicious scent, though inferior in colour to the English violet—much paler. We lit fires and made an excellent breakfast on the top, while the Survey officer, Captain Martin, set up his plane table and also his theodolite and commenced work. Just about a mile from the highest point, but still along the crest line, Lieutenant Blunt of the Engineers set up his heliograph on Sheikh Bâdin, a distance of about 60 miles in a direct line, which was in-

\* Heliographic communication was also established with camp Kundi Wam from a small ridge on the south side of it.

stantly responded to by Lieutenant O'Mealy, who had been detached there for signalling work.\* A number of State messages were sent off and replies received.

Fortunately, on the top of Kundi Ghar there was no wind to speak of, and it was very enjoyable to sit baking in the sun and spying into lands which had not been so extensively viewed by English eyes. There was little or no haze too, and the view all round was most extensive and grand. The bare barren hills being here and there relieved by patches of light green khasil cultivation and streams of water winding through the narrow and precipitous passes. To the west we could see the rugged top of the Takht-i-Suliman and the country inhabited by the Shirânîs. Under it again the Zhob valley with its broad stream and the Kasma Kuch which is a favourite halting place for powindah caravans coming down and up the general route to Ghazni and Kabul. More to the north-west could be just seen a short piece of the Gumal valley, the remainder and broader part being hid by a range of rugged hills. Nearer to us lay the small valley of Spin, so-called from its white appearance; it was evidently covered with patches of saltpetre, it appeared arid and is uninhabited, more to the north lay the fertile valley of Wano inhabited by the Derwesh Kheyl of the Ahmedzai section. To the western end of this valley (which appeared about 20 miles long by about 15 broad) numerous villages, well built with towers and surrounded by cultivation; it is probable that the inhabitants of Wano have selected this end of the valley to live in, as it is furthest from the Mahsuds, whose depredations they complain bitterly of, and it is said they wish much for a British occupation of the valley. There is no doubt that if this were possible, it would also command the general route to Ghazni. The Wano Toi, a good stream of water, apparently runs right down the centre of the valley and then turns to the west and round a range of hills and joins the Gumal. The names of the villages in Wano and the extent of cultivation has been ascertained by Major Macaulay and is recorded in his office. The far hills towards Ghazni could just be seen dimly here and there, where there were prominent peaks.

Further to the north one comes again into Mahsud land, and could see the Khysor valley inhabited by the Nana Kheyls, and on further the Sperkai valley inhabited by Ahmedzais, both dotted with villages and cultivation, and the latter running up towards the north to the Pir Ghal range.

To the east of north beyond an entangled mass of high rugged hills, which form the Mahsud country, could be seen, the snow peaks of the Safed

Koh above the Kurram valley, and Sika Ram, the highest peak could be easily distinguished. The snow on the Safed Koh seemed unusually late and nearly reached to the foot of the range, this is accounted for probably from the unusual amount of rain we had had late in the season this year. Nearly due east could be seen Sheikh Bûdin and the plains of the Deraajat and the Bannu districts, and nearer again the valley of the Shahor, with all the halting places the force had camped on from Jhandola to Barwand, also the valley of the Danawat ravine running up towards the range separating the Shahor stream from the Gumal. The jagged peak of Girni Sir stood out on the sky line and behind it the misty plains of Dera Ismail towards the Indus, which, however, could not be seen. The ascent to Kundi Ghar had taken from  $\frac{1}{4}$  to 5 A.M. till 5 minutes to 10 A.M. of which we had halted one hour, we remained on the peak till 2-30 P.M. when the descent was commenced, this was perhaps harder for the ponies and mules than the climb up, but all arrived safely into camp long before dark after a very enjoyable trudge of about 20 miles there and back.

During the day a reconnaissance up the Shahor stream; the Nari route, was made. A path ran along the right bank, but it was difficult and impassable for baggage animals and would take 3 or 4 days to construct, it would, however, save a very long round from Nari Ragza to Kundi Wam; the distance by this route being but 3 miles, while our route was 7 miles.

Some of the cavalry accompanied by 2 companies 4th Punjab Infantry, went up the Khysor valley in charge of the mules and camels to cut khasil; a few shots were fired at them without result.

*Tuesday, 3rd May.*—The force marched from Kundi Wam with the intention of only going as far as Tor Wam, a distance of about 4 miles up the Khysor valley in a northerly direction. The route lay up the bed of the stream and was easy-going; the water had to be crossed and recrossed several times, but was not deep, and the bed was more sandy and less full of round boulders, so trying to march over. The following Nana Kheyl villages were passed:—Musa Kot, Ghaza, Kajal, Kot Jokeh Khan, Kalandar, Jumai and Ali Mahomed, all these were deserted; but were surrounded by fields of terraced and irrigated cultivation. Just beyond the last of these was the village of Tor Wam on the left bank and from here the road taken rose up to the plateau, a fine grassy flat, space for an encampment divided by ravines from ilex clad hills rising up to the Wajeh range.

Wajeh.

A little in advance of this the advanced troops being pushed on to reconnoitre came into contact with large parties of Mahsuds who immediately fired. The advanced troops consisting of the 1st Sikhs 4th Punjab Infantry, 3rd Punjab Infantry, and Nos. 3 and  $\frac{1}{2}$  No. 2 Mountain Battery, eventually driving the enemy off the lower hills pursued them up the higher points, the artillery from below playing upon the enemy whenever parties collected together could be seen. The 1st Sikhs, who advanced further than the rest, went up the main spur on the left of our attack and about half way up were met by a charge of fifty Mahsuds. The Sikhs, however, stood firm with fixed bayonets and delivered a well directed volley into the Mahsuds, and as they rushed down checked their advance within 40 yards of their front, and the Mahsuds retired up the hill leaving several dead behind them. The wooded nature of the ground on which the fight took place allowed parties of the Mahsuds to come very close to our line and several hand to

hand encounters took place. The enemy were eventually driven off the highest range and made no attempt to follow up when the force retired into camp. Our casualties were 1st Sikhs, 2 men killed, 1 man mortally wounded, who died next day; and 14 more wounded severely and slightly; the 3rd Punjab Infantry and 4th Punjab Infantry, each had one wounded. The enemy lost severely, and over 20 bodies were counted by the 1st Sikhs on one ridge. Among their losses too were Mad Mir a noted malik and another influential Mahsud. The following section of the Mahsud tribe were supposed to have been engaged. All Balolzais of Memal Kheyl division.

- (i) Nazar Kheyl section of the Nana Kheyl division;
- (ii) Abdul Rahman Kheyl;
- (iii) Gogai Kheyl;
- (iv) Nekzan Kheyl;
- (v)  $\frac{1}{2}$  Kokerai. Of the Shingidivision the 6 Boia Kheyl and Karra Kheyl sections were engaged.

The camp in the meantime was brought on to a fine flat, grassy ragza, called Shah Alum Ragza; it was surrounded by ravines which were densely covered with ilex, and two excellent little hills for picquets existed on the north and east side of camp. The water-supply was procurable from the ravine on the east of camp, to which a couple of roads down were made by the Pioneers. Two villages and towers of the Khysor valley were blown up and destroyed, belonging to Nana Kheyls, who had failed to submit. A sowar of the 4th Punjab Cavalry, having incautiously and against orders gone out beyond the line of picquets in the early morning at camp Kundi Wam was set up on by a couple of armed Mahsuds and much cut about; he was without a sword or any weapon himself; his shouts for assistance brought some of the sowars of the quarter guard of the 4th Punjab Cavalry which was close at hand to his rescue. The assailants, however, having given him about a dozen cuts in different parts of his body, ran off and were not caught.

From Shah Alum Ragza could be seen to the west on the other side of the nullah the Dri-Narai, three vallies stretching up to a lofty range of hills which appeared well wooded and very picturesque. Up the northern valley of the three ran the road to Kabul, which it is said is extensively used by the Waziris; it ran in a zigzag which could be distinctly seen from our camp over the range and passes through Bermoul and Kharwar and into Chark, and so into the Sagar valley and by Barak-i-Barak and Charasia to Kabul; this latter portion is the usual Dawar route also. Major Davidson has got a good description of the route from Syad Akbar, Shah of Kanigoram, who says for a footman it is 8 marches, and the road a good one.

During the afternoon the Pioneers and Sappers made the road on up towards Kanigoram through the dense forest of ilex. This increased in density and extent towards the north and east and covered the hills on these sides, rendering it extremely easy for an enterprising enemy to rush the line of baggage on the next day's march.

A few shots were fired during the night round the picquets, but it was very evident that the enemy had been very thoroughly beaten, and had lost very heavily in the fight during the morning, the death of Mad Mir\* being especially felt by them.

\* Mad Mir, a noted chief.



*Wednesday, 4th May.*—The force marched at the usual hour from Shah Alam Ragza towards Kanigoram. As before stated, the route lay through a dense forest of ilex bushes. The road for the first part of the way ran over

the flat ragza, and then down into the bed of the stream, running up to the kotal,\* which separates the Khysor and Sperkai valley from the Badar and Kanigoram. The road was rough and narrow; and after we had passed over that part which had been improved by the Sappers the day before, progress was necessarily very slow, as the Pioneers who, with the exception of the 1st Sikhs as an advanced guard, led the way, had to make the road, move away boulders and lop off obstructing branches as they went along. The right flank of the line of march was covered by the 2nd Punjab Infantry and the left by the 1st Punjab Infantry; the ground on the right was more densely wooded and more difficult than that on the left. Behind these regiments, again continuing the flanking line were the 4th Punjab Infantry on the right, the 6th Punjab Infantry on the left, while the 3rd Punjab Infantry brought up the rear of the line of baggage. The enemy had evidently had enough of it, however, and had dispersed, for beyond a stray shot here and there at the flankers by thieves; nothing occurred to oppose the line of march; the road, as already stated, was, however, very narrow and rough, and a steady ascent to the kotal which has an elevation of 7,350 feet, and as might be foreseen owing to the above facts, and the delay entailed by having to make the road as we moved along, there was a very great delay in starting and moving along our long

line of baggage animals. The kotal reached, the

descent towards the Badar valley commenced, the descent was much shorter and easier than the ascent this side of the hills, being also less thickly wooded, and the foot of the kotal and the bed of the Badar stream was reached after about two miles from the top. Here on the right bank on two fine grassy plateaus rising up on the east side to ilex clad, low hills our camp was pitched, and very shortly after the arrival of the leading troops, the line of mules began to stream in. Nothing in the way of incident occurred during the day with the exception of a shot fired at one of the baggage guard of the 1st Sikhs; it appears the thieves must have slipped in between the line of flankers and the line and baggage; for as the 1st Sikhs mules were passing along the densest portion of the ravine, two or three men rushed out and fired at the nearest sepoy and hit him in the leg. He, however, immediately loaded his rifle and fired two shots at them, as they were rushing on him to cut him up, which checked their advance; in the meantime the rest of the baggage party of the 1st Sikhs came up and they and a few of the 32nd Pioneers followed up the assailants, one of whom had evidently been hit by the wounded sepoy as drops of blood were seen here and there where they had moved off, they were not, however, caught up and must have escaped in the thick jungle. After it got dark, the small parties of the enemy moving about got bolder, and several shots were fired into both the 4th Punjab Infantry and 3rd Punjab Infantry; fortunately without doing any damage, except in one instance. This was as follows:—The 4th Punjab Infantry had a small picquet flanking the line of march on the right, the picquet were all lying down, while one man, the look-out sentry, was standing up, he was stalked through the thick brushwood by some thieves and shot through the chest, the ball being a matchlock one and entering his left breast passed through the lung and out behind his back; he was brought on into camp as soon as possible, but died very soon after. Beyond this and the 1st Sikhs' man wounded no

casualties occurred. The 3rd Punjab Infantry who were doing rear guard had a good deal of shooting and were fired into very often but fortunately without result. A Native officer of the regiment having marked the bush from which a shot was fired into the regiment, selected six men and sent a volley into the bush and rolled over the man who was sitting behind it. Again, Lieutenant Gaitskell of the 3rd Punjab Infantry, who was moving along with the rearmost party halted half a company at the top of the kotal and hid them behind some bushes; he waited  $\frac{1}{2}$  of an hour, but saw none, so moved on down the slope a short distance to where a picquet fire was left burning, and sending the greater part of the  $\frac{1}{2}$  company on; he posted four or five men and himself behind a rock. He had scarcely taken up his position before a big Mahsud came striding up to the fire, when he got within a few paces three shots fired by the sepoys dropped him, and more shots were fired at some others who were following behind him, one of whom also was hit. The party then moved on into camp, and the last man got in soon after 9 P.M., no shots were fired during the night.

In the meantime during the day, soon after our arrival in camp, the cavalry and 2 companies of the 1st Sikhs were pushed on to the town of Kanigoram, the object being to capture some mullahs from Khost. Major Macaulay went with the party, but as usual on these occasions, the mullahs got wind of our intention and decamped. The road on to Kanigoram, a distance of about 3 miles, ran first of all along the tops of three grassy plateaus which were divided by small ravines into which the road dipped in and out and then into the bed of the nullah, across it along the left bank rising up to the higher level of the town as it neared it. The road for the latter part was very stony but otherwise not bad. The town of Kanigoram was found deserted; it is situated on a small, stony ridge on the left bank of the Badar stream, between it and the bed of the stream is an extensive stretch of irrigated cultivation rising in terraces, banked up by substantial stone walls from the stream bed up to the edge of the town and intersected by narrow lanes along the borders of which many English wild flowers and plants were growing in profusion, noticeable among these was the clematis, wild briar, nettles, and many small wild flowers common in English lanes and hedgerows.

The terraced fields which also extended on the west side of the town and ridge on which it is situated were bright with young khasil crops and made a very picturesque and striking contrast to the dirty looking town and the rocky ridge on which it is built. The town itself extends along the crest of this ridge and principally down the east side of it; though there are a few houses on the other side also and contains probably 400 houses, these are built very much like an ordinary hill village in the Himalayas, one above the other in steps. There are several strongly built towers and the main street is covered in with rafters like one of the big bazars in Kabul or Kandahar, but the roof is so low that a horseman cannot ride through and the town seemed desolate and dirty and no sign of shops or a bazar to be seen. A few old grey beards were seen seated on the house tops here and there, passively and evidently morosely looking at us walking through their town. The houses were all built of stone and mortar and a great deal of wood work is employed in their construction. The cavalry after going through the town moved back down along the fields and back to camp. On the way back, a report was received from a camel surwan that his camel had been stolen

from him and carried off up one of the ravines on the left bank by 5 or 6 men. A small party of the 6th Punjab Infantry had come up and a few shots were fired at the thieves and the cavalry trotted up the nullah but too late to recapture the camel which was successfully carried off.

No shots were fired at the picquets during the night.

*Thursday, 15th May.*—The force moved on to near Kanigoram, a distance of about 3 miles, and encamped about half a mile short of the town on a high plateau on the right bank of the stream called Silirag. The route has already been described in yesterday's diary and capital roads were made up to the plateau from the nullah bed by the Sappers. The plateau formed an excellent camping ground in every respect. The stream ran close along the western side of it and it was not commanded by hills; and gave ample accommodation for the entire force. Abundance of khasil was procurable from Kanigoram and there were some fine trees and plenty of wood about, while the leading Brigade and 1st Sikhs, Pioneers and cavalry with the exception of 50 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry, moved down the Badar nullah to the new camping ground.

General Kennedy and Major Macaulay with the 4th Sikhs and 2nd Punjab Infantry, No. 2 Mountain Battery, 3 guns, 50 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry and Sappers moved up the Badar Algad to destroy the towers and residence of certain men who had failed to submit. This force moved 3 miles up the Algad along the proper left bank passing a considerable amount

Saudagar.

of cultivatable and khasil land when the village of Saudagar, Gogai (*a Gigi*) Kheyl was arrived at. The towers of the village were blown up and the dwelling houses surrounding it were burnt, two more towers further on were also destroyed. In the meantime the cavalry horses, and ammunition and gun mules were allowed to graze on the khasil crops. When the towers were destroyed the party marched back down the ravine and to the new camp arriving about 12, mid-day.

There has been excellent fishing all the way at every camping ground almost, both in the Shahor and the Badar a large number of small hill trout have been caught by officers fortunate enough to possess fishing rods.

*Friday, 6th May.*—The force halted at camp Silirag. Nothing of note occurred. Preparations for the ascent of Pir Ghal were made. The party was to consist of 140 rifles from each of the Punjab Frontier Force regiments of the force (*i.e.*) the 1st Sikhs, 4th Sikhs, 1st Punjab Infantry, 2nd Punjab Infantry, 3rd Punjab Infantry, 4th Punjab Infantry, and 6th Punjab Infantry, the whole under Colonel MacLean, C.B., 1st Punjab Cavalry, to escort Captain Martin and Lieutenant Blunt, the Survey and Signalling Officers; besides these, however, and one officer detailed for duty with each regimental party, there were numerous volunteers for the expedition. The idea was to start at day light, make the ascent of the mountain and return to some suitable spot where the mules, &c., would be halted and there bivouac for the

Sam Kanigoram.

night, and return to the new camp at Sam Kanigoram early on the morning of the 8th.

The meet was in the nullah below camp at 4 A.M.

*Saturday, 7th May.*—Just before the rouse for the party to ascend Pir Ghal sounded, a shot from somewhere near where the Waziri Jirghas was encamped was fired into the political camp at the treasure guard sentry, unfor-



tunately wounding him in the thigh, the thief was not traced; the sentry, however, died a day or two after. The party for the ascent of Pir Ghal assembled in the nullah below camp soon after 4 A.M.; however, it was not till 4-45 A.M. that a start was made. The 1st Sikhs leading, followed by the 4th Sikhs, 1st Punjab Infantry, 2nd Punjab Infantry, 3rd Punjab Infantry, 4th Punjab Infantry, baggage, and 6th Punjab Infantry as rear guard. The road ran in a northern direction to the town of Kanigoram and then just before reaching it turned to the north-west skirting the green valley on that side of the town and up the right bank of the Piri Algad. The road was extremely stony and narrow and there was a constant crossing and recrossing of this stream as we got further up. We passed several large villages which were surrounded by fields of terraced cultivation and looked substantial and well-to-do, and were deserted by their inhabitants. We crossed over a spur into the bed of another stream up which the road lay after (about 3 miles from Kanigoram) and at 12 noon arrived at a low bare kotal running down and connecting a low hill with a spur from Pir Ghal. The distance to this point must have been about 7 miles from our camp and here we halted to collect the baggage and discuss what was desirable to do, as it seemed impossible to reach the top of Pir Ghal that day. The top of the mountain was too distant to hope to reach, so it was decided to halt as far on as we could reach comfortably that day, and make the ascent and back to camp the next. The baggage was accordingly sent on with an advanced guard and about 3 miles further on a place was selected for the bivouac. This was a fine open clearing in the flat top of an underfeature surrounded by dense woods of pine, deodar and oak; on the eastern slope of the underfeature a clear spring of water ran, which after disappearing underground for a mile, re-appeared in the bed of the ravine up which we had ascended. By 1-30 P.M. the whole of the baggage and troops were bivouacked and the latter began at once to cook their rations and make their arrangements for a comfortable night. Picquets were posted round for the security of the party, and the whole of the troops were told off to their posts in case of alarm. A shot was fired by a 1st Punjab Infantry orderly who was a short distance out with an officer's grass-cutter at about 6 P.M., he saw three men moving among the trees near him armed, they, however, apparently had not observed him and when he shouted to them to know what they were doing, one of them turned round and tried to fire off his matchlock at him, the fuse, however, missed fire, and the three men made off, the sepoy fired a shot after them, but without result, though he says the man he fired at fell and then ran on again. The next incident of any kind were two shots fired into the bivouac from the parallel spur on the far side of the water-supply. There were evidently aimed at the 2nd Punjab Infantry, falling in for evening roll-call, both bullets were picked up in the bivouac and hurt no one, they were small round jezail bullets about the size of an ordinary slug. Colonel McLean sent out some of the Waziris in camp with us to put a stop to this and explain our intention, and nothing further occurred in the way of firing or disturbance during the rest of the night. We all turned in very early after our dinner and slept as comfortably as our rocky beds would allow till daybreak. A strongish breeze sprung up during the night, but it was not particularly cold. At day break on the morning of Sunday, 8th May 1881, a strong party of nearly half the force having been left to guard the baggage of the bivouac with certain officers also told off to remain behind, the rest began the real ascent of Pir Ghal; the orders for the baggage were that it was to move back, without waiting for the return of those going up to the top, as far



as the kotal 3 miles back, starting at 10 A.M. The first part of the ascent was very steep and up the slope of a peak which was not actually the highest point, or the real Pir Ghal, this, however, was necessary, and it was equally necessary to descend on reaching the sky-line for a considerable distance in order to make the ascent of the highest point. The slope was covered with pine trees and oaks, and though steep would have been comfortable walking but for the hill pine leaves which made the ground very slippery. We went about 2 miles up this hill to the sky-line and then began the ascent, this we found covered with patches of snow lying deep in the northern sides of the hill, through this we walked and it soon got trampled down and hard and easy going, and went down a drop of about 700 or 800 feet and began the ascent again, this time to our objective point. This climb was really stiff, and about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles up the hill side was much barer than the one we had just come off, but covered with patches of grass here and there. The first man reached the top at 7-30 A.M., and Captain Martin immediately set up his plane-table and began work and did as much as he possibly could both at plane-table and theodolite work in the time allowed him; and Lieutenant Blunt eventually got into communication with the heliograph with Sheikh Bûdin, though it could be but indistinctly seen, and with General Gordon's camp at Razmak, and also with our own camp at Kanigoram, which had shifted its position in the meantime to Sam Kanigoram, a small flat ragza where Sir Neville Chamberlain had encamped, N.-E. of the town.

We remained on the top till 9-30 A.M. when every one moved off the hill and began the almost equally trying descent.

We made very few halts on the way back, the only long one being at the kotal to allow the baggage to go on, the whole of the troops who had made the ascent formed the rear guard behind the baggage, we returned by the same road we came up, the only exception being that on reaching the town of Kanigoram we turned along its western side and so into camp.

It is possible to ride to the point we bivouacked, that is about 10 miles of the ascent, and the whole distance from our camp to the top taking all the twists and turns into consideration must be 14 miles.

*Monday, 9th May.*—The force marched to Doya Toya, the junction of the Makin and the Badar streams, about 9 miles, the route lay from our camping ground at Sam Kanigoram in a general north-east direction, first over a small kotal and along the opposite base of the small hill and then into a nullah bed which was dry and in which it only ran for a short distance, rising up across a flat open ragza at the end of which, about a mile on, it again descended into a small nullah bed and up the opposite side.

Here the Badar again joined our route, and our road lay along its left bank for about a mile and a half and then descended into the shingly bed of the stream through which a good stream of water was flowing; about a mile from where we descended into the bed of the Badar, the Maidan nullah flows in on the front the north-west. The remainder of the route to Doya Toya runs along the stony bed of the nullah; high commanding cliffs and hills border the nullah bed on each side. The only narrow point is a small Tangi where the nullah bed, from a uniform width of about 100 yards, diminishes to 10 or 20, and eventually gradually opens out again. This is a point where a block in the baggage would always occur and much delay. The water has to be crossed and recrossed a great number of times, which is fatiguing to the troops and

animals and most detrimental to the shoes. The men had now been regularly marching along the bed of a stream over round loose waterworn boulders ever since they left Zam, and their loss in shoe leather was a very serious item.

Arrangements were made at Doya Toya to reinforce General Gordon's brigade with the detachment, 4th Punjab Cavalry, 200 sabres, 32nd Pioneers, No. 8 company Sappers and Miners, No. 2 Mountain Battery, 2 guns, No. 4 Mountain Battery, 3 guns, and taking from General Gordon's force No. 1 Mountain Battery, 2 guns (this latter battery being stationed at Dera Ismail Khan). These men are to move off with their baggage without bugle sound at 4 A.M. and to go on to Razmak, 14 miles, to join General Gordon's camp there. The remainder of the force is to march an hour later behind the above to Makin.

The rear guard of the 4th Sikhs had several shots fired at it escorting the baggage into camp. One *kahar* was killed and Lieutenant Tonnochy's (the Adjutant) horse was wounded in the rump by a bullet.

*Tuesday, 10th May.*—The portion of the force previously named detailed to join General Gordon left at 4 A.M., but their baggage took rather longer to get away than had been anticipated and the remainder of the force did not move till 6 A.M. The route to Makin lay up the Makin nullah through which a broad, strong stream was flowing, the bed was narrow, and it had to be very frequently crossed and recrossed, many patches of cultivation were

Najib, Marobi, Sawan Killa, passed on each bank and the villages of Najib and  
Murtaza Kas, Gunno Kheyland Marobi, Sawan Killa, Martaza Kas, Gunnokhel and  
Maliksha. Maliksha were passed on the way up the nullah. On

nearing Makin which is about 6 miles from Doya Toya the nullah first widens out considerably and then splits up into three forks on the high, flat ragza land. Between the two eastern branches our camp was formed, bordered on each side by a nullah bed; in the western nullah a good supply of water was obtainable and the roads of communication down to it and of ingress and exit from camp were improved by working parties. General Kennedy, while the camp was being laid out and the troops and baggage moving up, moved on to Razmak to meet General Gordon with whom he returned to the camp at Razmak and remained there for the greater part of the day. A few shots were fired at the picquets as they were withdrawn from camp Doya Toya but without doing any damage. The 4th Punjab Infantry were on rear guard and again laid a trap for any Waziris following up the rear guard. A party of sepoys hid behind a large rock and waited till all the troops had passed, when they saw a party of 3 armed Waziris coming along, these they let pass, and they were followed by a party of six men who, however, discovered them before coming close on to them and turned to run away when the sepoys fired a volley, and as they say killed two of them and captured also a little boy who was carrying provisions for the party, whom they brought into camp; however, as they brought in no trophies from the men alleged to have been killed, it seems doubtful if they actually killed any of the Waziris.

*Wednesday, 11th May.*—The force halted at Makin. Makin seems a considerable town (for Waziri land) and probably contains 200 houses and many smelting furnaces, much of the iron work is carried on here, it lies at the foot of a high mountain along the lower slopes of which it rises in terraces, below it stretching fields to the edge of the nullah bed. Many officers, including General Gordon came over from the Razmak camp to visit ours and returned the same afternoon accompanied by a few of the Tank force, who returned to

camp at Makin next morning. The distance from our camp at Makin to Razmak is about 8 miles, the route is easy and is a steady ascent up the bed of

\* Toda China Algad.

a nullah\* which is broad and easy going, this nullah is flanked on the west side by a flat wooded ragza which, however, is intersected by ravines; on the east side the hills are high and rounded and covered with undergrowth. Razmak is 7,500 feet high and is a fine series of rolling downs running down from the lower slopes of the Shoi Dhar. There is ample camping ground and plenty of water, but the supply of khasil appeared to have been run short, there was plenty of grass however to be cut.

*Thursday, 12th May.*—The force remained halted at Makin. General Gordon moved back to Razanni.

*Friday, 13th May.*—The force marched to Janjal, returning by the same route as it had come to Doya Toya, and from there moving down the bed of the Takki Zam, 3 miles, to a large kachi covered with irrigated khasil cultivation, upon which the camp had to be pitched, this ground was damp but sufficiently extensive for the requirements of the force. Just before

Pazha.

reaching Janjal the Pazha Algad falls in from the north into the Takki Zam. By this route the Shakto Algad can be reached and it is hoped that communication by it with General Gordon's force may be established as he has orders to return to India by the Shakto Algad.

*Saturday, 14th May.*—The force marched on to Sarimanja Kach, distance about 9 miles, the route lay entirely along the broad bed of the Zam, passing the villages of Tutteewala and Bangiwalla on the right and left banks respectively. About 7 miles from camp, we passed through the Barara Tangi, the scene of General Chamberlain's fight. The heights on the right of the stream were certainly formidable and the lower ones were surmounted by a tower which commands the entrance of the pass, the heights on the left were much easier than would be inferred from the description and there is little doubt that the position could be turned with modern rifles and our mountain guns with very little difficulty. Camp was pitched on a kachi on the right bank under Sur Rogho Ragza which afforded a capital camping ground of ample extent. The crops were cut and utilized for the cattle. The weather began to be perceptibly warmer and a dull, heavy mist hung over the country so that one could not see more than  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile. This is a sign of heat.

*Sunday, 15th May.*—The force marched to Margaband, a distance of

Margaband.

11 miles, as before the route lay along the broad bed of the Zam. The water had to be crossed a very few times and the bed of the stream is so broad and extensive that even with our long string of camels, it is quite easy to get along quickly, and the rear guard was in by midday. The camels are certainly lightly laden or without loads, so they go easily and quickly, but along such an easy and broad route long marches can be got over without difficulty. The hills on either side too were lower and easier. The weather, however, was getting decidedly warmer and the heavy haze was still hanging about. There was not a sign of opposition to our progress anywhere, and one began to feel that the expedition was over.

The camping ground at Margaband is on the left bank and is extensive and good; we were able to camp without taking up cultivated land.

*Monday, 16th May.*—The force marched to Jhandola, the baggage and cavalry went by the river bed to Dotak where the Zam joins the Shahor and so on to Jhandola. The infantry, however, after going down the bed of the stream for a mile about, turned up the left bank and through a small pass called the Sekh Narai which opens out on the opposite side in the Mandana plain which borders the left bank of the Zam. We crossed this Mandana Kuch and entered the bed of the Zam again near Palosin, but almost immediately left it again and ascended above the Palosin Kach by the Spin-Ragza route which lay over a high, flat, stony table-land, sprinkled here and there with thorn bushes, and which lead us almost in a direct line to the Chingan Kach, our former camping ground, where camp was again formed. Baggage and all men in early in the day. The weather was decidedly warmer and but for a breeze which blew nearly all day would have been very trying. The flies too were numerous and very troublesome. A heavy mist hung round the country all day. The telegraph wire had been left standing at Jhandola and an office was at once started there on our arrival. Mr. Shaw, Assistant Superintendent, Telegraphs, having come out from Tank to arrange it and also to roll up the wire as we retired.

*Tuesday, 17th May.*—The force marched to just beyond the entrance of the Zam, a distance of about 12 miles, a very hot march. We encamped on the stones in the broad bed of the Zam. Very hot all day, and flies distracting. The 1st Sikhs moved into Tank as also did No. 3 Mountain Battery and several officers.

*Wednesday, 18th May.*—The force marched to Tank, the regiment encamping on their old ground. Very hot.

1st Sikhs and No. 3 Mountain Battery marched on the evening of the 18th to Pezin on their way to Abbottabad.

*Thursday, 19th May.*—4th Sikhs and No. 1 Mountain Battery, 2 guns, marched easily in the morning to Hotala on their way to Dera Ismail Khan, escorting all magazine, survey, signalling and hospital stores.

In the evening at 8 p.m. the 3rd Punjab Infantry marched to Hotala *en route* to Dera Ismail Khan and the 4th Punjab Infantry to Pezin *en route* to Bannu.

*Friday, 20th May.*—Early in the morning the 1st and 6th Punjab Infantry marched to Kundi *en route* to Kohat. These were the last regiments remaining. The only others to move now being the detachments of the 2nd and 3rd Sikhs who are to go to Dera Ismail Khan and so on by boat to Dera Ghazi Khan; these leave to-night.

C. H. MANNERS-SMITH, *Lieut.*,  
*Deputy Asst. Quarter Master General,*  
*Waziri Field Force.*

20th May 1881.



## Report on Routes traversed by the 2nd Brigade, Waziri Field Force, May 1881.

I.—From Camp Meerean, Bannu District, *vid* the Khysor valley and Razmak Pass to Makin.

II.—From the Khysor valley to the Shakto valley *vid* Dosalli and the Shum Plateau.

III.—Descent of Shakto valley to Jani Kheyl, Bannu district.

The portion of Waziristan traversed by the 2nd Brigade is that drained by the Khysor and Shakto streams, and lies between the Dawar valley on the north (drained by the Tochee), and that drained by the Tank Zam on the south.

The Tochee, the Khysor, and the Shakto all run parallel to each other from west to east, and are separated by ranges of barren stony hills: these are almost entirely of conglomerate and very destitute of trees, but west of the Dakka Khula are often thickly covered with bushes of *ilex*, &c. The intervening ranges increase in height from north to south, while the size of the three valleys abovementioned lying between them decreases in the same proportion, the valley of the Tochee being the largest, while the range south of it is the smallest, and so on. In each case, also, the northern slope is uniformly steeper than the southern.

2. A very noticeable feature throughout the whole country are the long flat-topped stony plateaux called "ragza" (or The ragzais. rogho). They are often of great extent, and vary in height from 50 to 200 feet above the beds of the streams. They correspond to the similar feature seen in Kashmir called "karewahs," and undoubtedly mark what was once the bed of the valley. The streams have in course of time cut their way through this bed, and now flow in wide deep cut channels between high precipitous banks, the top of which, when ascended, proves to be the edge of either a stony plain (a ragza) or of a long flat-topped hill extending to the foot of the hills, and varying in width from a few yards to a mile or two. These ragzais are very seldom cultivated, and form excellent encamping grounds when water and fodder are obtainable near them.



3. Speaking generally, the roads are simply the beds of the streams. They are, however, not so bad as this might seem to imply. Except at certain tangis (where the stream has generally had to cut through something harder than the almost universal conglomerate), the beds of the Khysor and Shakto are broad level roads from 100 to 250 yards wide, with an imperceptible gradient. Although they are trying to the feet of men and horses from being entirely paved with large water-worn stones; they are at the same time invaluable to a large force in allowing baggage animals to move on a wide front.\* The streams of water

\* This was most important to the 2nd Brigade, encumbered as it was with 3,500 camels and 2,500 mules; for not only would the protection of such a long train on a narrow road have been most difficult, but also it was found that, wherever the road became so narrow as to be only a single file road, a march of 5 or 6 miles was the utmost which could be accomplished in one day.

flowing along these wide beds are insignificant, and no obstacle at all events at this season (May); and it would only be after very heavy rain that they would render the road impassable. In this report the practicability or otherwise of the road for wheeled guns has been omitted, the country not being suited to them. If necessary, it would be possible to take them up the Khysor route, but the labour and wear and tear to material would be great.

4. As the country is almost entirely destitute of grass, a force is chiefly dependent for fodder on the green crops procurable.

Kutza lands and crops. The cultivated land is confined to the irrigated kutza lands lying here and there along the banks of the streams below the plateaux. These kutas are very rich, and produce two or three crops a year, one of which ripens in May: they are a most prominent feature in the upper part of the Shakto as being the only valuable property in the country, and their importance is shown by their all having names which is by no means always the case of the villages. The crops are measured by kanals; a kanal being  $\frac{1}{8}$  of an acre; they are chiefly wheat and barley.



5. Shortly before they issue into the plains, the Shakto and Khysor tangis. The Shakto, the Khysor, and the Tochee all pierce through a narrow ridge of rock, forming remarkable

gorges† (or tangis which are almost

likened natural doorways. The strata is very peculiar, and similar in each case, viz., several narrow walls of rock, parallel to each other, standing at right angles to the course of the stream, which flows through a narrow gap in the wall. These walls (which stand one behind another like the side scenes of a theatre) would afford strong positions to an enemy defending the gorge, and just that kind sought for by an Afghan one, viz., a perfectly secure position up to the last moment and then a safe retreat. The thickness of some of them is not more than 4 feet. The rough sketch in the margin shows the formation. That of the Tochee (6 miles above Tochee Fort) is also the same.

General outline of route.

6. The general outline of the route taken by the 2nd Brigade, Waziri Field Force, was as follows:—

- I.—From Camp Meerean (on right bank of Tochee river) up the valley of the Khysor for 4 marches to Razzani, at the foot of the Shoi Dhar mountain, and thence to the top of the Razmak Pass (7,100).
- II.—Returning from the Razmak Pass, the force descended to Razzani thence along the original route as far as the Sara Mela valley, where

it turned south, ascended the dividing range between the Khysor and Shakto to the Shum plateau (6,000 feet), and descended to the Shakto valley at Wallahdin or Krách Kheyl.

III.—From Wallahdin the force descended the Shakto valley for 4 marches to Jani Kheyl (Bannu district). Total 13 marches.

7. Numerous paths run from the Khysor valley into Dawar. On these "Dawar Routes," Sheránna a separate report has been furnished containing Algad, and Nowól and Engamul passes. such information as could be gathered about them.

A separate report is also herewith enclosed of a reconnaissance made of the Sheránna Algad, a tributary of the Shaktú.

The Nowól and Engamul passes were separately reported on by Lieutenant Gordon, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.

8. In the military sketch which accompanies this report the route of the 2nd Brigade has been shown in detail. In addition to strictly military information, certain general information, more especially as to the kutza lands, has been included at the special request of the political officer accompanying the column, Mr. R. Udny, c.s.

#### I.—EDWARDESABAD TO MAKIN *via* THE KHYSOR VALLEY AND RAZMAK PASS.

##### (1) *Edwardesabad to Camp Meerean, 10 miles.*

As in Route 278, Route Book.—After reaching village of Meerean (or Norur) cross the Tochee, fordable except in rains. Deputy Commissioner, Bannu. Camp was pitched on the right bank on high gravelly soil. Plenty of good water from the Tochee up to the date of force leaving, *viz.*, 4th May; none whatever when crossed on return on 21st May. Supplies from Meerean and other villages on the left bank, which is entirely cultivated.

##### (2) *Camp Meerean to Spin Wom, 10 miles.*

Route crosses the wide stony plain for 7 miles to the Tangi Kheyl huts, where the Khysor river issues from the hills, passing at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  the villages of Sardee Kheyl, and at 4 those of Mirmee Kheyl (1 tower in Pilóds village); road good. Thence to Spin Wom the road is simply the broad stony bed of the Khysor; it is rough, but presents no difficulties to a force not encumbered with wheeled guns. Low bare hills on both sides command road at close range, but are easily crowned at 10 miles. Spin Wom, a large flat piece of ground, formerly cultivated, about a mile long by 400 yards broad. Water good and plentiful from the stream. There is no village. About 60 kanáls of green crops were obtained as forage. Plenty of grazing for camels round camp. Height 1,600 feet.

##### (3) *Spin Wom to Dua Wurka, 11 miles.*

Road (as before) continues for nearly 2 miles in bed of stream, when it reaches the Khysor Tangi (marked A in sketch), about 40 yards wide, formed by the river cutting through a rocky ridge. Both sides are high precipitous rocks, rising like walls, at right angles to the road, behind which an enemy

might make a very determined stand until enfiladed, as he would be safe even from artillery fire. After very heavy rain the stream fills the gorge which is said to be then impassable for hours, and there does not appear to be any alternative route nearer than the Kissonai Pass (see sketch).

Shortly after passing the gorge, the road ascends on to the Momaki Ragza, which it crosses for nearly 3 miles, descending again to the stream at C; the ascents and descents at B, B<sup>1</sup>, and C had to be smoothed and improved for about 150 yards at B, and less at B<sup>1</sup> and C. After crossing the river bed at C, the road ascends a hill on the left bank; the ascent is rather steep (for about 300 yards) for camels, but not otherwise difficult. In making this march with a large number of baggage animals, it is probable that time would be saved by making them keep to the bed of the Khysor the whole way from the Tangi to Dua Wurka, as much time is lost at these small ascents and descents.

The road continues along the high ground on the left bank, being the southern edge of the Drozunda plateau, and is good and easy. At D routes branch off and cross the plateau towards Hyder Khey1 and Tappiyé in Lower Dawar (see Dawar, Routes II and III). At 9½ miles pass the Marammai tower (Turi Khey1) standing on edge of the high river bank to left of road, and at 11 miles reach Dua Wurka, a collection of three villages close to the foot of some low stony hills. Camp was pitched on the cultivated land (kutza) below Mandattis village, where the crops were cut. Water from stream good and plentiful; very little camel grazing. About 70 kanáls of green crops were obtained and more was available. Height 2,500 feet.

(4) *Dua Wurka to Sirobo, 15½ miles.*

Road runs for nearly 2 miles along the ragza on left bank, about 150 feet above the stream (the latter is the best route for baggage animals), passing on the opposite bank the two strong towers of Karkanai. At E it descends to the bed of the stream, and is narrow and bad for about 50 yards. Thence the road keeps to the bed of the stream the whole way to Sirobo. It is of the character already described, *viz.*, roughly paved with large water-worn stones, but presenting no difficulty. At 3 miles pass Wurmaukai, a solitary tower on left bank, and at 4 miles the large village of Dakkai Burji with four or five strong towers commanding the approach both ways. This village stands on the high bank at the junction of the Dakka Khula, by which stream there is said to be an easy route into the Shakto Valley. From here the hills on both sides increase in height, and are well covered with brushwood, chiefly holly bushes. At the same time the bed of the stream, which has hitherto been about 150 yards or more in width, narrows considerably for the next 3 miles, being in several places only 30 yards broad, running between high precipitous banks of conglomerate, which shut out all view of the ground behind them. Here are passed in succession Mydeen Khey1 Tota, Ali Mush, and Abbas Khan Kili, all small hamlets of the Turi Khey1 standing on the high banks above the stream, and with one tower in each.

At seven miles reach Sandu Kili (two towers), where the valley again opens out.

From here a road is said to run towards Tappiyé in Lower Dawar; it is not evident where it leaves the Khysor (Dawar, Route IV).



At nine miles pass Eti Ziarat in a large grove of trees on left bank; very good springs of water. At  $10\frac{1}{2}$  miles reach the large village of Musakki (two towers) with rich cultivated lands around it, and occupying a strong position at a bend in the valley.

The Lukkai Khula joins just above the village and below the junction (at F). The bed is very narrow for a few yards.

At Musakki two roads branch off to Dawar, one running by the Lukkai Khula, and thence over the watershed and down to Amzonee and Mullakh in Upper Dawar, and the other bending to the right and going towards Tappiyé in Lower Dawar (Dawar, Routes IV and V). The village of Asad Kheyl stands on a high bank near the junction of the Lukkai Khula. At  $13\frac{1}{2}$  reach Sirobo, "the head of the water," so called because the stream which has previously been running beneath the surface here reappears.

The ground for encamping is very bad, being little more than the slopes of a stony hill covered with holly bushes. There is also a small piece of flat ground available near G when the crops are cut. (The kutza on which General Chamberlain encamped has been washed away). There is ground on the high plateau on the right bank; but the ascent would be difficult and steep. Water good and plentiful from the stream. Plenty of grazing for camels. Fifty kanáls of green crops were obtained. No other supplies. Height 4,200 feet.

(5) *Sirobo to Razzani, 11 miles.*

Throughout this march also the road follows the bed of the stream (here quite dry), and is as before described. No villages or cultivation are passed. At  $3\frac{1}{2}$  pass the mouth of the Sara Mela Algad (stream), a large valley similar in character to this part of the Khysor, and shortly afterwards the bed of the river, which is here running between large ragzais, narrows to a width of about 30 yards for a quarter of a mile, when it again opens out. Here on the left (at H) is a path leading to Dosalli, a village to the south. At  $6\frac{1}{2}$  miles Khoni Ziarat, a large grove of trees in the bed of the stream, and a camping ground of the Waziris. The water in the Khysor here disappears entirely in the sand, and from this down to Sirobo there is none whatever. From here a road runs to Mullakh in Upper Dawar (Dawar, Route VI). From Khoni Ziarat for the next  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles the road skirts the foot of the Giridi Rogho, across which a path (not fit for baggage animals) runs, which saves nearly a mile. Following the bed of the river, at 8 miles the junction is reached of the Khysor and the Main Valley, which above this point is called the Momai Rogho Algad. From here there is a route into Upper Dawar *viâ* the Momai Rogho Algad and the Lworgai Kotal (*see* Dawar, Route No. VII). The road turns up the Khysor southwards. It soon narrows considerably, but presents no difficulty; and at 11 miles reaches Razzani, a small village on rising ground above the left bank. Camp was pitched on the right bank on the ragza south of the village; the ascent to the plateau, after being improved and cleared of stones for about 150 yards, was easy and good. Plenty of good water from the stream. About 200 kanáls of green crops were obtained in all at Razzani. There was also plenty of grazing for camels. No other supplies obtainable. Height 6,000 feet.

(6) *Razzani to Razmak Pass, 5½ miles.*

Leaving the camp at Razzani the road crosses the end of a low spur, and descends again to the bed of the Khysor. A good road was cut down this descent, length about 150 yards.

Turi Khel-Darvesh Kheyl  
Waziris.

From here the Khysor is only a mountain stream. For the first 3 miles the path leading up the bed presented no difficulty to mules, but required smoothing and clearing away of boulders to allow camels to use it. At 2 miles pass Bazis village, a small hamlet. At 3 miles road leaves the stream and ascends the right bank; very steep for 100 yards; then level for ½ mile, but too narrow to be more than a single file road; then a very steep and narrow ascent for about ½ mile, when the top of the pass is reached. Distance from Razzani, 4¼ miles. The last ½ mile of this ascent is very difficult for camels; and short of choosing a new line of road, it was not possible to do much to improve it. In one place springs percolating through the soil keep the path constantly slippery. There is, however, no difficulty in it as a mule road, but it would always be a single file one: camels took nearly six hours to get from Razzani to Razmak; mules about 3.

From the kotal the ground is open and flat for a distance of more than a mile to the west of the road which skirts the foot of the hills on the east, which are rounded hills rising to a height of a few hundred feet only above the road. On the west long flat-topped ridges jut out from the lower slopes of the Shoi Dhar mountain; they form first rate encamping grounds, and there is room for a force of any size. The village of Razmak is a very small one with no supplies, though the amount of cultivated land round it is large (extending for a mile or two); the crops were thin and poor. About 300 kanals were obtained altogether, but part of this came from lower down the valley towards Razzani. Camp was pitched on the ridge south of the village, about 1¼ miles from the kotal and 5½ from Razzani. Plenty of good water from the head of the Tanda China Algad (near M) and from a spring at L. The only grazing for camels is the holly bushes on hills to east which does not suit them.

The road up the Razmak Pass from Razzani is easily protected on the right flank, the hills on that side being easily crowned. On the left flank (east) the hills are high, steep, and wooded, and are not so easily crowned. Height of pass 7,100 feet.

At Razmak the head of the Shakto Valley lies immediately on the opposite side of the small range of hills to the east. It is entered by two

Turi Khel-Darvesh Kheyl  
Waziris.

passes, the Nowól and the Engamul from 3 to 4 miles south of the Razmak Pass. Both were reported very difficult for baggage animals in the descent on the eastern side; a good road was made from the Razmak side, on the 11th May 1881, to the top of the Nowól Pass, length of ascent about 1 mile.

(7) *Razmak to Makin, 8 miles.*

From Razmak the road follows an open valley—that of the Tanda China—the whole way to Makin. The stream has a wide stony bed forming an easy road; it follows closely the foot of the eastern range of hills, which are thickly wooded, and is bordered on the west by the long flat-topped ridges before mentioned, the height of which above the stream gradually increases,

Turi Khel-Darvesh Kheyl  
Waziris.

as the latter descends, until near Makin they are 100 feet or more above it. At 2 miles from camp a path leads up to the left to the Nowól Pass, and at 3 a similar one to the Engamul Pass.

At  $4\frac{1}{2}$  pass Lungchura, a village lying about a mile off the road up a side valley to the west, and on east a few huts called Mahsúd-Waziris. Mirzang. At 7 miles pass a large and very strongly built tower, standing on high ground to the left of the road. At 8 miles the stream joins a larger one from the west, and here are situated the group of Mahsúd Waziri villages called Makin.

(For description of these, see reports from 1st Brigade).

## II.—KHYSOR VALLEY TO SHAKTO VALLEY *via* DOSALLI AND THE SHUM PLATEAU.

The route into the Shakto Valley, *via* the Nowól Pass, being reported impracticable for down country camels, the force returned to the Khysor Valley to find another way in marching first to Razzani, and thence to the mouth of the Sara Mela Algad.

### (1) *Razzani to Dosalli, 7 miles.*

From Razzani the route followed was that already described along the bed of the Khysor back as far as the point marked H, about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Razzani, where a path ascends to the plateau. Up this ascent a good mule road was made (length about 150 yards). Crossing the plateau for about  $\frac{1}{2}$  a mile, the road descends into the stony bed of a small nullah about 30 yards wide, whose course it follows for about one mile, until at 7 miles Dosalli is reached. Camels should keep to the Khysor until its junction with the Sara Mela, and thence up the bed of the latter, not only because the first road is rough for them, though a good one for mules, but also because it is a narrow single file road. Camp was pitched on the ragza close to the village. The ascent from the bed of the Sara Mela at the village is steep for camels, but quite practicable. An additional road with a better gradient was also cut. Dosalli is a fair sized village, standing on a large ragza, a great part of which is (contrary to custom) cultivated. About 130 kanáls of green crops were obtained; no other supplies. Plenty of good water from the Sara Mela stream, the water in which disappears shortly below the village in the same manner as that in the Khysor. Height 5,200.

### (2) *Dosalli to the Shum plateau, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles.*

Leaving Dosalli, the route (instead of turning up the broad valley of the Sara Mela as might be expected) strikes at once up the dry bed of a small side nullah—the Kazhakai. Wooded hills on both sides overhang the stream, but are easily crowned. At  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles was a small tangi (marked K) only 4 feet wide, though only about 20 yards long. The rock proved a sufficiently soft shale to be cut away, and a road passable for camels was soon made.

At 3 miles reach a low kotal; to this point the road is perfectly easy for both camels and mules, but is only a single file road. Beyond the kotal

the path enters a small valley and divides, one branch passing round each side of the hill marked Turi Kheyl and Mahmit Kheyl sections of Darvesh Khel Waziris. N, which latter commands the kotal, and is steep and difficult to ascend from this side. The right hand road (*a, b, c*) follows down the course of the stream for about  $\frac{1}{4}$  mile, and then turns up a very steep and rough ascent (*b, c*) to the plateaux; this route is only fit for mules. The other road (*d, e, f*) ascends the stream, passing through narrow tangis at (*d*) and (*e*); that at (*d*) is only about 20 feet wide, the small stream of water flowing over a bed of solid rock; it is, however, only about 50 yards long.

The tangi at (*e*) is of similar character, but about 200 yards long. With the exception of these two tangis, the road (*d, e, f*) is perfectly easy, and, notwithstanding them, no great difficulty was experienced in passing the laden camels up this road; the ascent into the plateau at (*f*),  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Dosalli, is small and gradual. Camp was pitched at the northern end of the plateau as being nearest to the water-supply from the stream near (*e*). Plenty of grazing for both camels and mules. One hundred and seventy kanáls of green crops were obtained from the cultivated lands near Q.

#### *The Shum plateau.*

The Shum is a wide grassy plain on the water shed between the Khysor and Shakto, elevation 6,000 feet, and the principal grazing ground of the Turi Khel and Mahmit Turki Khel and Mahmit Kheyl Sections Darvesh of Kheyl Waziris. Khel Waziris, who bring their flocks here about the month of June. [*N.B.*—Though no flocks were seen in either the Khysor or Shakto, there is no doubt that all these tribes own a certain amount]. The extent of the plateau is roughly  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from east to west, and about the same from north to south; but several broad side valleys open into it, so that the actual extent of flat ground is considerably more. The hills to west and east of it rise to a height of 200 or 300 feet above the plateau, and are covered with the dwarf oak common to all these hills. There are also a few fine large trees scattered round the edge of the plateau and on a knoll in the centre of it. The stream (marked *e, d, a, b*) afforded an ample supply of water for the whole force, and is said never to be dry in hot weather. Besides this one, the stream (marked P) at the lower end of the plain is a good sized one also, and there is probably water in the side valley Q.

There are no villages on or near the plateau; a path leading over a low kotal to the east was said to lead to a small village called Dinora, distant a few miles.\*

#### *(3) Shum plateau to Wallahdin (or Krách Kheyl).*

Mule road 5 miles. Camel road  $6\frac{1}{2}$  miles. There are two roads. *The mule road* crosses the plain, and at  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from camp reaches a low kotal, thence runs for  $\frac{1}{2}$  a mile down an easy path to a stream. From there the path

\* NOTE.—From what I could see of the general character of the hills to the east, I think it is probable that a good deal of the ground in that direction is of a similar character, and that there is a considerable amount of open and flat or undulating ground there. The descents towards either Khysor or Shaktú are, of course, everywhere steep.—G. F. Y.



crosses another low kotal (no difficulty) and descends to the Larai Nulla, which it follows through an easy tangi for 200 yards. Thence the path, still quite easy for mules, crosses in succession three spurs of the Wallahdin Ghur, and at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  reaches a kotal overlooking the small village of Wallahdin (or Krách Khel), whence a fair road descends to the village at 5 miles. The heights on both sides are easily crowned throughout, except the Wallahdin Ghur, which is a high steep hill commanding a view over all this part of the route. One or two shots were fired from it at the flanking party sent up.

The camel road follows the open Shum Valley for about 4 miles, when it turns up the Larai Nulla, follows it for about a mile, and then ascends by a fair road to the kotal at 6 miles, where it joins the mule road. It is easy throughout. There is a good deal of cultivation in the Larai Nulla, but no village.

The village of Wallahdin is an insignificant hamlet, about 9 miles from the head of the Shakto Valley, situated on a piece of kutza land on the left bank, and pinned in between the foot of the hills and the stream.

The Shakto Valley is here narrow and bordered with high hills, especially on the right bank, where their steep sides almost overhang the stream and completely command the village. Camp was pitched on the ragza behind the village, from the cultivated lands below which 140 kanáls of green crops were cut. Plenty of good water from the Shakto, which is here a fair stream; a small amount of camel grazing on the hills to the north. Height 5,700 feet.

### III.—DESCENT OF SHAKTO VALLEY FROM THE NOWÓL PASS TO JANI KHEYL.

#### (1) *Nowól Pass to Wallahdin, 9 miles.*

From the *Nowól Pass* the first 2 miles of descent are said to be very difficult for camels; those of the Waziris, however, pass down it laden with iron.

Thence to the junction of the *Nowól* and *Engamul* Valleys, at Wurzoh (about 4th mile) the road is said to be a fair one, and the remaining 5 miles to Wallahdin to be easy and good, even for camels.

From Wurzoh, at 4 miles, to the junction of the *Zinzargai* Alga, at 6 miles, there is said to be a continuous stretch of wide terraced cultivation with many fine trees and a few hamlets of the *Ummerzai* Section. The upper part of the Shakto is called the "*Shawali*."

#### (2) *Wallahdin to Baromand (or Zewar Kot), 13½ miles.*

The road followed by the force from Wallahdin to Baromand was simply the bed of the Shakto river the whole way, presenting no difficulties, and of the same character as that described in the *Khysor*. The first  $6\frac{1}{2}$  miles its average breadth is about 60 yards, afterwards from 100 to 200 yards, with many rich pieces of cultivated (kutza) land every here and there many of them fringed with poplar and other trees. They represent the most valuable property in the valley. No cattle, and but few of the inhabitants were visible. The villages are situated on the high stony plateaux overlooking the kutas, while

behind again the hills rise steeply. With the exception of Shere Ali's tower, Kikarrai Kot, and Zewar Kot (Baromand), the villages in the Shakto are

Shahabi Kheyl-Mahsúd Waziris. without either towers or walls. At 3 miles from Wallahdin pass two villages of the Shahabi Kheyls, whose chief settlement is said to be situated on the lower slopes of the Shoi Ghar.

Mirzanzai-Mahsúd Waziris. At R, S, T, and U pass through gorges, but not sufficiently narrow to be any obstruction; that at R is noticeable from its being through a piece of limestone where everything else is conglomerate.

Throughout this part of the Shakto the hills on either side are steep, broken by deep side valleys, and difficult for flanking parties to crown. The amount of water in the stream is not sufficient to interfere with its being used as a road, and this is said to be almost always the case. At  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles pass the junction of the Shum stream with the large village of Mirkanaí (or Mir Hussain) at its mouth standing on the high bank to the north. There is a fair stream of water in the Shum. Soon afterwards pass the two villages of Sandera (or Sanger), called also Kammolai and Manda Kheyl, and at  $6\frac{1}{2}$  reach the gorge marked (W), with the village of Khadari standing on the high bank above it.

Here the Shakto makes a sharp bend to the north-east and becomes much wider, receiving the tributary streams of the Shín Stargye, Nàshpàn, Bàràra, and Shista; their lower courses end in long flat plateau, on which stand the villages of Khadari and Bàràra.

The Shín Stargye Valley appeared to be a fine open one, sloping up towards the foot of the Shoogurh. There are said to be numerous villages at the upper end, and a fine open plain called "Sharkai." The

Kikarrai-Mahsúd Waziris. Bàràra Khula slopes gradually up to a kotal, which appeared to be about 4 miles off, and to have a tower on it. At  $7\frac{1}{2}$  pass Kikarrai, with the only tower seen in the Shakto (Shere Ali's). This part of the Shakto is very wide, and in the next 2 miles are situated the four large kutzas of "Dirgai Kutza," "Pezhizwom," "Matwom," and "Zhandrwom." At  $8\frac{1}{2}$  the villages of Matwom and Zhandrwom, where the Shakto bends round a small hill which lies in the centre of its course. The stream is here a good strong one for the next  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles; it flows in a very wide stony bed between high precipitous (ragza) banks which shut out all view of what lies behind. At 11 miles pass Kikarrai Kot, a large village encircled by a strong wall, and after another sharp bend reach at  $13\frac{1}{2}$  miles Baromand, a similar walled village. The proper name is said to be Zewar Kot, and Baromand only the name of the plateau. Three hundred kanals of green crops were obtained during the two days the force was there; no other supplies obtainable; good water from the stream. Two miles up the Shandzai Khula near here there is said to be the village of Pirgul.

Kikarrai-Mahsúd Waziris. At Baromand the hills on both sides approach closer, and the valley contracts and soon becomes a narrow gorge, in which (near the junction of the Khaorai Nulla) are two waterfalls. This gorge is the only point of difficulty on this route; in fact, the only place where the road is not in the bed of the stream. Here also cultivated land and villages cease entirely (with the single exception of Mandwom), and below this the valley seems to be given up to marauding bands chiefly of the Julai Khel.

(3). *Baromand to Mandwom, 6½ miles.*

Leaving Baromand the road ascends on to the ragza on left bank of the river, ascent about 70 yards long, steep, but practicable for baggage animals; it then continues along the high ground above the stream. There are one or two narrow places, but the road is perfectly practicable, though only a single file one. At about 2 miles a road branches off to the Dakkai Burj (*via* Dakkai Khula); it is said to be a very easy one, and to cross only open and undulating ground; distance about 6 miles. There is said to be another open plain somewhat similar to the Shum on or near the route.

At 3 miles cross the mouth of the *Zaindai Nulla*, descent and ascent rather steep, but practicable. At 4½ descend to the bed of the Shakto by a good zigzag road (250 yards long), made on 17th May 1881, rather steep for camels, but easy for mules. The road then crosses the stream below the 1st waterfall (V), which is from 15 to 20 feet in height. Soon after ascend a rocky spur on right bank by a road made on 17th May to avoid the second waterfall (W), and again descend. Ascent and descent, each about 150 yards, steep, but made practicable for camels, which were all brought down by this road. From the foot of this descent the road follows the bed of the stream for about 1½ miles, when the valley opens out again, and at 6½ miles Mandwom is reached.

This is a large piece of flat cultivated land on the left bank with hills encircling it on all sides. Water from the stream. There are a few huts in a side nulla (at X), at the mouth of which is a small tangi like a doorway only about 4 feet wide. Crops on the ground were still uncut on 18th May, and 100 kanals were obtained. Camel grazing on hills to south.

(4) *Mandwom to Kirkum Wom, 12 miles.*

Throughout this march the road again lies along the broad stony bed of the Shakto, presenting no difficulties. No villages are passed. At 1½ a path leads over the hills to the right into the Sheránna Algad, which here runs parallel to the Shakto for a mile or two, and the junction with which is passed at 3½ miles (a separate report on the Sheránna is attached). Below this the course of the Shakto becomes very circuitous, winding between high steep and rugged hills, and this part of the Shakto would be difficult to force if held by a determined enemy. At 4½ cross a large piece of grassy land on left bank suitable for encamping on, and shortly afterwards (at Y) pass through tangi, which, however, is not less than 30 yards broad. At about 8 miles there is a depression in the hills north of the valley, where paths branch off leading to Sin Ziarat and the Drozunda plateau; these are said to be easy distance to where they reach the Khysor, 6 or 7 miles. This part of the Shakto appears to be always infested by marauding parties. At 8½ reach the Shakto Tangi (marked Z) hitherto called in maps the "Shakto Pass." It is about 40 yards broad, and presents no difficulty when undefended ( ). Just beyond the

The Shaktú Tangi is the boundary of Mahsúd territory.

tangi, the Shakto is joined by the Khraista, a broad river bed paved with large stones like the Shakto, but with no water in it (*N. B.*—In approaching from Jani Khey the Shakto appears small and insignificant, while the Khraista appears the main valley). The Khraista runs up to a kotal between the Gubbergurh and the Bubbergurh hills, and a path leads thence to Palosin, said

to be fit for camels even. This valley was partially reconnoitred in April 1881, and appeared to be quite uninhabited.

From here the Shakto, whose bed is now about 300 yards wide, bends to the north-east along the base of a steep rocky range of hills, which stand up almost like a wall on the left bank. On the right bank are low hills, lower spurs of the Gubbergurh, ending towards the river in precipitous banks of conglomerate, fully 100 feet high. At 13½ reach Kirkum Wom, a flat cultivated kutza on the right bank. Water from the river and from a small canal drawn from it. No forage was obtainable, the crops having been already cut. A small hamlet of the Turi Kheyls lies about 1½ miles off beyond the hills to the south-east.

About a mile north of Kirkum Wom there is a narrow gorge in the hills on the left bank of the Shakto, and about a mile further on along the range another similar one. These are both called the Kissonai Pass; they are said to unite after a short distance and lead to Sin Ziarat and Drozunda; they are said to be easy, the northern one the best, and fit for camels.

Shortly beyond this the Shakto splits into a number of small channels, and sinks into the stony plain.

(5) *Kirkum Wom to Jani Khel Fort, 11 miles.*

Leaving Kirkum Wom the road ascends to the plateau behind the camp (no difficulty; several roads were cut), and runs for 11 miles over a wide stony plain to the frontier post of Jani Kheyl. The bare low hills on the right gradually die away into the plain, which on the left stretches uninterruptedly for about 12 miles to the Tochee. At 3 miles pass some graves near a small conical hill, which point seems commonly to be supposed to be the frontier. During the last 3 miles the road crosses several small nullah beds (no difficulty), which are said to be formed by the water of the Shakto in rainy weather, but it can only be very seldom that any water finds its way into them.

Road throughout good, though rough; no water from Kirkum Wom up to Fort Jani Kheyl. At 11 miles water at fort from a well inside and from tanks outside, sometimes scarce, but there was sufficient for the infantry and its baggage animals on 20th May 1881. No supplies.

EDWARDESABAD; }  
The 26th May 1881. }

GEORGE F. YOUNG, *Captain,*  
*Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General,*  
*2nd Brigade, Waziri Field Force.*

*N.B.*—A great part of the water in the Shakto evidently sinks into the soil, as, notwithstanding the receipt of several large tributary streams, it always remains about the same, and below the waterfalls gradually decreases.

Report on a Reconnaissance up the Sheranna Algad, made by Captain Young, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, on the 18th May 1881.

The Sheránna joins the Shakto about 3 miles below Mandwom. The last 2 miles of its course it runs parallel to the Shakto, a low spur only lying between them. There are no villages or cultivation in the Sheránna until quite the



upper end is reached (about 8 miles above the junction), at which point are the settlements of the Jalál Kheyl Section of the Nána Kheyl (?) Mahsúds.

Starting from the junction with the Shakto the route lies up the dry stony bed of the nullah, which is here about 100 yards broad. The hills on either side are not very steep; those on the left are the lower spurs of the Bubbergurh. At 2 miles a footpath leads over the spur into the Shakto.

There is no water in the Sheránna until 3 miles from the junction, at which point it sinks into the soil. In May 1881 there was here a fair-sized stream, but it was too brackish to be drinkable even by horses.

Up to 4 miles there are no difficulties. At that point the nullah narrows suddenly and runs through a peculiar sort of gorge. The high banks on each side seem to be formed of a soft sort of clay mixed with large rocks, and there is evidently a continual landslip going on, causing the bed of the stream to be blocked up with a mass of large rocks, over which the horses were led with great difficulty, the length of this gorge is about 300 yards.

At the end of the gorge the valley opens out again, and seems to be a level stretch of firm sand, with a stream of water flowing through the centre, but this appearance is deceitful, for there are bad quicksands over the whole bed of the valley for the next mile or more, commencing from the very mouth of the gorge. These quicksands occur in the very driest looking places, where the surface is either dry sand or gravel, and it was found quite impossible to distinguish them from firm ground. Almost every horse in the escort got involved in these quicksands, and were only extricated with much difficulty, and it has since been reported that on one occasion, some years ago, when the Turi Kheyl endeavoured to make a raid on the Jalál Kheyl by this valley, that they had to relinquish the attempt on this account. Some of the places will bear a man on foot, but not a horse.

The only way to ascend the valley is at the southern end of the gorge to turn sharp to the left, and keep close along the foot of the hills on that side (right bank). After about a mile from the gorge the quicksands become less numerous and the bed of the stream may be followed, but with great caution. At 6 miles the valley divides; one branch runs south-west, and becoming narrower ascends gradually between barren hills to a kotal about 3 miles from the point of separation. The other (and larger) branch runs due south through an open valley for about 2 miles to a gorge (8 miles). At its mouth are the winter quarters of the marauding tribe of the Jalál Kheyl, whose stronghold (to which also they retire in summer) is called Jywóke—headman named Kurreem Khan. The gorge is a deep narrow chasm, at the southern end of which the stream again divides, one branch passing on either side of a high, thickly wooded hill. This hill was stated to be Jywóke; no village or towers could be seen, but there was said by the guide to be one village about half way up the hill amongst the trees. A large number of sheep and cattle were visible through a field glass on the hill side.

A difficult path is said to lead by the right hand branch over a kotal into the Tank Zam.

The whole of the water in the Sheránna Algad is very brackish; there is, however, a spring in the gorge mentioned (at 4 miles), and on the north side of it, which is less so than elsewhere and possible to drink.

CAMP MANDWOM :

The 18th May 1881.

GEORGE F. YOUNG, *Captain,*

*Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General,*  
*2nd Brigade, Waziri Field Force.*

### March of the 2nd Column from Bannu to Razmak and back.

From the 1st to 16th April the 2nd Column was concentrating at Bannu: and on the 16th instant marched out to Meerean, 10 miles from Bannu, along the frontier road.

Meerean is a large village on the left bank of the Tochee or Gumbeyla river; and the site selected for the camp was on some undulating ground on the right bank, distant about two miles from the village.

The "front" was nearly due south, facing Mount Gubbergurh, the left of the brigade resting on the frontier road, with the rear up against right bank of the Tochee.

A field telegraph office was opened, also post office: and two speculating tradesmen opened shops of Europe stores, near the commissariat lines; one of them starting a soda water machine.

The general expectation was that a move would be made towards Khisora Pass about the 1st of May. The weather was comparatively cool for the time of year, and the troops very healthy.

The following is a brief diary of events from this date until the 2nd Column returned to Bannu on the 22nd May.

*Sunday, 17th April 1881.*—Divine Service in rifle brigade camp at 6-30 A.M., by Mr. Mayer, the Missionary from Bannu.

Camp Meerean.

A road was made throughout the camp in front of the line of officers' tents.

The General and Staff escorted by a party of the 18th Bengal Cavalry reconnoitred towards Khisora Pass, proceeding down the frontier road to Jani Kheyl (a fort distant 6 miles) and thence in a westerly direction to within two miles of the Khisora Pass. At the village of Rosaonda, two miles this side of the pass, no water was found; and the villagers reported none within four miles.

In returning, a bee line was taken direct to Meerean, along a very stony road, and the number of shoes lost urged the necessity of a large supply of spare being always kept in hand.

*Monday, 18th April.*—Intimation having been received that tents intended for the standing camp at Meerean, had arrived on left bank of river Kuram in carts, which, owing to the swollen state of the river were unable to cross, two hundred and fifty camels were sent, and the tents brought over to Meerean.

*Tuesday, 19th April.*—The General inspected the troops in marching order at 6-30 A.M.

21st Punjab Native Infantry arrived (from Kohat) and pitched their camp on the left of 30th Punjab Native Infantry.

Captain Monck-Mason arrived with ordnance park, laden on 287 mules.

Sun very hot from 11 A.M. to 5-30 P.M. The band of rifle brigade played in the evening near their mess tent.

*Wednesday, 20th April 1881.*—The General and Staff, escorted by the 18th Bengal Cavalry and accompanied by Captain Reconnaissance to Spin Wom. Meiklejohn, 20th Punjab Native Infantry, as Pushtoo interpreter, started for a reconnaissance towards Spin Wom at 4-30 A.M.

The route taken was up the right bank of the Khisora stream ; road very fair, except where it lay up the bed of the nulla, when the loose boulders made it bad "going" for cavalry.

At 7 miles, village Jangi Kheyl was reached ; here the stream emerges from the hills on to the Bannu plain. A quarter of a mile beyond Jangi-Kheyl is the village of Gūn Lalla Kheyl, on the left bank of Khisora, and about a mile further on is the plain of Spin Wom, two miles long by half a mile broad, in the widest place.

Spin Wom affords a capital site for a camp, it is bounded on the north-east by a range of low undulating hills, except at the head of the valley where they become rugged and irregular.

The Khisora Algad (stream) runs along the south-west of the valley : the soil is sandy, and there is good grazing for camels.

At the head of the valley is the actual entrance to Khisora Pass (called "Khisora Tangi"), where the river has cut its way through a high ridge, crossing it at right angles. The width of the "Tangi" is about forty yards : and though the rocks on each side are precipitous and inaccessible, the passage could be easily secured from the adjacent hills which command the pass.

The road, after passing through the "Tangi," diverges from the bed of the stream, over a ridge on to the Momuki plateau. Here the baggage of a force might be divided into two columns, one going over the ridge, and the other continuing along the bed of the river.

The hills north-west of Momuki plateau command both the road (over the ridge) and the bed of the river ; as also the villages of Lalla Kheyl and Zeyu Zeharut, both on the left bank.

The cavalry halted on the plateau for half an hour : total (estimated) distance from Camp Meerean fourteen miles.

From this point a good view is obtained of the Bóber Range (one running parallel to Gubbergurh), the village of Zeyu Zeharut, (with a tower and detached walled enclosure filled with, apparently, newly-cut crops) and the road towards Dua Wurka.\*

The "mount" was sounded at 8-15 A.M., and the return journey commenced.

On returning to Jangi Kheyl, an attempt was made to heliograph with Bannu, but was not successful. The road taken from here back to camp was along left bank of Khisora, which turned out a very bad one, covered with small loose boulders.

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\* Second stage from Meerean up Khisora Route.

The scouting of the 18th Bengal Cavalry throughout this reconnaissance was most efficient, the scouts scrambling up the hills on either flank like goats.

In camp, the news was received that five out of the six offending Mahsud Maliks had surrendered, and that therefore the chances of an advance into the country were *nil*.

Weather to-day hot and oppressive; evidently a storm hanging about. The chief amusement of men of the rifle brigade is bathing in the Tochee River; average depth of water about eighteen inches! Several good bags of quail were made by officers.

Camp Meerean.

*Thursday, 21st April.*—A heavy dust storm from 5 to 9 P.M. cooled the air, but spoilt our

dinners considerably.

*Friday, 22nd April.*—A deliciously cool morning. The general inspected 21st Punjab Native Infantry in marching order at 6-30 A.M.

*Saturday, 23rd April.*—Orders were issued for distinctive flags of different colors to be hoisted at commissariat depôt, post and telegraph offices, as guides to orderlies carrying letters. Weather hazy and very hot.

*Sunday, 24th April.*—Divine Service in rifle brigade camp at 6 A.M. by the Rev. Mr. Mayer, from Bannu.

*Cavalry Reconnaissance.*

*Shikdoo Pass.*

5 British officers.  
3 Native officers.  
120 Sabres, 18th Bengal Cavalry.

In accordance with instructions received, the force, as per margin, under command of Major Davidson, 18th Bengal Cavalry, and accompanied by the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, paraded at 5-30 P.M. on 24th instant, and proceeded to Fort Jani Kheyl: distance about 6 miles along the frontier road, arriving there at 7-10 P.M.

The squadron bivouacked under the north wall of the fort, British officers being quartered inside the fort.

At 2-20 A.M. on 25th instant a start was made up the road leading to the Shakto Pass. Owing to the darkness and stony state of the road, slow progress was made till day-break, when a graveyard (position of which had been explained by the guides on the night before) was reached, 8 miles from Jani Kheyl.

At 11 miles a halt was made. Time 5-45 A.M., and a dismounted party climbed a hill, west of the road, with the object of sketching, and heliographing to Camp Meerean. Communication was obtained at 6-45 A.M., and message sent, reporting progress up to date.

A good view of the country to the north and east, comprising the Bannu plain, Mount Kaffir Kot,\* and the Kalabagh Range, was obtained from this point. One of the chief objects of the reconnaissance, however, was to report on Mount Gubbergurh, 6,378 feet above the sea; but the hills and intricate ravines intervening, prevented any useful information being obtained as to the nature and run of the ridges and water-courses in that direction (Gubbergurh).

Immediately below our point of observation is the plain of Kirkum Wom,† on the right bank of the Shakto, well watered and studded with clumps of trees.

\* A Waziri place of refuge.

† The 2nd Column encamped here on the 19th May 1881, on their return march to Bannu down the Shakto Algad.



At 7-15 A.M. the descent from the hill was commenced; and the force divided into two parties: Major Richardson, 18th Bengal Cavalry, with a squadron in Khakee uniform, without lance pennons, was ordered to push up through the Shakto Pass, while Major Davidson, with a scarlet squadron, reconnoitred up the Karetch Nulla—a ravine said to run down between the Gubbergurh and Bober ranges, into the Shakto Algad.

Where the Karetch Ravine joins the Shakto is a circular island, or rather, what would be an island, when there is water in both streams; but at this time the Karetch was dry.

The Shakto "Tangi" (pass) itself is 600 yards from this island. It is 35 yards wide; very similar in appearance to the Khisora Tangi previously described; only the hills on either side are less rugged and precipitous. The passage could be easily secured.

The average width of the Shakto Nulla from Kirkum Wom to the junction with Karetch Nulla is 400 yards. Beyond the "Tangi," and as far as the khakee squadron went, the average width of the nulla is 300 yards.

The hills on left bank open out here, forming a small "Wom" or valley. There is a path across this, leading over a kotal, to Dua Warka in the Khisora, reported difficult and unfit for laden baggage animals.

The khakee squadron commenced return journey at 9-35 A.M., and arrived at Kirkum Wom at 10-30, being joined there by the scarlet squadron at 11 o'clock.

Three shots were fired at the rear guard when passing through the Shakto Tangi, (returning).

Orders for "home" were given at 11-30 A.M., and Jani Kheyl was reached at 2-30 P.M., exactly twelve hours from time of start.

There was a violent dust-storm at Jani Kheyl from 5 to 8 P.M.

The cavalry bivouacked at Jani Kheyl during the night of 25th—26th April, and marched back to Meerean on the morning of 26th.

As far as could be judged, the top of the hill Shoi Ghar (the first of the Bubbergurh range) might be reached from Kirkum Wom by infantry. But the ground is so intricate and irregular, in the direction of the Karetch ravine, that no very accurate information could be obtained. It is not probable, however, from what could be judged by the eye; and from the reports given by the native guides, that a party would be able to reach the top of Bubbergurh, and return to Kirkum Wom the same day.

Report on accessibility of  
Gubbergurh.

Information from guides  
about the Shakto Ravine.

The guides reported that about four miles beyond the point reached by the khakee squadron, up the Shakto Algad, there is a waterfall\* of about twenty or thirty feet. That the road is difficult there, but beyond, the valley is open, with many pukka villages (Mahsud) and much cultivation.†

There is a pass from the head of the Shakto to Makin, and also another easy road to "Shum" Plain, and thence by the Sara Mela Algad to the

\* This waterfall is the second of the two situated between Baromand and Mandwom, *vide* diary of 16th and 17th May. In point of fact this waterfall is nine miles, and not "four," from the spot reached by the khakee squadron on 24th April 1881.

† This report is true. There are many more villages and more cultivation in the Shakto than in the Khisora Valley.

Khisora ; midway between Sirobo (2nd march from Spin Wom) and Razanni (the 3rd) at the foot of Razmak Pass.

The Shakto Mahsuds raid on the Turi Kheyl villages, along the Khisora by cross paths.

Another road from the Khisora to the Shakto is by the Dakka Khula, striking the Shakto above the waterfall before mentioned.

The Shakto would afford a flanking route for a force in light marching order, protecting an advance up the Khisora, on Makin: and from the appearance of the hills heliographic communication could be kept up daily between these two routes.

*Monday, 25th April 1881.*—Two guns No. 1 Mountain Battery, under command of Major Morgan, arrived from Dehra Ismail Khan.  
Camp Meerean.

*Tuesday, 26th April 1881.*—General Gordon, with escort of 18th Bengal Cavalry, reconnoitred the hills west of camp, through which was a road to the Tochee Nulla, and the Dawar Valley. They returned at 10 A.M.

*Wednesday, 27th April 1881.*—Orders received from General Kennedy for the brigade to hold itself in readiness to move on 1st May.

*Thursday, 28th April 1881.*—Heliographic communication established with Sheikh Bûdin. No news had been received there of General Kennedy up to date. Very hot until 4 P.M., after which steady rain (apparently general), and deliciously cool evening.

*Friday, 29th April 1881.*—A reconnoitring party started at 5 A.M., and crossed the hills west of camp, pushing well up the Tochee River. They returned at 2-30 P. M. Heavy rain from 3 to 5 P.M.

*Saturday, 30th April 1881.*—The 14th Sikhs arrived from Bannu at 7 A.M.; also the 5th Punjab Infantry at 8 A.M.

The brigade was now complete in troops, transport and supplies, and consisted of the troops, as per margin.

18th Bengal Cavalry.  
1-8th Royal Artillery.  
No. 1 M. B., 2 guns.  
4th Battalion Rifle Brigade.  
6th Company Sappers and Miners.  
14th Sikhs.  
5th Punjab Infantry.  
20th Punjab Native Infantry.  
21st Punjab Native Infantry.  
30th Punjab Native Infantry.

Strength in round numbers, 4,000 fighting men, 4,000 followers, 3,000 mules, 3,000 camels and 21 days' provisions. Troops very healthy: transport in good condition, and followers well clothed and shod; nothing wanting, except orders to move to the front. The General sent a telegram to Army Headquarters, reporting his brigade complete. The Sappers marked out the ford across river Tochee with stakes. Weather delightfully cool. Music and songs in the evening, round a camp fire, in Rifle Brigade lines.

*Sunday, 1st May 1881.*—Divine Service by Mr. Mayer at 6 A.M. Helio signalling with Sheikh Bûdin. A message was received (through Dehra Ismail Khan) that General Kennedy had destroyed Mashak Khan's village on the 26th April without opposition. When his brigade marched through Shahor Tangi, the rear guard did not reach camp until 11 P.M. The General and Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General rode out to find ground suitable as parade ground for the whole brigade: found same about half a mile from camp. Weather cool. Atmosphere very clear.

*Monday, 2nd May 1881.*—The brigade paraded in two lines at 6-30 A.M.

Camp Meerean.

After the General had inspected the troops, the brigade marched past by companies. A bad "march past," but the troops looked fit to go anywhere. Working parties engaged all day, breaking up the big stack of commissariat supplies into small blocks. Brigade orders issued for march to Spin Wom to-morrow at 4 A.M., subsequently cancelled, owing to orders received from Punjab, Military, that we were not to move. The General telegraphed, in reply, that General Kennedy was dependent on him for seven days' provisions, and that the latter had requested him to be at Razmak on 7th May.

*Tuesday, 3rd May 1881.*—A hot close morning. Further orders received from Punjab, Military, *viz.*, that we were to move to Razmak at once. The surplus Commissariat stores were all sent into the village of Meerean by 10 A.M.

*Wednesday, 4th May 1881.*—The advanced guard marched at 4 A.M.,

Camp Spin Wom.

arriving at Spin Wom at 7-30. The main body arrived at 9-40 A.M. Camp was pitched, facing the Khisora stream. Commissariat reserve in rear. The Sappers went out after breakfast to improve the road through the Khisora Tangi. Colonel McQueen, 5th Punjab Infantry, was appointed Commandant of outposts. The rear guard arrived at 12 noon. Distance from Camp Meerean 10 miles.

*Thursday, 5th May 1881.*—The advanced guard marched at 4-15 A.M., and

Camp Dua Wurka.

the whole brigade was in camp by 9 A.M.; the rear guard arrived at 1-20 P.M. Very fair road; thermometer 98° in shade. Height above sea 2,580 feet. In the course of the afternoon 124 camels arrived laden with 450 maunds of supplies from Bannu. On the right of Dua Wurka (west) is the *Siparah Hill*, 3,000 feet high: ascent easy, being undulating; grassy slopes.

*Friday, 6th May 1881.*—The advanced guard marched at 4 A.M., sharp.

Camp Sirobo.

At 4-35 descended into the bed of the stream. Road steep and narrow. The Sappers remained behind to improve it. Halted at the Dakka Khula village at 5-30 A.M., 4½ miles from camp, on the right bank of the Khisora. Two towers here and a third about a mile ahead on the left bank. The advanced guard started again at 5-40, and passed village Dakka Boorj; the nullah becomes narrow here, 50 yards wide: sides precipitous. Hills covered with brushwood and trees. Bed of the nullah stony, but road very fair. There was a *Karez* at Dakka Boorj, with tunnels in the rock, showing the direction of the water-course. Passed village Ali Mush at 6-25 (7½ miles) and village Abbas Kheyl on the left bank at 8 miles. The nullah widens here, and road turns to the left. A good view of Shoi Ghar was obtained at this point, where a halt of half an hour was made, and the head of the baggage column came up with the advanced guard. Hills on either side undulating and covered with scrub bushes. The column started against 7-15 A.M., and reached village Sonder, a quarter of a mile up. The cultivated land about the village belonged to some cloth-weavers, clients of the Alikheyl-Turikheyls. The village of Eti Ziarat on left bank was passed at 7-45 A.M., very thickly wooded. This is the last village of the Turikheyls, and shortly afterwards we passed the boundary, marking the Manua Kheyl territory.

Sirobo was the worst camp we had met. up to date. Very cramped, and the cavalry had to make shift in the bed of the stream, where there was no



hold for their picketing pegs. The camels, too, had to be left away out in the middle of the nullah, necessitating extra guards at night.

Camp Razzani.

*Saturday, 7th May 1881.*—The advance guard marched at 4-30 A.M., and main body at 5 A.M.

Camp Razzani was reached at 9-30, distance 11 miles. The guides reported no water on the road between Sirobo (which means "head of the water") and Razzani; but it having rained during the night, there was a small "fresh" of muddy water throughout the march.

The road was good, and average width of nullah 200 yards. Passed through a "tangi,"  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Sirobo, and reached village Khoni Ziarat at 4 miles. There was a large space of open uncultivated ground here, covered with oak bushes (*ilex albus*), sufficient room for half our force to have encamped.

There was a plentiful growth of mistletoe on the scrub oaks, and several magpies were seen here flying about singly, instead of in pairs: bad luck to them!

Momai Rogho Nullah was reached at 7 miles, being about 300 yards wide where it joins the Shakto.

The village of Razzani was reached at 11 miles, the camping ground being on the "Ragza\*" (high, and generally uncultivated ground above the bed of the stream).

Plenty of room for the camp, except that three Native infantry regiments on the left were somewhat cramped. The camels took a long time ascending the "Ragza," there being only one narrow road. The egress from camp, too, was difficult, a deep nullah running across the front, passable at one point only.

Camp Razzani.

*Sunday, 8th May 1881.*—The brigade halted to-day. Several shots were fired into camp during the night. An infantry reconnaissance, under Colonel McQueen, 5th Punjab Infantry, started for Razmak Pass at 5-30 A.M., and arrived at the top of the kotal at 7-15 A.M. A signalling party was pushed up the hill to the left of the kotal, the General and Staff accompanying it. At 9 A.M., a flash was seen

Communication with General Kennedy.

from the highest point of Mount Pir Ghal (11,500 feet). General Kennedy sent a message, directing the 2nd Column to march to Razmak to-morrow, and that he hoped to meet General Gordon between that and Makin.

The Bozdar (Native Surveyor) took up his position on a hill, two miles to the west of our signalling post, and returned to Camp Razzani with his escort by another road.

At 11-30 A.M., the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General rode off to look for a suitable camp for to-morrow: found same about a mile and a half beyond the Razmak Pass. Plenty of space, and cool clear streams running down from "Shoi Ghar." Any amount of "Khasil" (green crops) and grass.

The party commenced return march to Razzani at 12 noon. The 5th Punjab Infantry and 20th Punjab Native Infantry between them furnished a rear guard and working party to improve the road. The Sappers also and

\* "Ragzas" and "Kachis" are features of ground common to Waziri land: the former may best be described as a small plateau some height above the stream, and to cultivate which, irrigation is necessary. A "Kach" is the low-terraced ground running down from the foot of a "Ragza" to the bank of the stream.



working parties from camp commenced improving the road from that end. The reconnaissance party all reached camp by 4 p.m. One man rifle brigade, who wandered away from the lines unarmed, was shot dead by a marauder.

*Monday, 9th May 1881.*—The advanced guard marched at 4-30 A.M., reached top of the kotal at 6-20, and arrived in camp at 8 A.M. Distance 5 miles.

Camp Razmak.

Just at day-break when the advance guard were leaving Razzani, a party of Waziris stole close up to a picquet of 30th Native Infantry and opened fire on them; our picquet killed one and wounded another, at which the Waziris made off, carrying away the killed and wounded men.

The ascent up Razmak Pass was very steep, and the rear guard did not reach camp until 12 midnight.

*Tuesday, 10th May.*—The brigade halted here; and "all hands" enjoyed

Camp Razmak.

the climate and splendid scenery. Looking eastward from the hill, near the kotal, a good view was obtained of Dawar Valley, the Tochee, Khisora, and Shakto streams, running down to the Bannu plain; and beyond that again, Mount Kaffir Kot and the Safed Koh Range: while from the north and west, Shoi Ghar and Pir Ghal (topped with snow) looked down on the valleys and smaller hills of Waziri land.

A convoy of camels, carrying six days' provisions for General Kennedy, left camp at day-break, escorted by the Rifle Brigade and 30th Native Infantry, and handed over the convoy to an escort from 1st Column half-way between Razmak and Makin.

One man, Rifle Brigade, slightly, and one 18th Bengal Cavalry, severely wounded.

Generals Kennedy and Gordon met half-way between Razmak and Makin, the former returning with his party to our camp.

The 4th Punjab Cavalry, 3 guns No. 2 and 4 Mountain Batteries, 8th Company Sappers and 32nd Pioneers joined our column from General Kennedy's.

A survey party under Major Holdich, R. E., started up Shoi Ghar bivouacked there and returned on 11th instant. They had a skirmish with the Mahsuds, killing 6. Our loss, 1 man, Punjab Native Infantry, killed.

Weather showery and cold.

*Wednesday, 11th May.*—A reconnoitring party under Colonel Campbell,

Camp Razmak.

*Reconnaissance towards Showali in Shakto.*

60 Sabres 18th Bengal Cavalry.

2 guns 1-8th Royal Artillery.

200 rifles each from { Rifle Brigade.  
14th Sikhs.  
5th Punjab Infantry.  
20th Punjab Native Infantry.  
21st Punjab Native Infantry.  
30th Punjab Native Infantry.  
2 companies Sappers and Miners.

30th Native Infantry, consisting of the troops, as per margin, started at 5 A.M. with the object of searching out and reporting on a road leading over a pass between Razmak and Makin into the Shakto Algad (stream).

The foot of Nowól Pass was reached at 6, and the top at 7 A.M.; probable height above sea 8,000 feet. The pass was very narrow, and the force could only advance "two deep." Camels in single file would have completely blocked the road. The sides of the ravine were very steep and thickly covered with oak. On the top of the kotal was an open plateau with just sufficient room for the reconnoitring party to form up in close column.

From the top of a hill to the right front of the kotal, Showali is visible, said to be distant 5 miles.

Village of Abbōh Kheyl just below; no camping ground to be seen, and the descent from kotal appeared very steep.

At 8 A.M. 200 rifles accompanied by the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General pushed on to a hill to the east, about a mile and a half from the kotal; while 200 under Captain Mein, 5th Punjab Infantry, reconnoitred down the road.

From the top of the hill a good view was obtained of both the Nowól and Engamul ravines: these two nullas join about 2 miles below the village of Abbōh Kheyl and form one stream, called the Shakto Algad.

From the top of the hill, the descent from the kotal appeared very steep (it was reported so by Captain Mein and to be impracticable for camels), and there was no suitable camping ground nearer than Wurzang-a-Ragza, about five miles from the top of the kotal. During the above reconnaissance the Sappers and working parties of infantry were engaged in improving the road from the foot of the ascent to the top of the kotal. The force returned to Camp Razmak at 3 p. m.

Owing to the difficulties of the road and the great distance between Razmak and Wurzang, the contemplated march into the Shakto over the Nowól Pass was abandoned; and it was decided to return to Razzani and enter the Shakto *via* the Shum Plain.

*Friday, 12th May.*—The brigade marched at 4-30 A.M. for Razzani, arriving at 7 o'clock. No firing during the march, but two or three rounds were fired at our signalling party above Razmak Pass.

*Saturday, 13th May.*—A reconnoitring party started at 4 A.M. toward-  
Camp Dosalli. Dosalli and Shum Plain. The main body followed at 5 A. M., halted at Monro Rogo Durra at 6 A.M. and reached camp (distant 7 miles) at 10 A. M.

The village of Dosalli is on a long narrow "Ragza," partly covered with trees; the ascent to it is steep, and the village and camping ground are completely commanded by the surrounding hills.

The Sappers went out at 3 p. m., to improve the road towards Shum Plain.

*Saturday, 14th May 1881.*—The advanced guard marched at 4-30 A.M. for Shum Plain, distance about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles, the main body following at 5-30 A.M.  
Camp Shum Plain.

The road was very bad, but the Sappers improved it, and the infantry halted continually, and having piled arms, cleared off the stones, to make it better going for the camels.

A party of Mahsuds attacked a cavalry picquet south-west of camp, but were driven off in considerable haste, and scattered by a couple of volleys from the rifle brigade and four rounds shrapnell from the screw guns.

Shum is a large plain, four miles long by a thousand yards in the widest place: general direction of the water-course south-south-east.

No water on the plain itself, except in a pool under a large mulberry tree, after rain; the nearest water is in the Naspā Zhawar Nulla,  $\frac{1}{4}$  mile north of Shum Plain, and a plentiful supply in Garion Nulla, 3 miles to the south.

No cultivation except at the south end of the valley; surrounding hills low and undulating, suitable for cavalry picquets by day.

At the end of the valley (south) the Khá Nulla runs into the Garion; and the road turns west up the Khá Nulla to Walladin Kach.

At the junction of Garion and Khá Nullas is a road to Borara (in Shakto) reported unfit for mules.

The commencement of the ascent to Walladin is 5 miles from Camp Shum; the same is 400 yards long, and not very steep. Descent 350 yards and not so steep as the ascent. Total distance from Shum to the encamping ground at Walladin, 6 miles.

There is also another and a shorter road from Shum to Walladin, fit for mules, between two conical hills, south-west of the plain, distance 4 miles.

*Sunday, 15th May.*—Advanced guard started at 4 A.M., and the whole force, including rear guard, was in camp by 10-30 A.M., distance 6 miles.

Camp Walladin.

The Sappers, Pioneers, and a small infantry escort marched by the shorter road above referred to, and arrived in time to improve the ascent to Walladin Kach. One of our infantry picquets was fired on in the morning, and a sepoy, 14th Sikhs, dangerously wounded. There was ample space for camp at Walladin, but the ground was intersected diagonally by several deep nullas, which necessitated the camp being broken up into three blocks.

Khasil and grazing plentiful. Water-supply from the Shakto Algad, the roads down to which from the Kach were steep.

The village of Walladin (Mahsud) was just below camp, and was abandoned by the inhabitants the day before arrival of the force.

Camp Baromand (in Shakto).

*Monday, 16th May*—Marched at 4 A. M., arrived 9-30, distance 14 miles: road (down the bed of the stream) good but stony. As the malik of Walladin did not come in, the village was burnt by the rear guard before starting: no opposition. During to-day's march the fertility of the valley, as compared with the Khisora, was very noticeable. The country, too, was very well wooded, and many more of the inhabitants showed themselves, the women and cattle remaining in the villages.

Matwom Kach was passed at 8 miles. This village was rich in wheat, barley, oat and rice crops; the Kach had been selected as site for camp by the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General the night before, but the whole place was found to be under water, the villagers having turned the stream on during the night. Nothing could be done therefore but march on to Baromand, 6 miles further. Here the force was obliged to encamp in three detachments: two regiments and one battery on a *ragza*; the cavalry, Rifle Brigade, 30th Punjab Native Infantry and Staff on the Kach on right bank of the Shakto; and the remainder on the left bank.

In the afternoon the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General reconnoitred towards Mandwom (the next march). There were reported to be two waterfalls, impassable by transport animals. The local maliks, and, in fact, the whole of the Waziris accompanying the political officer were very much averse to the force proceeding any farther down the Shakto: and strongly urged that the Dakka Khula road should be taken, which here branches off to the left, striking the Khisora between Sirobo and Razzani.

They (the maliks), both in previous consultations in camp and while unwillingly accompanying this reconnaissance, vehemently exaggerated the



difficulties of the Shakto route, and declared it was impossible to reach the first waterfall before night. Our intentions and plans were, however, to return to Bannu *via* the Shakto, if practicable; so they were ordered to shove along and give us a chance of judging on the practicability or otherwise of the road, as well as themselves.

The first waterfall was reached just after sunset and was found to be decidedly impracticable, there being a sheer drop of over fifteen feet. Not so, however, a path turning it over a *ragza* on the left bank, which though very steep and difficult, looked as if it could be managed. The party now returned, and reached camp about 9 p. m.

Camp Baromand.

*Tuesday, 17th May.* The Brigade halted.

Working parties from each regiment, and the Sappers and Pioneers were engaged all day making the road to Mandwom. Reconnaissance continued to the second waterfall, about a mile beyond the first. This was also impracticable, and the road was made over a kotal to the right.

*Wednesday, 18th May.*—This was the most tedious and difficult march that had been met with up to date; although a

Camp Mandwom.

start was made at 3 A. M., and the distance was only 8 miles, the rear guard did not reach camp until 1 o'clock at night; every animal however, except one mule which broke down and was abandoned, arrived safely at Mandwom.\*

*Thursday, 19th May.*—Marched for Kirkum Wom at 3-30 A. M.; the cavalry started at 2-30 A. M. with their baggage and went straight on to Jani Kheyl. The whole brigade were in camp (at Kirkum Wom) by 10 A. M.; the heat during this march was very great, but the camping ground cool and shady. No green forage obtainable.

*Friday, 20th May.*—The brigade marched to Jani Kheyl, distance 10 miles.

Camp Kirkum Wom. The heat in tents was very great, and a blinding

dust-storm lasting from 5 to 9 p. m., made things generally uncomfortable, without perceptibly cooling the air.

*Saturday, 21st May.*—Marched to Meerean. There being no water in the

Camp Meerean.

Tochee, the camp was pitched on the other side of the river, about two miles beyond the village.

*Sunday, 22nd May.*—Marched to Bannu, where orders were issued, on 23rd instant, for the brigade to break up and regiments to proceed to their several destination.

1-8th Royal Artillery, the Rifle Brigade, 14th Sikhs, 22nd and 26th Native Infantry (these two belonging to 1st Column), 2 companies Sappers and Miners, and 20th Native Infantry were railed from Khushalghur, the remaining regiments proceeding by route march.

In the above diary, little or no mention is made of the quantity or description of forage obtained throughout the expedition. The condition of the camels, when they returned to Bannu, was proof that there was no scarcity of grazing for this portion of the transport. The forage for the cavalry horses and mules consisted entirely of "khasil" (green crops) and sufficient was found at or near every camping ground. When leaving Meerean (4th May) the *khasil* was beginning to ripen, and therefore almost unfit for forage, but as the interior was reached and the higher the elevation, the greener and

\* Reconnoitred from Meerean on 24th April, *vide* diary of that date.



younger were the crops, until on arriving at Razmak the corn was barely a foot above ground. The political officer invariably sent a native subordinate on ahead with the camp color men, and as the camps were nearly always pitched in standing crops, the same were measured and assessed at once, thus enabling regiments to cut down their own forage. The Khisora is, doubtless, the more open and shorter route to Makin. On the other hand, the Shakto Valley is more fertile, and runs through the very heart of the Mahsud country; while lateral communication with the Khisora is obtainable throughout.

One noticeable point about this expedition was the very small number of casualties among the baggage animals, there being a loss of only forty camels and mules in a total of over six thousand.

The system of regimental transport officers is a good one, but there is still room for much improvement in the manœuvring of a long train of baggage animals, especially in leaving and entering camping grounds.

The picquet and flanking duties which, in addition to the long marching, fell to the Native infantry corps, were very hard: also the road-making which was most efficiently carried out by the Sappers and 32nd Pioneers.

After an unusually hard day's work, the free issue of a dram of rum and a meat ration were greatly appreciated, and if this boon were regularly granted in all future campaigns, it would, without doubt, greatly tend to improve the efficiency and stamina of our native troops.

C. GORDON, *Lieutenant,*  
*Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General,*  
*2nd Column W. F. F.*

*P. S.*—Routes from Bannu to Razmak and back are appended.

*Route from Bannu to Razmak, vid Khisora.*

No. of Stage.	Name.			Distance.	Remarks.
				Miles.	
1	Meerean	...	...	8	Camping grounds on right bank of River Tochee, or two miles this side of the village.
2	Spin Wom	...	...	10	
3	Dua Wurka	...	...	11	Camping ground cramped.
4	Sirobo	...	...	8	
5	Razzani	...	...	11	Cross Razmak Pass at 4 miles.
6	Razmak	...	...	5	
Total	6			Total 53	

*Route from Razmak to Bannu via Shakto.*

No. of Stage.	Name.	Distance.	Remarks.
		Miles.	
1	Razzani *	5	
2	Dosalli	7	
3	Shum Plain	4½	No water nearer than ½ mile.
4	Walladin	6	A shorter road for mules, 4 miles.
5	Baromand	14	Pass Borora at 6 miles and Matwom at 8 miles: good site for camp at latter place.
6	Mandwom	8	
7	Kirkum Wom	12	
8	Jani Kheyl	10	Pentagonal fort. Roads diverge from here to the Tochee, Khisora and Shakto passes. Scarcity of water makes it an unsuitable place for the concentration of a large body of troops.
9	Meerean	8	
10	Bannu	8	
Total	10	Total 82	

\* There is a shorter route from Razmak into the Shakto Valley over the Nowól Pass to Wurzang, and thence via Showali to Walladin; but the road from Razmak to Warzang is difficult and unfit for camels.